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Legislators have frequently shown a disposition to promote
equality, under the name of equity, a word to which greater
latitude has been given than to justice. But, this idea of equity,
vague and half developed, has rather appeared an affair of
instinct than of calculation. It was only by much patience and
method, that it was found possible to reduce to rigorous pro-
positions, an incoherent multitude of confused sentiments.1
Introduction
This Article introduces you to the equity doctrine of substantive
consolidation. In substantive consolidation the assets of individual
members of a corporate group are pooled and intragroup debts for-
given so that claims of third-party creditors may be satisfied from a
single common source during a bankruptcy proceeding. I hope to con-
vince you that it is the most important doctrine in corporate reorgani-
zation. Each year the allocation of billions of dollars among
competing creditor groups turns on decisions by courts to approve or
reject use of the doctrine. For this reason, I believe that courts and
commentators should have clearly stated the parameters of substan-
tive consolidation doctrine long ago. To date, however, no such clear
formulation exists; the current state of substantive consolidation doc-
I JEREMY BENTHAM, THEORY OF LEGISLATION 134 (Richard Hildreth trans., Boston,
Weeks, Jordan, & Co. 1840).
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trine is a mess, leaving courts and reorganization participants adrift.
Though few would disagree that the doctrine is in disarray, I largely
part company with accepted wisdom in an attempt to remedy the situ-
ation. The merits of this Article reside in its multiple deviations from
the norm.
My overall argument for reformulation of substantive consolida-
tion doctrine is structured as a series of observations in which I make
the following general points. First, the recent Owens Coming deci-
sions2 are examined (1) to explain why the doctrine matters to modern
commercial finance, (2) to illustrate how the doctrine works in a par-
ticular case, and (3) to provide the factual background necessary to
understand why I believe a federal circuit court incorrectly decided
the case-a mere $1 billion may have changed hands based on flawed
judicial reasoning. Second, contrary to case law rhetoric suggesting
that the doctrine of substantive consolidation should be rarely used,
my empirical research shows that the doctrine is used in over half of
our large public bankruptcy cases. This widespread usage highlights
the importance of understanding the doctrine (beyond the possibility
of a $1 billion judicial error). Third, basic economic theory explains
why so many situations exist for application of the doctrine, despite
judicial pronouncements that occasions for its use should be rare.
Simply put, we are not surprised when managers pursue cost savings.
I suggest that when managers of one corporation replace market
transactions with internal production of goods and services by acquir-
ing another corporation, in many cases we would expect managers to
ignore corporate formalities for the acquired corporation following its
acquisition as part of the cost-savings effort. Significantly, the failure
to observe corporate formalities often sets the stage for the imposition
of substantive consolidation. Empirical research finding widespread
occasions for use of substantive consolidation might be explained by
managers' pursuit of cost savings as predicted by economic theory.
Fourth, though I observe a muddle in the case law, I reason that
substantive consolidation can be supported in three situations and
suggest reformulating the doctrine based on this simple tripartite divi-
sion: substantive consolidation may be granted (1) to achieve cost sav-
ings that a court believes will benefit at least one creditor without
harming other creditors, (2) in cases justifying the application of tradi-
tional veil piercing doctrine upon a showing of the need to correct
some harm, and (3) when intercompany guarantees are present. I ex-
2 In re Owens Corning, 316 B.R. 168 (Bankr. D. Del. 2004), rev'd, 419 F.3d 195 (3d Cir.
2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 1910 (2006).
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plain how the cost-saving and veil-piercing rationales are firmly
grounded in existing substantive consolidation case law, requiring only
that courts recognize them as discrete and alternative grounds.
My explanation of why substantive consolidation is justified in
cases of intercompany guarantees is new to substantive consolidation
doctrine, however I ground my arguments in traditional equity-based
concerns over intercreditor fairness. Though intercompany guaran-
tees have long been considered a basis for substantive consolidation,
the courts have never articulated a reason for this position (and it was
firmly rejected by the circuit court in Owens Coming). I argue that
substantive consolidation is appropriate in most guarantee cases to
avoid claim dilution for those creditors without guarantees, because
intercompany guarantees should be identified as a form of double
proof (an evil that our insolvency laws often attempt to mitigate in
other contexts). I label the form of double proof worked by intercom-
pany guarantees the "squeeze down effect." I observe that reformula-
tion of intercompany guarantees as a separate and independent
ground for substantive consolidation does not in fact destroy the legit-
imate reliance interests of most creditors who obtain the benefit of
guarantees. Rather, many guaranteed creditors use guarantees to cre-
ate by contract the result achieved by substantive consolidation in a
courtroom.
Lastly, I argue that use of substantive consolidation doctrine is on
sound constitutional footing. To do so, I first find statutory support
for the substantive consolidation procedure through close analysis of
the bankruptcy claims filing process, rejecting the extant weak argu-
ments that find support for the doctrine in § 105 and § 1123 of the
Bankruptcy Code. Second (to supplement my statutory analysis), I
debunk arguments that the doctrine is unconstitutional because the
procedure did not exist at the time of the Judiciary Act of 1789. I find
approval for a consolidation remedy in English Chancery practice in
1673 (a result directly contrary to the widely held belief that the con-
solidation procedure originated in the U.S. Supreme Court in 1941).
My observations and analysis yield a reformulated doctrine of
substantive consolidation that is easy to understand, passes constitu-
tional muster, and can comfortably coexist with both asset-backed fi-
nancing and syndicated lending.
On a broader level, the prevalence of substantive consolidation in
our largest bankruptcies teaches us something about corporate form
as actually used in practice, supplementing recent corporate law schol-
arship. The signature book guiding current corporate law debates-
[Vol. 75:237
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The Anatomy of Corporate Law3-explores neither the impact of in-
solvency law on corporate form nor the special problems raised by
corporate groups.4 Professors Hansmann and Kraakman, two of the
seven authors of The Anatomy of Corporate Law, stress the idea that
separate corporate personality holds the key to understanding corpo-
rate form, proposing that separate corporate personality be under-
stood in terms of "asset partitioning."'5  Because substantive
consolidation breaks down asset partitions within corporate groups
under the stress of insolvency by ignoring corporate form, I argue that
we must choose between a context-sensitive and a context-neutral rule
for evaluating the role that corporate form plays in ordering financial
relationships.
I suggest that the function of asset identification and the mecha-
nisms of artificial personality are coequal in importance with asset
partitioning in understanding the corporate form. The mechanisms of
artificial personality are simply those features of certificates of incor-
poration and bylaws that allow corporations to make decisions
through the actions of natural persons. A stand-alone company ac-
tively uses its mechanisms of artificial personality to conduct business.
When a parent company acquires subsidiaries, however, it ac-
quires multiple mechanisms for the exercise of artificial personality,
which the parent company does not need-the management mecha-
nisms of the acquired companies are redundant. Accordingly, these
acquired mechanisms of artificial personality hibernate. By distin-
guishing the asset partitioning function from the mechanisms of artifi-
cial personality we can see that hibernation of the mechanisms of
artificial personality need not result in the breakdown of an asset par-
tition (contrary to the reasoning of some courts).
Asset identification occurs when ceremonies are performed (and
transaction costs incurred) to collect assets under a single corporate
3 REINIER KRAAKMAN ET AL., THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW: A COMPARATIVE
AND FUNCTIONAL APPROACH (2004).
4 See id.; see also David A. Skeel, Jr., Corporate Anatomy Lessons, 113 YALE L.J. 1519,
1522 (2004) (book review).
5 See Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The Essential Role of Organizational Law,
110 YALE L.J. 387, 394-95 (2000). Asset partitioning has two facets: affirmative and defensive.
Affirmative asset partitioning provides a corporation's creditors a priority claim against the as-
sets of the corporation, ahead of claims of the shareholders' creditors. Defensive asset partition-
ing limits the liability of shareholders for claims against the corporation. Recently, Professors
Hansmann and Kraakman further developed the theory of asset partitioning, noting the poten-
tial of the "unsettled" doctrine of substantive consolidation as a possible cost-saving measure in
reorganizations. See Henry Hansmann et al., Law and the Rise of the Firm, 119 HARV. L. REV.
1335, 1401-02 (2006).
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name through various contribution and acquisition transactions. Fu-
ture transfers of assets previously collected under a single name may
be accomplished without duplicating the prior ceremonies of collec-
tion by simply transferring the corporate name through a simple trans-
fer of stock certificates. Transfers of stock certificates preserve the
benefits of prior ceremonies used to collect assets under a single
name, thus saving transaction costs because the cost of a stock transfer
typically is less than the cost of the multiple transactions undertaken
originally to collect assets under the corporate name.
By recognizing the asset identification function as separate from
the asset partitioning function we can see that a parent corporation
may acquire subsidiary corporations simply because a stock acquisi-
tion provides a means of transferring assets at the lowest direct cost.
When this occurs, we find that asset partitions within corporate groups
simply may be by-products of acquisition transactions undertaken
with aims unrelated to matching creditors with asset pools (i.e., for
reasons unrelated to affirmative or negative asset partitioning).
My three-part division6 of aspects of the corporate form lurks in
the background of my reformulation of the doctrine of substantive
consolidation, suggesting when use of the doctrine is appropriate and
when it is not.
Part I of this Article provides a general explanation of why sub-
stantive consolidation doctrine is of great importance to commercial
finance. Part II shows how substantive consolidation doctrine pro-
foundly affects America's largest insolvency cases by examining de-
tails of the Owens Corning bankruptcy. Part III then looks more
broadly at recent large reorganizations, noting its widespread use and
offering economic explanations for this phenomenon. Part IV of this
Article goes behind the case law rhetoric, encumbered as it is by a
plethora of factors and tests, to extract principles that might be used
to reformulate the doctrine. Parts V, VI, and VII develop three inde-
pendent rationales for the use of substantive consolidation: an eco-
nomic rationale (Part V); an equitable rationale grounded in
corporate law veil piercing (Part VI); and an equitable rationale
6 My recognition of the mechanisms of artificial personality and the asset identification
function are not original. Indeed, Professors Hansmann and Kraakman note them as essential
ingredients in creating an asset partition. See Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 5, at 392-93.
I differ in two respects. First, I emphasize the asset identification function as having independent
value by facilitating future asset transfers at lower cost irrespective of the asset identification
function's essential role in allowing the creation of an asset partition. Second, I note how use of
the mechanisms of artificial personality are context-sensitive: active use being essential in a
stand-alone company but potentially redundant within a corporate group.
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grounded in historical considerations of fairness, originating with doc-
trines of marshaling (Part VII). In each case, the purpose is to explain
how substantive consolidation doctrine should be formulated, and not
to merely describe its current state of development. 7 Part VIII of this
Article explains why reformulation of the doctrine of substantive con-
solidation passes constitutional muster under the Supreme Court's de-
cision in Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollo, S.A. v. Alliance Bond Fund,
Inc.8 Grupo Mexicano taught us that equitable remedies must be
grounded in equity as it existed in 1789,9 absent a subsequent grant of
statutory authority.10 This Article shows how substantive consolida-
tion may be justified on statutory grounds and also shows that, con-
trary to popular wisdom, equity had favorably considered a
consolidation remedy prior to 1789.
L Why Substantive Consolidation Matters to Commercial Finance
In the Owens Corning bankruptcy case," the allocation of ap-
proximately $1 billion turned on the application of the arcane equity
doctrine of substantive consolidation.1 2 A district court judge had or-
dered the substantive consolidation of various Owens Corning subsid-
iaries to facilitate a plan of reorganization. 3  In substantive
consolidation, the intercompany liabilities of the subject companies
are eliminated, the assets of these subject companies are pooled, and
the third-party liabilities of the subject companies are satisfied from
this single pool of assets. This pooling of assets changes the percent-
age of recovery, for better or worse, that individual creditors would
7 Many articles collect and discuss substantive consolidation cases in an attempt to assist
our understanding of this body of law. See, e.g., Mary Elisabeth Kors, Altered Egos: Deciphering
Substantive Consolidation, 59 U. Pn-r. L. REV. 381 (1998) (collecting cases and articles). To my
mind, these efforts remain a valuable resource but none synthesize and rationalize the doctrine
in a manner that helps courts systematically decide future cases on a basis that I find satisfactory.
For example, I understand Professor Kors to suggest that substantive consolidation doctrine
should evolve as an overall balancing test. See id. at 449-51. Though her thorough analysis
allows for more sophisticated balancing (making many fine points with which I agree), without
guidance as to how factors should be weighted in the test, I fear we return to the state of confu-
sion currently found in the courts. In my view, the last thing we need is another balancing test.
8 Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollo, S.A. v. Alliance Bond Fund, Inc., 527 U.S. 308 (1999).
9 Id. at 318-19.
10 See In re Owens Corning, 419 F.3d 195, 208 n.14 (3d Cir. 2005) (discussing arguments
against substantive consolidation after Grupo Mexicano).
11 In re Owens Corning, 316 B.R. 168 (Bankr. D. Del. 2004), rev'd, 419 F.3d 195 (3d Cir.
2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 1910 (2006).
12 Id. at 172.
13 Id.
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receive in the absence of a consolidation.14 In Owens Corning, the
district court judge approved a special type of substantive consolida-
tion known as a "deemed" consolidation, in which legal entities are
not actually combined but distributions to creditors are made "as if"
there had been a business combination.15 A deemed consolidation
may save transaction costs as compared with an actual business com-
bination by eliminating the need to perform various procedures asso-
ciated with an actual business combination (such as retitling assets and
assigning contracts). The order benefited various unsecured bond
holders and trade creditors to the detriment of a syndicated lending
group by increasing the expected recoveries to the unsecured creditors
and decreasing the expected recoveries to the syndicated lenders (a
result that would have obtained whether or not a "deemed" consoli-
dation had been chosen to effect the reorganization).16 The Third Cir-
cuit reversed, siding with the syndicated lenders who argued that the
facts did not support imposition of substantive consolidation because
the lenders had relied on separate guarantees from various subsidiar-
ies and the substantive consolidation destroyed certain benefits associ-
ated with the guarantees. 17
Though any billion-dollar decision focuses the mind, the case has
larger ramifications. For three principal reasons, the Owens Corning
decisions hold highest significance for commercial financing practices.
First, the trillion-dollar securitization industry must craft structured fi-
nancing transactions that withstand attempted substantive consolida-
tion of the special purpose companies ("SPCs") used in those
financings.1 8 Relaxation of the standards for imposition of substantive
consolidation makes structuring these transactions more difficult and,
14 For examples of the procedure, see infra Part II ("The Owens Corning Bankruptcy as an
Illustration of the Technique") and Part V ("Reformulating an Efficiency Promotion Rationale
for the Doctrine").
15 Owens Corning, 419 F.3d at 199, 202.
16 Owens Corning, 316 B.R. at 169, 172.
17 Owens Corning, 419 F.3d at 216.
18 In a typical structured financing, a parent company transfers assets to a wholly owned
SPC. Though the financing can take many forms, in substance, the SPC borrows money using
the transferred assets as collateral and returns the loan proceeds to the parent as compensation
for the initial transfer of assets. The parent can use the SPC as the vehicle to obtain financing at
a lower rate of interest so long as investors believe that the financing has been insulated from the
harmful effects of a potential parent company bankruptcy. See generally Steven L. Schwarcz,
The Alchemy of Asset Securitization, 1 STAN. J.L. Bus. & FIN. 133 (1994) (describing the struc-
ture and purpose of asset-backed financing transactions including the isolation of assets in an
SPC). For a detailed discussion of special purpose entities, see STANDARD & POOR'S, STRUC-
TURED FINANCE: LEGAL CRITERIA FOR U.S. STRUCTURED FINANCE TRANSACTIONS 43-57
(2004), http://www2.standardandpoors.com/spf/pdf/fixedincome/SF-legal-criteriaFINAL.pdf.
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if relaxed too far, could destroy the utility of structured financing
altogether.19
Second, the mere threat of substantive consolidation provides an
impetus for creditors in nonstructured financings to reach agreement
on reorganization plans for fear of the consequences of nonagree-
ment. The recently confirmed reorganization plans for Worldcom,
Inc., Enron Corp., and Conseco, Inc.-the three largest bankrupt
companies ever reorganized in the United States20-all reflect this in-
fluence. 21 Bargaining over the structure of corporate reorganization
plans takes place in the shadow of the doctrine of substantive consoli-
dation just as bargaining takes place in other circumstances against
the backdrop of laws relevant to those contexts.22 Tightening the stan-
dards for imposition of substantive consolidation alters the balance of
power in reorganization negotiations, generally making the position of
certain institutional lenders stronger as compared with the interests of
many classes of unsecured creditors, including trade creditors and in-
voluntary claimants.
Third, the possibility of substantive consolidation may inform and
shape the restructuring of a debtor with unsecured syndicated financ-
ing (i.e., a large loan facility arranged by an agent bank in which many
other banks fund a portion of the loan commitment). In syndicated
finance, one of the largest capital markets in the world, agent banks
often structure transactions in which a parent company borrows funds
supported by unsecured guarantees granted by its various subsidiary
companies to the lender group. Before Owens Corning, the market-
place considered the presence of these guarantees as a reason to im-
pose substantive consolidation 23 because case law had identified the
presence of intercompany guarantees as a factor supporting use of
19 See TRIBAR OPINION COMM., OPINIONS IN THE BANKRUPTCY CONTEXT: RATING
AGENCY, STRUCTURED FINANCING, AND CHAPTER 11 TRANSACTIONS (1990), reprinted in 46
Bus. LAW. 718, 726 (1991) (noting that substantive consolidation would defeat one of the major
premises of the rating in a structured finance transaction).
20 See William H. Widen, Prevalence of Substantive Consolidation in Large Bankruptcies
from 2000 to 2004: Preliminary Results, 14 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 47, 59 (2006) [hereinafter
Widen, Prevalence of Substantive Consolidation] (listing large bankruptcies).
21 Id. at 60 (describing the role of substantive consolidation in selected bankruptcies).
22 See, e.g., Robert Cooter et al., Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: A Testable Model
of Strategic Behavior, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 225, 225 (1982); Robert N. Mnookin & Lewis Korn-
hauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950 (1979);
Guhan Subramanian, Bargaining in the Shadow of Takeover Defenses, 113 YALE L.J. 621, 625
(2003).
23 See TRIBAR OPINION COMM., supra note 19, at 741, exh. A (including in factor "(x)" the
absence of guarantees between parent and SPC as a basic assumption underlying a noncon-
solidation opinion required by rating agencies in a structured finance transaction).
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substantive consolidation.2 4 In a complete reversal of marketplace ex-
pectations, Owens Corning transformed intercompany guarantees into
a tool to oppose substantive consolidation because, in overturning the
district court's order of substantive consolidation, the Third Circuit
gave significant weight to the syndicated lenders' reliance on the in-
tercompany guarantees as a factor against consolidation.25 Existing
substantive consolidation case law does not adequately theorize how
to address the special problems presented by syndicated lending when
unsecured intercompany guarantees are used to structure a loan.
The first two considerations pull in opposite directions. The
securitization industry prefers significant limits on the scope of sub-
stantive consolidation primarily because the substantive consolidation
of a bankrupt debtor with an affiliated SPC subjects the assets of the
SPC to the automatic stay applicable to the debtor's assets.26 This au-
tomatic stay prevents the timely application of the SPC's assets to
make payments on the obligations issued by the SPC. The timeliness
of payments figures prominently in the investment grade credit rating
assigned to obligations issued by the SPC.27 Because timeliness of
payment forms a cornerstone for an investment grade credit rating
(and substantive consolidation directly interferes with timely pay-
ment), the securitization industry hovers between panic and dread
whenever a judge, like the district court judge in Owens Corning,28
suggests that the doctrine applies to a wider range of cases. On the
other hand, use of the doctrine can greatly simplify restructuring a
bankrupt family of companies, potentially reducing costs associated
with accounting for a multitude of separate entities. Many unsecured
creditors recoil whenever a judicial decision, like that of the Third Cir-
cuit in Owens Corning,29 proposes new limits on application of the
24 See, e.g., In re Vecco Constr. Indus., Inc., 4 B.R. 407, 411 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1980). The
presence of intercompany guarantees continues to weigh in favor of substantive consolidation in
some circuits. See, e.g., In re Verestar, Inc., 343 B.R. 444, 462 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2006). Histori-
cally, the market did not give credence to a passing case law suggestion that the presence of
guarantees might counsel against use of substantive consolidation in some cases because the
existence of guarantees reflected knowledge of corporate separateness. See In re Snider Bros.,
Inc., 18 B.R. 230, 238 n.5 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1982) (noting that the presence of guarantees indi-
cates awareness of separate corporate forms).
25 In re Owens Corning, 419 F.3d 195, 212 (3d Cir. 2005) (noting that to undo the bargain
represented by guarantees is "a demanding task").
26 The automatic stay appears in § 362 of the Bankruptcy Code. See 11 U.S.C. § 362
(2000).
27 See TRIBAR OPINION COMM., supra note 19, at 720.
28 In re Owens Corning, 316 B.R. 168, 171 (Bankr. D. Del. 2004), rev'd, 419 F.3d 195 (3d
Cir. 2005).
29 Owens Corning, 419 F.3d at 211-12.
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doctrine because limits on the doctrine reduce their bargaining power
to negotiate forms of restructuring using consolidation that may en-
hance their recoveries (both by lowering transaction costs and through
simple hold-up value conferred by the mere threat of substantive
consolidation).
If the practical threat of substantive consolidation disappears
through the tightening of standards for its imposition, then so does a
point of leverage to negotiate reorganization plans that use the tech-
nique. I believe this result would tend to disadvantage small creditors
and tort claimants. Academics have considered how the institution of
secured credit disadvantages these creditor classes, 30 but attention has
not focused on how syndicated lenders' use of multiple guarantees
may disadvantage this same group by systematically diluting recov-
eries on their claims. This Article explains the phenomenon of claim
dilution and shows how substantive consolidation may reduce the dis-
advantage of claim dilution.31
The Owens Corning decisions reflect a general failure by courts
to establish clearly the parameters of a doctrine vitally important to
modern corporate finance. This Article will argue that while capital
markets have evolved sophisticated securitization and syndication
techniques, development of the doctrine of substantive consolidation
has failed to keep pace. This Article offers a critique of the existing
doctrine and offers a way forward for development of the doctrine
that remains sensitive to concerns of the securitization and syndicated
lending industries while also preserving some balance in reorganiza-
tion negotiations.
I continue with a brief overview of the facts in the Owens Corn-
ing decisions and then proceed with an examination of how and why
the doctrine of substantive consolidation figures prominently in the
largest bankruptcy cases in our history.
30 See, e.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, The Uneasy Case for the Priority of
Secured Claims in Bankruptcy, 105 YALE L.J. 857 (1996) (arguing that the institution of secured
credit may be inefficient); Symposium, The Priority of Secured Debt, 82 CORNELL L. REv. 1279
(1997) (discussing a proposal to "carve out" a specified percentage of asset value in companies
for the repayment of unsecured creditors rather than secured creditors). Professor Elizabeth
Warren at Harvard Law School originally suggested that a percentage carve-out of asset value of
a debtor should be exempt from claims of secured creditors and reserved for the payment of
unsecured claims in order to promote fairness to unsecured creditors. See Elizabeth Warren, An
Article 9 Set-Aside for Unsecured Creditors, 51 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 323, 323 (1997).
31 See infra Part VII ("A New Fairness Rationale for the Doctrine Based on Eliminating
Double Proof in Cases of Intercompany Guarantees").
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II. The Owens Corning Bankruptcy as an Illustration of
the Technique
The table below illustrates, in a simplified format, what is at stake
in the Owens Corning decisions. In the example, Owens Corning's
("OC's") seventeen bankrupt subsidiaries become SubOne, SubTwo,
and SubThree, as direct wholly owned subsidiaries of OC Parent.
Dollar figures are fictional for ease of illustration. Asset values do not
include the value of any interests in subsidiaries.
Table 1: The Basic Arithmetic of Owens Corning
Noteholder Loan Lender
Entity Asset Value Claims Amount Claims
OC Parent $980 million $4 billion $2 billion $2 billion
SubOne $1 billion -0- -0- $2 billion
SubTwo $1 billion -0- -0- $2 billion
SubThree $20 million -0- -0- -0-
Consolidated $3 billion $4 billion $2 billion N/A
Notice that, even though the lending syndicate's loan amount to
OC Parent totals only $2 billion, the lenders hold a $2 billion claim
against both SubOne and SubTwo. These two other claims exist be-
cause the lenders required that SubOne and SubTwo provide guaran-
tees of the loan to OC Parent. The lenders do not have a direct claim
against SubThree because, as part of the negotiation with OC Parent,
the lenders agreed to limit guarantee claims to significant subsidiaries
with an asset value of $30 million or more. This means that the equity
value in SubThree benefits creditors of OC Parent.
These guarantees have two effects. First, they protect the lending
syndicate against structural subordination. No future creditor of the
consolidated group 32 may achieve structural priority over the lending
syndicate in the assets of SubOne or SubTwo. Potential future credi-
tors include voluntary contract claimants, involuntary tort claimants,
the Internal Revenue Service, and the Pension Benefit Guaranty Cor-
poration. Second, the guarantees give the lending syndicate structural
priority over the noteholders, who only have a single claim against OC
32 Readers must distinguish between (1) procedural consolidation, (2) substantive consoli-
dation, and (3) a consolidated group. Procedural consolidation simply means that a single court
has jurisdiction over multiple related cases; it results in administrative efficiencies when debtors
are related by common ownership but does not result in the combination of legal entities. Sub-
stantive consolidation combines legal entities, either hypothetically (in a "deemed" consolida-
tion) or actually, for the purposes of making distributions and voting on plans. A consolidated
group is simply a family of companies related by common ownership that would prepare consoli-
dated financial statements and tax returns; it does not imply any combination of legal entities.
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Parent. This structural priority allows the lending syndicate to collect
an aggregate of $2 billion out of SubOne and SubTwo before any
noteholder sees a dime. This result follows from the general rule that
a legal entity pays its creditors before its shareholders receive any dis-
tributions. The guarantee claims of the lending syndicate turn the
lenders into direct creditors of SubOne and SubTwo. OC Parent only
has an equity interest in SubOne and SubTwo.
The "Consolidated" row in the table illustrates the situation
where substantive consolidation breaks down the asset partitions cre-
ated by the separate subsidiaries, eliminating intercompany liabilities.
The noteholders, with $4 billion in claims, compete with the lenders,
holding $2 billion in claims, on a pari passu basis, for $3 billion in
assets so that every creditor receives fifty cents on the dollar. The
additional lender claims created by the guarantees disappear in the
consolidation. For the loan syndicate, this represents the difference
between getting paid the full $2 billion on their loan and receiving
only $1 billion.
The Owens Corning debtors started the proceeding that re-
quested substantive consolidation prior to formal consideration of a
reorganization plan.33 They hoped to learn whether substantive con-
solidation would be available so that, if they included it as part of a
plan, they would not have to develop a new plan if the court disal-
lowed consolidation at a later stage.34 A district court judge heard this
matter, rather than a bankruptcy court judge, because jurisdiction had
been removed from the bankruptcy court judge for reasons not perti-
nent to this analysis.35
In deciding to approve substantive consolidation, the district
judge focused first on the management of the Owens Corning consoli-
dated group, stating: "[the court has] no difficulty in concluding that
there is indeed substantial identity between the [OC Parent] and its
wholly owned subsidiaries. ' 36 The presence of central headquarters
control, management on a product line (rather than legal entity) basis,
lack of separate business plans or budgets, dependence on the parent
company for funding, centralized cash management, and establish-
33 Owens Corning, 419 F.3d at 202.
34 See id. at 202 n.6.
35 Id. at 202 & n.8.
36 In re Owens Corning, 316 B.R. 168, 171 (Bankr. D. Del. 2004), rev'd, 419 F.3d 195 (3d
Cir. 2005).
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ment of subsidiaries for the convenience of the parent (particularly for
tax reasons) 37 all supported this finding.38
The district judge then found that substantive consolidation
would greatly simplify the proceeding because questions still existed
over the accuracy of audit results to separate the financial affairs of
the Owens Corning companies, the key remaining problems being
failures to pay interest on intercompany advances, calculation of in-
tercompany royalty payments, 39 and resolving outstanding assertions
that the lending syndicate's guarantees should be voided as fraudulent
conveyances. 4° For the district judge, these first two issues made a
prima facie case for substantive consolidation.41
The lending syndicate did not sufficiently rebut this prima facie
case. 42 Though the syndicate had relied on guarantees to prevent
others from achieving priority, the judge found that in reality the syn-
dicate had also relied on the overall credit of the consolidated group. 43
For example, the lending syndicate only received consolidated finan-
cial reporting and did not monitor the separate debt level at the sub-
sidiary guarantorsa
The Third Circuit reversed. 45 It suggested that the substantial
identity between a parent and its subsidiaries, which is created by cen-
37 Several of the most valuable subsidiaries in the Owens Corning consolidated group that
provided guarantees to the lending syndicate are tax shelters. For example, Owens Corning
Fiberglass Technology, Inc. ("OCFT"), a common type of tax shelter known as an "intellectual
property holding company," owns all intellectual property in the Owens Corning consolidated
group, licensing it back to consolidated group members. Owens Corning, 419 F.3d at 200 n.3.
The state tax benefits are twofold: consolidated group members get a state tax royalty deduction
in their home states, and the royalty income received by OCFT is not subject to state tax because
OCFT's state of incorporation has no state-level corporate tax. Some states have attacked simi-
lar shelters as sham transactions. See Syms Corp. v. Comm'r of Revenue, 765 N.E.2d 758 (Mass.
2002); Lanco, Inc. v. Dir., Div. of Taxation, 879 A.2d 1234 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2005); A &
F Trademark, Inc. v. Tolson, 605 S.E.2d 187 (N.C. Ct. App. 2004); Geoffrey, Inc. v. S.C. Tax
Comm'n, 437 S.E.2d 13 (S.C. 1993).
38 Owens Corning, 316 B.R. at 171.
39 Royalty payment calculations that caused accounting problems relate to the intellectual
property holding company tax shelter described above. See supra note 37.
40 Owens Corning, 316 B.R. at 171-72. An intercompany guarantee might produce a
fraudulent transfer if the guarantor does not receive reasonably equivalent value for providing
the guarantee (for example, if SubOne and SubTwo provided guarantees without receiving loan
proceeds). See generally Phillip I. Blumberg, Intragroup (Upstream, Cross-Stream, and Down-
stream) Guaranties Under the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act, 9 CARDOZO L. REV. 685, 689
n.14 (1987) (collecting citations to articles).
41 Owens Corning, 316 B.R. at 171.
42 Id. at 172.
43 Id.
44 Id.
45 In re Owens Corning, 419 F.3d 195, 216 (3d Cir. 2005).
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tralized management, is ordinarily found in consolidated groups. 46 It
deemed problems over calculation of interest and royalty payments
relatively minor.47 Without minimizing fraudulent conveyance con-
cerns over intercompany guarantees, the Third Circuit felt those issues
should be handled separately, and not as part of a motion for substan-
tive consolidation. 48 Rather than finding that the lending syndicate
had relied on the credit of the consolidated group as a whole, the
Third Circuit pointed to the specific negotiation of the guarantees, in-
cluding a $30 million guarantee threshold, and its belief that the syndi-
cated loan agreement required Owens Corning to maintain the
separate existence of its subsidiaries, as evidence that the lenders re-
lied on the guarantees for priority, and not merely to assure parity.49
The Third Circuit was unmoved by the fact that the offering memo-
randa used to market the parent company notes to noteholders did
not disclose their structural subordination as a risk factor, suggesting
that the proper way to handle such concerns would be in a fraud suit.50
III. The Widespread Use of Substantive Consolidation
In this Part, I argue that courts commonly use substantive consol-
idation despite their rhetoric that the occasions for its use should be
few and far between. This usage occurs primarily in approval of con-
sensual reorganization plans. I provide an economic explanation for
why this result should not surprise us.
Though one might conclude that courts would treat consensual
plans very differently than they might treat a contested case (e.g., in
the consensual case simply rubber stamping the wishes of the parties),
we find dicta in case law suggesting that courts must make an indepen-
dent assessment of the appropriate use of the remedy. Reorganiza-
tion plans themselves often cite principles developed in contested case
law to support use of the doctrine. Though, on the margin, I suspect it
is easier to obtain approval for use of the doctrine in a negotiated plan
46 Id. at 215.
47 Id.
48 Id.
49 Id. at 212-14. One of the petitions for certiorari made much of the fact that the Third
Circuit did not give proper deference to the fact finding of the district court. See Petition for a
Writ of Certiorari at 26-30, McMonagle v. Credit Suisse First Boston, 126 S. Ct. 1910 (2006) (No.
05-827), 2005 WL 3606450. These questions are not germane to the issues discussed in this Arti-
cle. The procedure pursuant to which a bankruptcy court makes an early determination of plan
issues, prior to a confirmation hearing, was approved in In re Stone & Webster, Inc., 286 B.R.
532, 541-43 (Bankr. D. Del. 2002).
50 Owens Corning, 419 F.3d at 215 n.27.
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context, the statements of both courts and reorganization parties at-
test to the importance and vitality of the case law doctrine in the nego-
tiated plan context.
The widespread use of the doctrine of substantive consolidation
raises the question of whether our corporate law default rule treating
each legal entity separately, even when it is a member of a corporate
group, should be replaced with a default rule consolidating entities in
bankruptcy. If over fifty percent of large corporate reorganizations
use substantive consolidation, one might argue that the more efficient
default rule would mirror the contract that most parties would negoti-
ate for themselves.
A. Substantive Consolidation Is Not an Uncommon Remedy
Courts and litigants who oppose imposition of substantive consol-
idation often claim that use of the doctrine is extraordinary. 51 They
stress the mundane nature of the facts in their cases. The conclusion
follows that, if substantive consolidation applies to the common case,
then use of the doctrine will break out everywhere like a plague.
Some academics predict that common use of the doctrine will wreak
havoc on the orderly conduct of business affairs. 52 According to this
view, the sanctity of the corporate form, shielding investors from per-
sonal liability for business debts, demands the quarantine of substan-
tive consolidation to the truly rare situation. The accepted wisdom,
however, springs from a false premise.
Substantive consolidation appears frequently in negotiated plans
for our largest Chapter 11 reorganizations. My preliminary empirical
study of the twenty-one largest corporate bankruptcy filings from 2000
to 2004, ranked by asset size, 53 reveals that substantive consolidation
was imposed, proposed, or settled in eleven of those cases.54 Eight of
51 There is almost unanimous judicial consensus that the remedy is to be used sparingly.
See id. at 208-09; see also In re Gandy, 299 F.3d 489, 499 (5th Cir. 2002) (stating that substantive
consolidation is "an extreme and unusual remedy"); Eastgroup Props. v. S. Motel Ass'n, 935
F.2d 245, 248 (11th Cir. 1991) (noting that substantive consolidation should be used sparingly).
52 See Brief of Amici Curiae in Support of Appellant, Owens Corning, 419 F.3d 195 (No.
04-4080) [hereinafter Brief of Amici Curiae] (arguing against substantive consolidation).
53 The ranking of bankruptcy cases based on prefiling asset size comes from WebBRD, a
database maintained by Professor Lynn M. LoPucki at the UCLA School of Law, which adjusts
asset size to current dollars. See Lynn M. LoPucki, WebBRD: A Window on the World of Big-
Case Bankruptcy, http://lopucki.law.ucla.edu/index.htm (last visited Jan. 3, 2007). The Owens
Corning bankruptcy is the twenty-first largest bankruptcy filed during the 2000-2004 time pe-
riod. Id. Professor LoPucki provided valuable insight into the advantages and disadvantages of
various definitions that might be used to analyze data.
54 Widen, Prevalence of Substantive Consolidation, supra note 20, at 53. My ongoing em-
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the top ten bankruptcies constituted "Substantive Consolidation
Bankruptcies," as defined in the study. 55
The contrast between the constant caution against widespread
use of the doctrine in reported decisions and its common use in nego-
tiated plans of reorganization stands out with particular force because
the standard for imposition of substantive consolidation is purported
to be the same in both contexts. In negotiated reorganizations, courts
use substantive consolidation both (1) in consideration of settlement
of actual or potential litigation involving substantive consolidation
and (2) in approving liquidations and reorganizations that impose sub-
stantive consolidation in some form.
Settlement of substantive consolidation litigation takes place in
the shadow of the substantive consolidation doctrine because, even if
the parties consent, bankruptcy courts must still assess the propriety
of the settlement. This independent assessment does not require the
court to decide whether it would have imposed substantive consolida-
tion. Rather, the court reviews the settlement to determine whether,
in light of the doctrine, a reasonable basis exists for the settlement. 56
The fact that courts do not ordinarily scrutinize the merits of
compromises involved in suits between individual litigants
cannot affect the duty of a bankruptcy court to determine
that a proposed compromise forming part of a reorganiza-
tion plan is fair and equitable. There can be no informed
and independent judgment as to whether a proposed com-
promise is fair and equitable until the bankruptcy judge has
apprised himself of all facts necessary for an intelligent and
objective opinion of the probabilities of ultimate success
should the claim be litigated.57
pirical research finds that substantive consolidation was used in over half of the largest public
company bankruptcy cases filed from 2000 to 2004.
55 See id. at 59, tbl. The study counts "deemed" consolidations as "substantive consolida-
tions" because courts apply the same tests, factors, and justifications to order both actual consol-
idations and deemed consolidations. Id. at 50. Further, many creditors simply do not care about
the structure of the company emerging from bankruptcy but focus instead on the size of the
distribution received. See id. at 51.
56 In re W.T. Grant Co., 699 F.2d 599, 608 (2d Cir. 1983) (stating that a bankruptcy court
may approve a fair and equitable settlement that is not "below the lowest point in the range of
reasonableness" (citation omitted)). Rule 9019(a) of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Proce-
dure provides in pertinent part that "[o]n motion by the trustee and after notice and a hearing,
the court may approve a compromise or settlement." FED. R. BANKR. P. 9019(a).
57 Protective Comm. for Indep. Stockholders of TMT Trailer Ferry, Inc. v. Anderson, 390
U.S. 414, 424 (1968) (citation omitted).
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Many reported decisions reflect court approval of the settlement of
substantive consolidation litigation. 58
Courts consider the substantive consolidation doctrine in detail
when confirming plans that provide for substantive consolidation. 59
This consideration often occurs in the context of some opposition to a
plan.60 In In re Standard Brands Paint Co.,61 however, the court con-
sidered the propriety of a "deemed" consolidation in a reorganization
plan even though no party opposed it.62
"Deemed consolidation" is a peculiar and awkward term of art
with a recent vintage. In a "deemed" substantive consolidation, dis-
tinct legal entities are not combined. Instead, votes on a plan, plan
distributions, or both, are computed "as if" legal entities had been
combined.63 Courts disagree over whether deemed consolidations
58 See, e.g., In re Apex Oil Co., 118 B.R. 683, 688, 693 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1990); In re
Resorts Int'l, Inc., 145 B.R. 412, 418, 459 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1990); see also Findings of Fact &
Conclusions of Law Confirming Supplemental Modified Fifth Amended Joint Plan of Affiliated
Debtors Pursuant to Chapter 11 of the United States Bankruptcy Code, and Related Relief, In
re Enron Corp., No. 01-16034 (AJG) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. July 15, 2004) [hereinafter Findings of
Fact]. In In re Enron, the court spent significant time and effort in concluding that the terms of
the settlement of substantive consolidation issues were supported by an assessment of the likeli-
hood of successful litigation in light of the doctrine. Id. at 39, 48-55, 113-14, 138.
59 See, e.g., In re Lisanti Foods, Inc., 329 B.R. 491, 497-99 (D.N.J. 2005); see also In re
Worldcom, Inc., No. 02-13533 (AJG), 2003 WL 23861928, at *6-16 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Oct. 31,
2003).
60 The plan proponent, typically the debtor or debtors in possession, must prove by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence that the plan meets the requirements of § 1129 of the Bankruptcy
Code. See, e.g., In re Cellular Info. Sys., Inc., 171 B.R. 926, 937 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1994). These
requirements include that the plan not "discriminate unfairly," and that it be "fair and equita-
ble" to creditors impaired under the plan who have not voted to accept it. 11 U.S.C.
§ 1129(b)(1) (2000). Thus, in a plan subject to this so-called "cram down" provision, the court
would need to consider the appropriateness of imposing substantive consolidation as part of
considering the plan as a whole. In the absence of a plan cram down, the need for an express
review of the appropriateness of substantive consolidation is less clear, though courts have con-
sidered the applicability of the doctrine even in the absence of objections. See infra text accom-
panying note 62. There may be individual creditor objections within an impaired class even if
the class itself votes to accept a plan. This may provide a further reason for a court to separately
consider the appropriateness of imposing substantive consolidation.
61 In re Standard Brands Paint Co., 154 B.R. 563 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1993).
62 Id. at 565.
63 For a description of a deemed consolidation, see In re Genesis Health Ventures, Inc.,
402 F.3d 416, 420 n.6 (3d Cir. 2005). The earliest reported decision of which I am aware that
considers and approves a deemed consolidation is In re Standard Brands Paint Co. See In re
Standard Brands Paint Co., 154 B.R. at 566-67 (indicating that a plan that made distributions as
if the entities were combined, but without actually combining the legal entities, was "unusual,
possibly unique"). As far as the parties and the court could determine, the plan proposed in In
re Standard Brands Paint Co. was the first deemed consolidation, though the procedure was not
then referred to as such. Id. at 573.
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should be considered substantive consolidations at all.64 I find no limi-
tation in the Bankruptcy Code restricting a court's ability to craft a
limited remedy custom tailored to particular facts by scaling back an
already accepted remedy. 65 This custom tailoring occurs when a court
orders something less than a full substantive consolidation to reach a
fair, equitable, and cost-effective result. 66 Indeed, a deemed consoli-
dation may save costs compared to a full consolidation, in part by
eliminating the need to retitle property and obtain new business quali-
fications, leaving more value for creditors in a reorganized company. 67
Empirical research shows that appropriate occasions for use of
substantive consolidation are neither few nor far between. Why does
the case law rhetoric of rarity differ from the commonplace reality in
large reorganizations? Foundational work in economics and law pro-
vides an answer.
B. Economic Theory Explains Why Many Cases Exist
In his examination of the role of transaction costs in determining
the size of firms, Ronald Coase posited a distinction between external
transaction costs (those costs that a firm incurs when it bargains with
third parties to acquire goods and services) and internal transaction
costs (those costs that a firm incurs internally to provide those same
goods and services to itself).68 He theorized that the size of the firm
expands so long as the firm determines that the external transaction
costs exceed the internal transaction costs of providing those goods
and services. 69
64 Compare In re Standard Brands Paint Co., 154 B.R. 563 (approving a deemed consolida-
tion), with In re Genesis Health Ventures, Inc., 402 F.3d at 424 (finding that a deemed consolida-
tion does not constitute a de facto substantive consolidation).
65 The possible constitutional limitations on the use of equity by courts exercising bank-
ruptcy jurisdiction are discussed in Part VIII, infra ("Why Use of the Doctrine Does Not Present
Constitutional Concerns").
66 As an equitable doctrine, some courts have expressly recognized that they may modify
or adjust the effects of substantive consolidation to fit the circumstances of the case. See In re
Standard Brands Paint Co., 154 B.R. at 570; In re Parkway Calabasas, 89 B.R. 832, 837 (Bankr.
C.D. Cal. 1988). Under such a flexible approach, a court need not actually combine entities in
order to take advantage of the benefits that asset pooling or voting combinations might offer in a
particular case.
67 In In re Standard Brands Paint Co., for example, tax considerations strongly favored a
deemed consolidation without the actual combination of legal entities. See In re Standard
Brands Paint Co., 154 B.R at 565. An actual combination would have triggered cancellation of
indebtedness income for state tax purposes. Id.
68 See Ronald H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386, 392 (1937).
69 Id. at 394. Coase's view of the firm does not necessarily conflict with the conception of
the firm as a nexus of contracts. Indeed, Coase appeared to view the two theories as comple-
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When we examine the structure of corporate law, we find a vari-
ety of mechanisms designed to allow a corporation to function as an
independent, artificial person. The corporation has managers to de-
termine which products and services to sell, to set prices, and to bar-
gain with others, together with procedures within which managers
make these decisions (such as those found in certificates of incorpora-
tion and bylaws). These are the mechanisms of artificial personality.
What should we expect to happen when another firm decides to pro-
vide itself with goods and services internally rather than continue to
bargain with the third-party corporation?
Often, the firm simply acquires the third-party corporation,
bringing the formerly external functions inside the firm. This tech-
nique has many advantages over internally developing the ability to
provide those same goods and services, not the least of which is speed.
The acquisition may occur either as an asset purchase or as a stock
purchase. 70
From the narrow perspective of closing the acquisition at the low-
est cost, the stock purchase presents many advantages over the asset
acquisition. The stock purchase does not require diligence to prepare
asset schedules, transfers of title to particular assets (other than
mentary. See Saul Levmore, Irreversibility and the Law: The Size of Firms and Other Organiza-
tions, 18 J. CORP. L. 333, 334 n.2 (1993). The literature identifies limitations on Coase's insight
that firms and markets present alternative forms of economic organization, selected based on
relative transaction costs. See, e.g., OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF
CAPITALISM 3-4 (1985) ("Unless the factors responsible for transaction cost differences could be
identified, the reasons for organizing some transactions one way and other transactions another
would necessarily remain obscure."). Even critics who suggest these limitations see themselves
as building upon Coase's insight. See Armen A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, Production, Infor-
mation Costs, and Economic Organization, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 777, 783-84 (1972) ("We do not
disagree with the proposition that, ceteris paribus, the higher the cost of transacting across mar-
kets the greater will be the comparative advantage of organizing resources within the firm; it is a
difficult proposition to disagree with or refute."). For example, Coase's insight has been refined
to develop an explanation for vertical integration. See OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND
HIERARCHIES: ANALYSIS AND ANTITRUST IMPLICATIONS 194 (1975); Benjamin Klein et al., Ver-
tical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive Contracting Process, 21 J.L. & ECON.
297 (1978). The perceived limitations of Coase's insight are not liabilities for the analysis herein
presented because my goal is not to explain transaction cost differences. I rely only on the
simple notions that firms have incentives to internalize the production of goods and services
when transaction cost savings result and that one method to internalize is through acquisition.
70 The acquisition of shares often requires additional procedures such as preparation of
disclosure materials, shareholder votes, director votes, and government approvals, such as anti-
trust clearance from the Department of Justice or the Federal Trade Commission. Even with
such additional procedures, acquisition by share purchase may have timing and other cost-saving
advantages over internal development of capacities. Similar procedures accompany an asset
acquisition.
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shares), assignment of existing contracts and licenses, rehiring of em-
ployees, and other similar administrative matters. Thus, in many
cases, we find that the single-entity firm acquires a subsidiary when it
internalizes the production of goods and services. Over time, the sin-
gle-entity firm grows into a complex, consolidated corporate group,
increasing in size until it no longer can identify cost savings that might
be achieved through further growth because the internal monitoring
and information costs of managing the larger entity would exceed the
potential cost savings realizable through internalizing away from the
market. (One might characterize such growth as the move from firm
to economic institution, but in this Article I focus on corporate groups
that function as single firms despite internal structure.)
After internalization of production, many of the target corpora-
tion's officers and directors are no longer needed to determine prod-
uct, set prices, and negotiate with third parties. Further, the target's
structure for management decision making duplicates similar struc-
tures already existing at the parent (e.g., the parent has its own of-
ficers, directors, and bylaws). Because the prospect of transaction cost
savings motivated internalization in the first place, we should expect
the redundancies to atrophy or hibernate, particularly if special cir-
cumstances do not motivate the acquiring firm to maintain them.71
Here it is important to focus on one of the central themes of sub-
stantive consolidation case law: when a subsidiary becomes the "alter
ego" or "mere instrumentality" of the parent company, the environ-
ment is ripe for imposition of substantive consolidation. The cele-
brated case of Fish v. East72 provides a representative list of factors for
determining when a substantial identity exists between parent and
71 The business combination between R.J. Reynolds Industries ("RJR") and Nabisco
Brands, Inc. in 1985 provides an obvious example of special circumstances in which efforts to
preserve corporate separateness following an acquisition could be important. Though I under-
stand that the parties took some care to keep the asset partition created by the separate corpo-
rate forms in place so that potential tobacco litigation exposure in RJR did not spill over to
Nabisco, the market did not consider these efforts entirely successful. See BRUCE WASSERSTEIN,
BIG DEAL 679 (1998) (describing the failure of a targeted stock offering linked to the Nabisco
food business because of fears that the food business might have become responsible for to-
bacco-related liabilities of RJR). The tobacco and food businesses eventually were separated in
a spin-off transaction. See Nabisco Group Holdings Corp., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at F-11
(Mar. 21, 2000), available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/847903/0000912057-00-
012717.txt. Until recently, subsidiary corporations had an independent reason to keep up at
least the charade of independence because a contract to cede control away from a corporation's
board of directors was void. See McQuade v. Stoneham, 189 N.E. 234, 237 (N.Y. 1934). See
generally ROBERT CHARLES CLARK, CORPORATE LAW 781-88 (1986) (outlining history of cases
and examples of state law).
72 Fish v. East, 114 F.2d 177 (10th Cir. 1940).
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subsidiary. 73 Significantly, the listed factors could double as a to-do
list of cost-saving steps to implement as part of internalizing produc-
tion. Consider how the Fish v. East factors discussed below translate
into this to-do list.
The acquiring corporation owns all the stock of the target com-
pany when a stock acquisition is selected to implement the decision to
internalize production. Typically, the acquiring company replaces the
officers and directors of the target company with its own officers,
making the subsidiary management mirror that of the parent.74 To
save costs, the acquiring company often centralizes capital-raising and
cash-management activities.75 In many acquisitions, particularly the
acquisition of a public company, the acquiring company will have
formed its new subsidiary-a factor mentioned in Fish v. East and one
that particularly concerns companies who internally create SPCs for
securitization transactions. 76 Though the acquiring company typically
does not adopt as one of its goals the express strategy of leaving the
target company with insufficient capital, the consolidated group has
no incentive to monitor the level of capital within the newly acquired
subsidiary because financing decisions are made at the parent level for
the consolidated group as a whole. Because the acquiring company
made the acquisition to produce goods and services internally, the tar-
get company may have little or no business aside from providing prod-
ucts to other members of the corporate group. The new subsidiary
73 Id. at 191 (listing factors to consider because "[tihe determination as to whether a sub-
sidiary is an instrumentality is primarily a question of fact and degree"). Factors cited include:
(1) the parent owns all or a majority of the capital stock of the subsidiary, (2) there are common
directors and officers, (3) the parent corporation finances the subsidiary, (4) the parent corpora-
tion is responsible for incorporation of the subsidiary, (5) the subsidiary has grossly inadequate
capital, (6) the parent company pays the salaries or expenses or losses of the subsidiary, (7) the
subsidiary has no independent business from the parent, (8) the subsidiary is commonly referred
to as a subsidiary or as a department or a division of the parent, (9) directors and executive
officers of the subsidiary do not act independently but take direction from the parent, and (10)
the corporation and subsidiary are not following the legal requirements of separation. Id.
74 If the acquiring company is a public company, it typically does not place outside direc-
tors on the boards of its internal subsidiaries because, among other problems, such a move would
increase the costs of internal decision making by, for example, incurring the cost of providing
information to outside directors.
75 Localized efficiencies gained from centralized capital-raising activities are explored in
William H. Widen, Lord of the Liens: Towards Greater Efficiency in Secured Syndicated Lending,
25 CARDOZO L. REV. 1577 (2004) [hereinafter Widen, Lord of the Liens].
76 This occurs when the acquiring company forms an acquisition subsidiary and makes a
tender offer for the shares of the target company (assume a 91% tender condition). After the
acquisition subsidiary acquires 91% of the shares of the target, it effects a short-form merger of
the target into itself, squeezing out the minority shareholders of the target who did not tender
their shares, with the acquisition company surviving the merger.
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often may be thought of as a division or department (and, in any
event, will be identified as a subsidiary of the parent). The directors
and officers of the new subsidiary almost always take direction from
the parent company, even when a complete overlap in personnel does
not exist. Finally, the importance placed upon formalities associated
with internal asset transfers and corporate meetings typically is dra-
matically less than it is in third-party transactions. Preparation of evi-
dence of these internal transactions and meetings is prepared (if at all)
after the fact, by junior lawyers in law firms or on a general counsel's
staff. The preparation of such documentation provides good fodder
for teaching young attorneys precisely because the internal transac-
tions often do not really matter to the firm-it is not like third-party
negotiations because mistakes can easily be fixed.
I do not mean to suggest that all acquiring companies purchase
target companies, thus forming subsidiaries, for the transaction cost
reduction reasons given in Coase's model. Subsidiaries may be
formed internally for a variety of reasons 77 or acquired externally sim-
ply for investment. Nor do I mean to suggest that every acquiring
company implements all the transaction cost reducing steps listed in
Fish v. East. I do mean to suggest, however, that we should expect
many acquiring companies to take steps that create a substantial iden-
tity between the target and the acquiring company.
The economic theory predicts that firms seeking to become more
cost-efficient through growth will create the very environment that
breeds substantive consolidation. My empirical survey of the use of
substantive consolidation in large public bankruptcies supports this
proposition because it finds that the corporate form is routinely ig-
nored within corporate groups in bankruptcy. 78 I believe this substan-
tial identity between a parent company and its subsidiaries exists in a
wide variety of cases precisely because creation of that identity of in-
77 A firm might expand to achieve increased market power or monopoly status. Expan-
sion also may occur for less rational reasons, such as the desire of a CEO to empire-build. I do
not suggest that Coase developed a complete theory of firm expansion. My observation that the
Coase insight provides only a partial explanation of firm structure merely reflects the consensus
view in the literature, which contains additional theories compatible with Coase's insight. See,
e.g., OLIVER HART, FIRMS, CONTRACTS, AND FINANCIAL STRUCTURE (1995) (developing a prop-
erty rights theory of the firm); Raghuram G. Rajan & Luigi Zingales, Power in a Theory of the
Firm, 113 Q.J. ECON. 387 (1998) (developing a theory of the firm based on power over physical
assets). To the extent the theory does provide a partial explanation, we should expect to see the
reduction of various internal capacities within subsidiary corporations as part of the cost savings
achieved when a firm moves from external to internal product sourcing by acquiring a
subsidiary.
78 See Widen, Prevalence of Substantive Consolidation, supra note 20.
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terest produces the very cost savings that motivated the creation of
the consolidated corporate group in the first place. Though I focus my
attention on asset partitions created within corporate groups through
the process of acquisitions, subsidiaries may be created within a cor-
porate group for a variety of other reasons (such as the desire for a tax
advantage or the ease of qualification to do business in a foreign juris-
diction), for which the mechanisms of artificial personality in the
newly formed company are also redundant. In these cases too, we
would expect cost-saving concerns to result in the atrophy or hiberna-
tion of the additional mechanisms of artificial personality within the
corporate group.
The above remarks reveal potential context-sensitivity to the cor-
porate form because the same legal entity may function very differ-
ently in the context of being a member of a corporate group than it
functioned prior to its acquisition in the context of being a stand-alone
company. When a corporation acts as a stand-alone investment vehi-
cle or as a parent company, it performs several functions. First, it cre-
ates a primary asset partition between its investors and creditors of
the business it operates, providing a liability shield. Second, the cor-
porate form contains within its legal structure management and other
mechanisms by which it selects product, makes pricing decisions, and
bargains with third parties-the features that make it an artificial
person.
A third function of the corporate form lurks in the background:
in both internal and external roles, the corporation allows for easy
identification of a group of assets under a single name. It functions
like the folder on your computer desktop that holds many individual
files. With any corporation, a variety of prior performative acts im-
bued with legal meaning (such as capital contributions and asset ac-
quisitions) operate to identify, collect, and segregate property under
the single, convenient label of the corporate name. When an acquir-
ing company proceeds by stock acquisition, transaction cost savings
accrue (which the parties presumably share in the process of negotia-
tion) because the acquiring company buys a collection of assets simply
by acquiring a name that represents the cumulative effect of prior
transactions. The asset acquisition, in contrast, requires a reenact-
ment of all the prior ceremonies of transfer and acquisition in order to
identify, collect, and segregate those assets under a new name. By
analogy to the computer desktop, an asset acquisition requires the
transfer of individual files rather than the transfer of a single folder.
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The convenience of asset identification in the initial stock acquisi-
tion, however, comes at a price. When the consolidated group desires
to transact business with external third parties involving property iden-
tified under a previously acquired subsidiary's name, the convenience
experienced in acquiring the assets becomes an inconvenient transac-
tion cost. The parent must then revive the artificial personality of the
subsidiary to complete any transaction. For example, if a third party
wants to purchase an asset from a subsidiary or a bank wants a direct
claim against the assets of the subsidiary through a guarantee or secur-
ity interest, the parent must use the management functions of the sub-
sidiary to authorize the sale, the guaranty, or the grant of security.
This is particularly important in large transactions in which legal opin-
ions must confirm the proper authority and enforceability of the trans-
action.79  This burden remains because, to the world outside the
consolidated group, as a matter of property law, the assets in the sub-
sidiary remain governed by the name of the subsidiary.A0 Transactions
internal to the corporate group do not suffer from this liability; man-
agers often neglect these formalities when the discipline of external
third-party involvement does not exert pressure for more costly, for-
mal procedures over less costly, informal ones.81
In summary, we find three key functions performed by the corpo-
rate form: (1) asset partitioning, (2) artificial personality, and (3) asset
identification. All three functions operate actively when the corpora-
tion is independent. When, however, the corporation becomes a sub-
79 In practice, I have been involved in numerous transactions in which (1) the parent could
not provide a list of all its subsidiaries without extensive due diligence, (2) the parent could not
provide an accurate list of the officers and directors of its subsidiaries, (3) when a list of officers
and directors of subsidiaries was provided, many of the named individuals had retired or died,
(4) no share certificates existed bearing the current names of the subsidiaries (often because the
subsidiaries were acquired in a merger), (5) when minute books could be found, the most recent
entries were many years old, and (6) other similar lapses were present. These issues all came up
in the context of preparing opinions for transactions with third parties or preparing due diligence
rooms for acquisitions. Many of these transactions involved large, well-known, investment-
grade companies that otherwise appeared to be well run.
80 The problem is not overcome by merging the subsidiary into the parent because the
merger itself may present many of the same transition-related transaction cost issues raised by
an acquisition through an asset sale. Rather than incur certain transaction costs today (to facili-
tate a future transaction that may never come), parent companies often deal with the problems
raised by the ongoing identification of assets to particular subsidiaries on a case-by-case basis
when confronted with an actual third-party transaction.
81 The presence of external auditors does not exert significant pressure because auditors
typically certify only consolidated financial statements. The consolidated financial statements
may be materially correct even if the consolidating statements incorrectly locate particular assets
within the consolidated group.
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sidiary, active use of the artificial personality structures may largely
cease. Further, the asset identification function may suffer if internal
transactions do not receive proper documentation. A substantial
identity between a parent and a subsidiary may exist because the arti-
ficial personality of the subsidiary is shut down or because systems of
asset identification break down. Thus, in many cases we find a hap-
hazard structure of asset partitions within a corporate group. A struc-
ture of asset partitions may arise for reasons of convenience and
expediency rather than for the specific purpose of partitioning assets
in a particular manner-in these cases, the asset partition is merely a
by-product of procedures (such as stock acquisitions) selected for
other reasons. I suggest that parties may more easily ignore the "inci-
dental" asset partition in bankruptcy proceedings than the asset parti-
tion expressly established to segregate assets and liabilities.
The above analysis poses a key question for our default rules gov-
erning the effect of use of the corporate form: should the legal effect
of the corporate form be treated differently when a corporation exists
as a subsidiary than when it exists as either a stand-alone company or
a parent company? In particular, should hibernation of the artificial
personality structures or breakdown in the asset identification func-
tion adversely impact the asset partitioning function? This, in essence,
is the question posed by the doctrine of substantive consolidation,
though the doctrine asks the question indirectly. To see why this is so,
we need to return to an old debate over whether treatment of the
corporate form should be context-sensitive or context-neutral.
C. Should We Change Default Rules for Corporate Groups in Light
of the Facts?
In the mid-1970s, Professor Jonathan Landers proposed that the
assets of each entity in a corporate group should be available to satisfy
the creditors of any member of the corporate group;82 (then Profes-
sor) Richard Posner objected.8 3 The Landers proposal amounts to a
reversal of the current, context-neutral default rule in which the assets
of each entity are available to satisfy that entity's creditors but not the
creditors of other entities in the corporate group. In effect, Landers
82 See Jonathan M. Landers, A Unified Approach to Parent, Subsidiary, and Affiliate Ques-
tions in Bankruptcy, 42 U. CHI. L. REv. 589 (1975).
83 Richard A. Posner, The Rights of Creditors of Affiliated Corporations, 43 U. CHI. L.
REV. 499, 500 (1976) ("Landers writes persuasively and his legal scholarship is meticulous. But
his neglect of economic principles vital to an understanding of credit transactions, limited liabil-
ity, and corporate affiliation undermines both his general approach and his specific
conclusions.").
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proposed a change in law providing for the mandatory substantive
consolidation of members of a corporate group in a bankruptcy pro-
ceeding. The Landers rule is context-sensitive, altering the legal effect
of the corporate form depending upon the environment in which it
appears.
Judge Posner took strong issue with the proposal because it was
not grounded in sound economic analysis of debtor-creditor relation-
ships.84 He concluded that, except in cases of misrepresentation, there
was no good reason to adopt a default rule that collapsed separate
legal entities into a single asset pool to satisfy creditors. 85 Moreover,
he gave reasons to believe the opposite by suggesting why rational
debtors and creditors should prefer the existing default rules. 6 Land-
ers responded that Posner's economic analysis diverted him from the
reality of actual cases in which benefits flow from having the law's
result mirror the reality of a single economic enterprise. 87
Judge Posner correctly framed the default rule issue presented by
Professor Landers's proposal to shift the presumption in consolidated
groups to favor a substantive consolidation creating a form of enter-
prise liability. He stated:
The criterion of an efficient corporation law is therefore
whether the terms do in fact reflect commercial realities, so
that the transacting parties are generally content with them.
A corporation law that is out of step with those realities, and
so induces contracting parties to draft waivers of the contract
terms supplied by the law, is inefficient because it imposes
unnecessary transaction costs. 88
My empirical results finding use of substantive consolidation in
over fifty percent of large public company bankruptcies would appear
to lend support to Professor Landers's proposal (at least in large
cases), because we find parties contracting around the default rule in
84 Id.
85 Id. at 507, 520-21, 526.
86 Id. at 516-19.
87 Jonathan M. Landers, Another Word on Parents, Subsidiaries and Affiliates in Bank-
ruptcy, 43 U. CHI. L. REV. 527, 540 (1976). Landers's proposal to make substantive consolida-
tion of wholly owned companies the norm, rather than the exception, formed part of his
comprehensive suggestion to restructure debtor-creditor relationships in the context of affiliated
groups. Id. at 528. It included a proposal to subordinate the debt claims of affiliated companies
to the debt claims of independent third parties. Id. at 528, 536.
88 Posner, supra note 83, at 506. I assume in this analysis that the structure of corporate
law default rules matters, and I do not address considerations to the contrary. For an opposing
view, see Bernard S. Black, Is Corporate Law Trivial?: A Political and Economic Analysis, 84
Nw. U. L. REV. 542 (1990).
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the majority of cases. At a surface level, Judge Posner's efficiency cri-
terion would seem to suggest that a change in the default rule was in
order. However, the details of particular consolidations reflect a level
of customization in plans that would not be captured by a simple uni-
versal consolidation rule.89 On the basic question of whether Profes-
sor Landers's proposal should be adopted, I must side with Judge
Posner in spite of my empirical results, but for a limited reason. I am
unable to say whether adopting Landers's change in the default rule
would save costs in any global or macro sense. How many parties
would need to contract around his new default rule, and how those
increased costs of contracting would compare to the costs of con-
tracting around the existing default rule, are empirical questions for
which Judge Posner fails to provide evidence in support of his conclu-
sions. I am unable to make a guess, much less a calculation. 90 I can,
however, identify a context in which a strong case can be made that
Landers's proposed default rule would save costs, the signature exam-
ple being unsecured syndicated lending. Ironically, Professor Landers
identified professional financiers 9' as one class of creditors that did
not need help from his enterprise liability theory, precisely because
they created a form of substantive consolidation by contract using
guarantees. 92 Yet, in Owens Coming, we find a lending syndicate that,
having contracted around the existing default rule to create a substan-
tive consolidation for the syndicate's benefit, insists that substantive
89 For example, in Enron, the court approved a settlement that gave a thirty-percent
weight to consolidation. In other cases, we find that some subsidiaries are excluded from the
scope of the consolidation, the Adelphia bankruptcy providing a recent example.
90 Judge Posner argued for the existing default rule respecting the asset partition of the
corporate form by providing arguments explaining what rational debtors and creditors should
prefer in order to reduce transaction costs. See Posner, supra note 83, at 505-09. I am unpre-
pared to argue for the efficiency of the existing scheme on this basis. I simply do not believe that
arguments for or against Professor Landers's proposal can be based on global considerations of
efficiency in the absence of empirical research. For a discussion of epistemological problems
with certain broad efficiency-based arguments, see William H. Widen, Spectres of Law & Eco-
nomics, 102 MICH. L. REV. 1423 (2004).
91 I say "professional financier" here, rather than the more modern "syndicated lender,"
because modern syndicated lending did not begin until November 12, 1987, with Chemical
Bank's syndication of a $2,414,500,000 credit facility for HM Anglo-American Ltd. and Imperial
Investments (Grosvenor) Limited to acquire Kidde, Inc.-a transaction in which I represented
the lead lender and for which I prepared the commitment papers and loan documentation. This
transaction was the first of its kind, and was managed by James B. Lee, who is widely recognized
as the father of modern syndicated finance. See, e.g., Phillip L. Zweig, The New Stars of Finance,
Bus. WK., Oct. 27, 1997, at 122, 125 ("Few institutions have come further faster than Chase
Manhattan Corp., thanks largely to its powerful head of investment banking, James B. Lee, 44,
who dominates the huge syndicated-loan business.").
92 See Landers, supra note 87, at 531 n.1l.
[Vol. 75:237
Corporate Form and Substantive Consolidation
consolidation is inappropriate because of reliance on the very guaran-
tees that broke down the asset partition.
In fact, benefits might well accrue to lending syndicates and bor-
rowers (who generally pay the lending syndicate's legal fees) under
the Landers regime. When a lending syndicate makes a loan to a con-
solidated group of companies, it often requires guarantees from each
member of the consolidated group so that the syndicate's loan will not
be structurally subordinated to the claims of the creditors of individ-
ual subsidiaries. Such a lending syndicate could dispense with guaran-
tees from the dozens, sometimes hundreds, of subsidiaries in a
consolidated group. The costs of (1) due diligence to identify the sub-
sidiaries, (2) corporate authorization to approve the guarantees, (3)
the documentation to evidence the guarantees, (4) the legal opinions
to confirm the effectiveness of the guarantees, and (5) ongoing moni-
toring to make sure that required additional guarantees are provided
as new subsidiaries are added to the corporate group should make the
Landers proposal attractive in some syndicated lending circles. Also,
the Landers regime would simplify negotiation of covenants restrict-
ing the extent to which a borrower might modify its internal structure
(for example, by transferring assets to newly created subsidiaries or
merging subsidiaries out of existence). Finally, with the Landers pro-
posal, the lending syndicate need not fear structural subordination if
the borrower formed new subsidiaries and incurred debt that was
structurally senior to the syndicate's loans without providing addi-
tional guarantees.
Though syndicated lenders might prefer the Landers proposal,
this is not the key insight provided by the debate over default rules.
The key idea for my analysis is Professor Landers's recognition that
intercompany loan guarantees are nothing more than an attempt to
contract around the existing default rule for corporate groups and re-
place that regime with his model of enterprise liability. In sum, in-
tercompany guarantees create a type of substantive consolidation by
contract.
The contractual solution achieved by the intercompany guaran-
tees is, however, an approximation of Landers's model, rather than a
precise replication. 93 Were Landers's default rule adopted, other cred-
itor groups who might prefer the existing default rule would be forced
93 A main difference between the status quo and the enterprise liability scheme is the
treatment of involuntary creditors, such as tort claimants, who do not have a chance to negotiate
around a particular default rule. Recoveries for such creditors necessarily differ under the two
schemes.
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to contract around the mandatory consolidation. 94 One group that
certainly would object to a broad form of the proposed default rule is
the securitization industry. Securitization depends on the notion that
the assets of a subsidiary, particularly of an SPC, remain separate
from the assets of the parent and other consolidated group members.
Financiers to the SPC do not intend that the SPC's assets remain
available to creditors of other consolidated group members. Just how
an SPC might be confident that its affiliates had successfully con-
tracted around Landers's proposed default rule is unclear. 95 Certain
borrowers who structure their affairs around "internal capital mar-
kets" similarly might wish to contract around the proposed default
rule.
96
Though no legislative proposal is pending to enact Landers's con-
text-sensitive default rule into corporate law,9 7 observe how the struc-
ture of the doctrine of substantive consolidation could, in effect,
substantially implement the Landers proposal through the back door.
To imagine this scenario you need only assume two things: first, that
imposition of substantive consolidation is proper upon a simple show-
ing that a substantial identity exists between a parent company and its
subsidiary; and second, that this substantial identity is widespread be-
cause the pursuit of transaction cost savings motivates consolidated
94 Under the Landers regime, a debtor in a consolidated group would need to insist upon a
liability waiver from each of its creditors to absolve the other group members of liability and vice
versa. This procedure would not be available for limitation of the scope of liability for tort
claimants. Further, the Landers proposal potentially creates federal income tax problems for
consolidated groups with foreign subsidiaries because, under current law, if a foreign subsidiary
guarantees the debt of its U.S. parent, the guarantee creates a deemed dividend. See I.R.C.
§ 956 (2000).
95 Professor Landers does contemplate that demonstration of reliance might provide an
exception to his general scheme of enterprise liability. Perhaps an SPC would demonstrate this
reliance or the default rule might specifically provide an exception for SPCs used in structured
financing transactions. At the time of his debate with Posner, the securitization industry did not
exist.
96 See George G. Triantis, Organizations as Internal Capital Markets: The Legal Bounda-
ries of Firms, Collateral, and Trusts in Commercial and Charitable Enterprises, 117 HARv. L.
REV. 1102 (2004) (describing how entities might be structured to create internal capital mar-
kets-a technique more difficult to use in a Landers regime).
97 In contexts other than corporation law, legislatures already have enacted a version of
the Landers proposal, imposing a form of enterprise liability on corporate groups to pay federal
income taxes and pension liabilities. For example, several liability is imposed on "affiliated"
group members if an election is made to file consolidated federal income tax returns. See I.R.C.
§§ 1501, 1502, 1504 (2000 & Supp. 2006). Similarly, certain federal pension funding obligations
apply jointly and severally to all "controlled group" members. See 29 U.S.C.A. § 1082 (West
Supp. 2006); see also I.R.C. § 414. The Supreme Court has resisted imposing enterprise liability
in the context of environmental laws, absent a showing that factors justifying traditional corpo-
rate law veil piercing are present. See United States v. Bestfoods, 524 U.S. 51 (1998).
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groups to produce this substantial identity. If I have made the case
that significant numbers of large American corporate groups carry the
substantive consolidation "virus" because they predictably ignore the
mechanisms of artificial personality in pursuit of cost savings, then the
contours of substantive consolidation doctrine become extremely
important.
To be clear, my first assumption above is largely a myth. For the
most part, courts do not hold that imposition of substantive consolida-
tion doctrine is proper simply because the subsidiary is the alter ego
or mere instrumentality of the parent, but some courts come close to
this standard. Nevertheless, the securitization market behaves as if
this simple test might apply; judicial rhetoric certainly does not dis-
courage this fear. I will use the simple test of substantial identity as
the benchmark against which to gauge the actual tests that courts use.
The closer a test comes to this benchmark, the closer we find our-
selves to a de facto judicial enactment of the Landers proposal.
The currently recognized justifications for imposition of substan-
tive consolidation divide into two camps. The first justification ratio-
nalizes use of the doctrine on considerations of efficiency and
necessity. The second justification rationalizes use of the doctrine on
grounds based in corporate law veil piercing, so long as its use does
not destroy some reliance interest. Both approaches may appear in a
single case. Courts often state tests as a combination of these two
justifications, creating needless confusion in the process.
IV. Extracting Two Tests for Substantive Consolidation from
Case Law
In this Part, I first examine market perceptions of substantive
consolidation and then consider the basis for these perceptions in case
law in an attempt to distill a few simple tests that might be applied by
courts. I explain how the courts have mixed standards and tests, cre-
ating confusion. Lastly, I conduct a close examination of reliance in-
terests, using Owens Coming as an example. Reliance interests figure
prominently in the case law tests, yet I believe reliance interests in
commercial financing settings have been seriously misunderstood.
This analysis sets the stage for my reformulation of substantive consol-
idation into three distinct tests in Parts V, VI, and VII of this Article.
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A. How the Financial Markets View Substantive Consolidation
Substantive consolidation opinions issued by law firms,98 going
back to the 1980s, acknowledge and discuss two traditionally recog-
nized and distinct rationales for use of substantive consolidation.
These opinions present a good starting point for analysis because they
reveal how the securitization market views the doctrine. These views
represent a tremendous investment in research on the doctrine of sub-
stantive consolidation, undertaken by numerous law firms, investment
banks, and rating agencies. The securitization industry has structured
and sold trillions of dollars of financing on the hope that its under-
standing of the doctrine allows the creation of bankruptcy-remote
SPCs not subject to the risk of substantive consolidation. My account
of these market views derives from practice experience during which I
was one of the principal drafters and reviewers of nonconsolidation
legal opinions at my firm.99
1. The Efficiency Rationale for Substantive Consolidation
What I consider to be the modern rationale for substantive con-
solidation surfaces in Second Circuit cases.100 These cases stress that
substantive consolidation is proper in cases of hopeless entanglement
of financial affairs of the subject companies. Given hopeless entangle-
ment, all creditors might benefit from substantive consolidation rather
than spending funds to disentangle the mess. Indeed, in some cases, it
may be impossible to separate the financial affairs of members of a
corporate group, and spending funds to attempt the impossible makes
little sense. In other cases, the disentanglement might be possible, but
so expensive that it dramatically reduces, or eliminates altogether, the
return to creditors. Whether based on necessity or simply cost sav-
98 Law firms typically render substantive consolidation legal opinions to a rating agency
(such as Moody's or Standard & Poor's) to support the award of a high investment grade credit
rating to a financing structure. The rating agency wants to know whether a special purpose
subsidiary corporation will remain separate from its parent company should the parent company
find itself in bankruptcy proceedings. Transaction participants often refer to the opinion as a
"nonconsolidation letter." See TRIBAR OPINION COMM., supra note 19.
99 To avoid misunderstanding, though my views derive from practice experience, they re-
present solely my own interpretation and not the views of any law firm or company.
00 See Union Sav. Bank v. Augie/Restivo Baking Co. (In re Augie/Restivo Baking Co.),
860 F.2d 515, 518-20 (2d Cir. 1988); Flora Mir Candy Corp. v. R.S. Dickson & Co., 432 F.2d
1060, 1062-63 (2d Cir. 1970); Chem. Bank N.Y. Trust Co. v. Kheel, 369 F.2d 845, 847 (2d Cir.
1966); In re Commercial Envelope Mfg. Co., No. 76 B2354, 1977 Bankr. LEXIS, at *15 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. Aug. 22, 1977); accord Reider v. FDIC (In re Reider), 31 F.3d 1102, 1105-06 (11th Cir.
1994). The Second Circuit introduced the term "substantive consolidation." See James Talcott,
Inc. v. Wharton (In re Cont'l Vending Mach. Corp.), 517 F.2d 997, 1004 n.3 (2d Cir. 1975).
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ings, this justification relies on economic efficiency to support use of
substantive consolidation.
The former Bankruptcy Act and the current Bankruptcy Code
both reflect this important goal of cost reduction.10' The rhetoric of
"hopeless entanglement" links directly to the idea of substantial iden-
tity. The entanglement metaphor, however, relates primarily to the
failure to maintain business records that properly identify assets with
particular corporate names (a breakdown in the asset identification
function), and not to the destruction of artificial personality (ignoring
the mechanisms of artificial personality).
2. The Veil Piercing Rationale for Substantive Consolidation
The second rationale for substantive consolidation traces its ori-
gins to the veil piercing doctrine 10 2 and dicta in the Supreme Court
case of Sampsell v. Imperial Paper & Color Corp.10 3 In a corporate
101 The general goal of the Bankruptcy Act was to enhance recoveries for creditors both by
increasing the assets available to the estate (by, for example, recovering preferential transfers
and fraudulent conveyances) and by minimizing costs incurred by the estate. See Otte v. United
States, 419 U.S. 43, 53 (1974) (noting "an overriding concern in the Act with keeping fees and
administrative expenses at a minimum so as to preserve as much of the estate as possible for the
creditors"); Katchen v. Landy, 382 U.S. 323, 328 (1966) (observing that legislative history indi-
cates that Congress gave special consideration to making the bankruptcy laws inexpensive in
their administration). Historically, the cost-reduction concern was a paramount factor affecting
the debates over the structure of our bankruptcy laws. See DAVID A. SKEEL, JR., DEBT'S Do-
MINION: A HISTORY OF BANKRUPTCY LAW IN AMERICA 40 (2001) (discussing concern over costs
in the debates on the 1898 Act). Concerns over cost minimization continue under the Bank-
ruptcy Code. See, e.g., NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513, 517 n.1 (1984) (noting that
Congress enacted the Bankruptcy Code "with the intention that business reorganizations should
be quicker and more efficient"); 9 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 1001 (Alan N. Resnick & Henry J.
Sommer eds., 15th ed. rev. 2006). The Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure also reflect the
policy of cost minimization. See FED. R. BANKR. P. 1001 ("These rules shall be construed to
secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every case and proceeding.").
102 See Stone v. Eacho (In re Tip Top Tailors, Inc.), 127 F.2d 284, 288-89 (4th Cir. 1942)
(employing reasoning analogous to that employed in veil piercing cases without explicitly men-
tioning "veil piercing"); Fish v. East, 114 F.2d 177, 191 (10th Cir. 1940) (same). The veil piercing
rationale continued into the 1960s, see Soviero v. Franklin Nat'l Bank of Long Island, 328 F.2d
446, 448 (2d Cir. 1964), and the 1970s, see In re Cont'l Vending Mach. Corp., 517 F.2d at 1000,
while the modern economic efficiency rationale was developing. By borrowing from state-law
veil piercing doctrine to formulate substantive consolidation, bankruptcy law, in essence, devel-
oped a federal version of corporate law to use in insolvency cases. Today, the economic effi-
ciency rationale and the veil piercing rationale for substantive consolidation coexist. One study
measures the significance of the doctrine of "piercing the corporate veil" outside the substantive
consolidation context. See Robert B. Thompson, Piercing the Corporate Veil: An Empirical
Study, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 1036 (1991).
103 Sampsell v. Imperial Paper & Color Corp., 313 U.S. 215, 218 (1941) ("Mere legal para-
phernalia will not suffice to transform into a substantial adverse claimant a corporation whose
affairs are so closely assimilated to the affairs of the dominant stockholder that in substance it is
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veil piercing action, creditors of a corporation assert liability against
the shareholders of the corporation. The creditors seek to break
down the wall of limited liability that exists between a corporation and
its creditors, on the one hand, and the shareholders, on the other
hand. One of the primary functions of the corporate form is to insu-
late the shareholders from the creditors of the corporation by forming
an asset partition, shielding personal assets from business activity
risks. 104 In the classic case of asset partitioning by corporate form, we
conceive of individual natural persons as the protected shareholder
class. Investment in the corporation presents the extent and limit of
an individual's exposure to risk of particular business activity.
In a veil piercing action, plaintiffs allege that the corporation is
either the "alter ego" or a "mere instrumentality" of the shareholders,
as evidenced by a failure to observe corporate formalities. If share-
holders did not respect the corporate form, then that form should not
act as a liability shield for shareholders against the corporation's cred-
itors.10 5 Significantly, classic veil piercing doctrine requires a showing
of some connection between the failure to respect corporate form and
harm suffered by the veil piercing proponent.106 Substantive consoli-
dation doctrine applies this theory of respect for corporate form, rec-
ognizing that a parent company functions as a shareholder for its
subsidiary, just as an individual may function as a shareholder for a
single corporation. On my analysis, if factors exist to support veil
piercing outside of bankruptcy, then they also support substantive
consolidation in bankruptcy.
Typically, veil piercing involves "upstream" claims by corporate
creditors against shareholders. 10 7 In a substantive consolidation, di-
rection does not matter: through a request for substantive consolida-
tion, creditors of a parent may seek a direct claim against assets of a
little more than his corporate pocket."). The Court described the technique used by the bank-
ruptcy referee as "an order consolidating the estates." Id. at 219.
104 See Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 5, at 390.
105 I note those aspects of veil piercing that apply most directly to substantive consolidation
doctrine. Comprehensive attempts to understand the justification for veil piercing exist that
emphasize multiple factors and considerations, including undercapitalization of corporations and
fraudulent transfers to shareholders. See, e.g., Robert Charles Clark, The Duties of the Corpo-
rate Debtor to Its Creditors, 90 HARV. L. REV. 505, 542-43 (1977).
106 See, e.g., 1 WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER, FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRI-
VATE CORPORATIONS § 43 (perm. ed., rev. vol. 1999).
107 Though the upstream move provides the general pattern for veil piercing cases, exam-
ples of reverse veil piercing, in which creditors of a shareholder attempt to reach assets of the
corporation, do exist. See, e.g., Goldberg v. Engelberg, 92 P.2d 935, 935 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App.
1939); C.F. Trust, Inc. v. First Flight L.P., 580 S.E.2d 806, 810 (Va. 2003).
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subsidiary (a downstream move), creditors of a subsidiary may seek a
direct claim against assets of a parent (an upstream move), or credi-
tors of one subsidiary may seek a direct claim against assets of another
sister subsidiary (a lateral move). Disappointed creditors simply fol-
low the assets in an attempt to enhance their recoveries, with simulta-
neous moves in all directions permitted.
In a veil piercing action, disappointed creditors of the corporation
seek the assets of a shareholder, although existing creditors of the
shareholder are unable to share in the assets of the corporation. The
corporate creditors typically exhaust company assets and, remaining
unsatisfied in the process, thereafter seek recovery from the share-
holder, competing with existing creditors of the shareholder. In con-
trast, a substantive consolidation provides that creditors of the various
companies share pooled assets on a pari passu basis, absent court-im-
posed subordination. 1 8
In a consolidated group, the parent company forms the primary
asset partition between individual shareholders and creditors of group
members. My sense is that courts tend to respect this primary separa-
tion between individual investors and corporate group creditors in
large public bankruptcies, even if they ignore the various asset parti-
tions created by subsidiaries within the consolidated group, because of
practical difficulties associated with pursuing assets from a large, di-
verse shareholder group (and one likely to include the proverbial wid-
ows and orphans, or their trusts). This is why I believe that, in the
large public bankruptcy cases, we do not find that a substantive con-
solidation within the corporate group leads to a veil piercing action
against shareholders.
In addition to this practical reason, I believe that important deci-
sion makers in our society generally subscribe to the notion that lim-
ited liability for investors (particularly for individual natural persons)
is the foundation on which our successful capital markets are built.
Ignoring limited liability among the legal entities in a consolidated
group does not threaten the perceived beneficial precondition for a
successful capital market structure so long as use of the doctrine does
not spill over to create liability for individual investors. Application
of substantive consolidation doctrine stops at the border of the parent
company more because the alternative is unthinkable in our frame of
reference than for reasons of doctrinal coherence (though at the level
108 For classic presentations of equitable subordination, see Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295
(1939), and Taylor v. Standard Gas & Elec. Co. (Deep Rock), 306 U.S. 307 (1939).
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of doctrine it might be harder to show an identity between a company
and a large group of investors than between a company and a small
group of investors). Neither the practical concerns of tracing nor con-
cerns over capital market disruptions apply to limit application of the
doctrine to privately held businesses.
The veil piercing justification for substantive consolidation is par-
ticularly important to understanding the current state of the doctrine.
Veil piercing cases supply the seemingly endless list of factors that
courts recite to justify substantive consolidation. These factors often
appear as simple laundry lists, without separation of the important
from the relatively minor,10 9 creating a justified impression of un-
dertheorized chaos.110 When importing these factors into the substan-
tive consolidation context, courts often forget the traditional veil
piercing requirement that misuse of the corporate form must contrib-
ute to a harm. The veil piercing rationale for substantive consolida-
tion thus finds itself distanced from its origins, creating the risk that a
simple finding of substantial identity may trigger a substantive consoli-
dation. To make matters worse, courts often combine the economic
rationale with the (often scaled-down) veil piercing rationale.
B. How the Courts Have Mixed Two Different Standards
Consideration of the two most celebrated articulations of the sub-
stantive consolidation doctrine illustrates the case law confusion be-
tween the economic rationale and the veil piercing rationale. In
Union Savings Bank v. Augie/Restivo Baking Co.,"' the court states
the test as follows: "[first] whether creditors dealt with the entities as a
single economic unit and did not rely on their separate identity in ex-
tending credit .... or [second] whether the affairs of the debtors are so
entangled that consolidation will benefit all creditors. ' 112 The court
clearly contemplates a disjunctive test. The first "veil piercing"
branch of the test (i.e., the "single economic unit" finding) allows sub-
stantive consolidation without a prior finding that the remedy is
needed to correct an identified "wrong," though it adds to the "single
109 See supra note 73 (listing factors).
110 In this respect I am in complete agreement with the academic brief filed with the Third
Circuit in Owens Corning. See Brief of Amici Curiae, supra note 52, at 11 ("There is danger
here. Differing tests with a myriad of factors run the risk that courts will miss the forest for the
trees. Running down factors as a check list can lead a court to lose sight of why we have substan-
tive consolidation in the first instance.").
111 Union Sav. Bank v. Augie/Restivo Baking Co. (In re Augie/Restivo Baking Co.), 860
F.2d 515 (2d Cir. 1988).
112 Id. at 518 (quotation omitted) (citation omitted).
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economic unit" factor the additional requirement that a reliance inter-
est not be destroyed. In applying elements of the Augie/Restivo test,
the Third Circuit's Owens Corning analysis suffers from this defect by
applying a veil piercing rationale without a prior finding of harm. 113
The second "economic" rationale in Augie/Restivo retains a link to the
requirement of substantial identity with its metaphor of entanglement,
and grafts onto that notion the requirement of an economic benefit to
all creditors. Substantial identity figures in both branches of the test.
In contrast, the test in In re Auto-Train Corp. 114 requires the sub-
stantive consolidation proponent to make two showings: first, that "a
substantial identity [exists] between the entities to be consolidated,"
and second, "that consolidation is necessary to avoid some harm or to
realize some benefit. 11 5 If the proponent makes these showings, the
court may order substantive consolidation if it finds that the "demon-
strated benefits of consolidation heavily outweigh the harm. ' 116 The
Auto-Train test mixes the economic rationale with the veil piercing
rationale and, in the process, sanctions a pure wealth transfer from
one creditor class to another on mere economic grounds. Further, the
balancing of benefit against harm is inconsistent with Augie/Restivo's
notion of "benefit [to] all creditors." 117
To understand fully my reformulation of substantive consolida-
tion doctrine, you must distinguish between two types of creditor
"harm." The first type occurs whenever a creditor experiences a "de-
creased distribution" in consolidation-a basic economic harm. The
second type occurs whenever a creditor is "wronged." Under my
analysis, a wrong of the second type results when a court defeats a
creditor's reasonable reliance on the separate existence of a particular
legal entity-typically a harm resulting from interfering with a con-
tract-based right. This happens when a court eliminates benefits from
a specific contract right that a creditor enjoys which protects the sepa-
rate legal status of the entity relied upon. In my view, such a right
does not exist merely because a creditor has contracted with a particu-
113 See In re Owens Corning, 419 F.3d 195, 210 (3d Cir. 2005).
114 Drabkin v. Midland Ross Corp. (In re Auto-Train Corp.), 810 F.2d 270 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
115 Id. at 276.
116 Id. (quotation omitted). In an alternate version of this test used by the lower court in
Owens Corning, the question does not become whether the benefits heavily outweigh the harm
but, rather, whether an objecting creditor "relied on the separate credit of one of the entities to
be consolidated," and whether that creditor "will be prejudiced by substantive consolidation."
In re Owens Corning, 316 B.R. 168, 171 (Bankr. D. Del. 2004), rev'd, 419 F.3d 195 (3d Cir. 2005).
If reliance and prejudice are shown, then the consolidation is not proper. See id.
117 In re Augie/Restivo Baking Co., 860 F.2d at 518.
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lar debtor, because a creditor does not, in the usual case, have a right
to prevent a debtor from entering into business combinations.' 18 In-
stead, specific contractual protection of separateness must exist for re-
liance in this sense. An example of such a contract-based right would
be a covenant in a loan agreement in which a lender required an entity
(either borrower or guarantor) to maintain its separate corporate
existence.
Under my analysis, substantive consolidation does not produce a
"wrong" simply because the consolidation produces a wealth transfer.
The two types of "harm" are distinct. The facts underlying the Third
Circuit's Owens Corning decision strongly support this proposition.
In Owens Corning, if the presence of a wealth transfer were sufficient
to defeat substantive consolidation, the estimated $1 billion wealth
transfer from the syndicated lenders to the unsecured noteholders and
other parent creditors would have created a simple bar to use of the
doctrine. Rather than relying on the mere fact of a wealth transfer to
support its decision, the Third Circuit instead believed it needed to
find separate creditor reliance on the individual guarantors. 119 With-
out this reliance, apparently the Third Circuit would have viewed the
lower court's imposition of substantive consolidation proper despite
the wealth transfer.
C. How the Owens Corning Circuit Court Misunderstood the Role
of Reliance on Guarantees in Syndicated Finance
My analysis of the difference between a wealth transfer and a
wrong suggests that the Third Circuit made an error in Owens Corn-
ing when it found loan syndicate reliance on intercompany guarantees
(despite the amicus support from the Loan Syndications and Trading
Association).12° A lending syndicate typically employs a web of in-
tercompany guarantees defensively, rather than offensively. A defen-
sive use of intercompany guarantees ensures that no subsidiary
creditor has structural seniority over the syndicate's loans.1 2  This
protection allows the syndicate to rely confidently upon consolidated
financial statements and consolidated financial tests to monitor the
corporate group as a single economic unit. Testimony from lending
118 See infra note 123.
119 In re Owens Corning, 419 F.3d 195, 212-14 (3d Cir. 2005).
120 See id. The Loan Syndications and Trading Association is the industry association that
advances the interests of lenders participating in the syndicated lending market.
121 The structure of syndicated lending and its use of guarantees are explained in Widen,
Lord of the Liens, supra note 75.
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syndicate representatives suggests the defensive use of guarantees in
the Owens Corning credit agreement, though the Third Circuit drew
the opposite conclusion from its understanding of what it called
"Lending 101."122
A lending syndicate uses corporate form to ensure a priority posi-
tion-an offensive posture-only when it takes affirmative steps to
ensure that the asset partitions created by the separate corporate
forms within the consolidated group remain in place for the life of
their loans. Offensive use requires extra steps because the general
corporate law rule holds that a creditor may not oppose a consolida-
tion or merger. 123 If lenders do not want their borrower engaging in
business combinations, they must contractually prohibit them. For ex-
ample, if lenders make loans to a stand-alone company but do not
want the loans to continue if their borrower becomes a subsidiary of
another company, they include a "change in control" default in their
loan agreement. This accelerates the maturity of the loan upon acqui-
sition of the borrower. Similarly, from extensive personal experience,
I know that if lenders make loans to a particular subsidiary within a
corporate group and they want that loan to function as a stand-alone
credit, the lenders prohibit the merger, consolidation, or dissolution of
that subsidiary. A lender might require a pledge of shares of a subsid-
iary to further ensure the integrity of the asset partition. 124 The most
extensive affirmative steps to ensure integrity of an asset partition oc-
cur in securitization transactions because the asset partition between
122 For a debate on the issue of reliance, compare Owens Coming, 419 F.3d at 212, with
Post-Hearing Brief in Support of Substantive Consolidation at 52-73, Owens Coming, 419 F.3d
195 (Nos. 00-03837 to -03854 (JKF)) [hereinafter Post-Hearing Brief] (excerpting lender testi-
mony). For example, a lead credit officer supervising the loan agreement testified that she could
think of no purpose for the guarantees other than to avoid structural subordination. Post-Hear-
ing Brief, supra, at 57.
123 See, e.g., Cole v. Nat'l Cash Credit Ass'n, 156 A. 183, 185 (Del. Ch. 1931) ("[I]t is not
permitted to a creditor of a corporation to prevent its merger or consolidation with another if
the statutory law of its creation authorizes it."). In Cole, the financial condition of the combined
company was less sound than the prior stand-alone company against which the complaining
creditor had a claim. Id. at 186. The court rejected this as a justification for enjoining the con-
solidation. Id. The court reasoned that the consolidated company would provide the creditor
with a larger pool of net assets from which it could seek payment. Id. The creditor could now
bring the claim against the combined entity, which included a claim against the assets of the
former company as well as a claim against additional assets of its merger partner. Id.
124 Courts have found substantive consolidation improper if consolidation destroys the ben-
efits of a pledge of subsidiary shares unless a priority is given to the holder of the pledge. See,
e.g., FDIC v. Hogan (In re Gulfco Inv. Corp.), 593 F.2d 921, 926-27 (10th Cir. 1979).
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the SPC and other consolidated group members must survive to an
investment grade level of certainty.12 -
The Third Circuit found that the lending syndicate in Owens
Corning intended an offensive web of guarantees to afford it a priority
(rather than merely to assure it a defensive parity).126 On my analysis
of reliance, the court could only have done so if it believed that the
credit agreement protected the integrity of the individual subsidiaries.
The lower court did not provide a specific interpretation of the merger
covenant in its opinion, though it found an absence of creditor reli-
ance.12 7 My reading of the loan agreement leads me to believe that
the Owens Corning subsidiaries could merge with both themselves
and the parent, though in fairness to the Third Circuit, the drafting
could have been clearer. 128
Regardless of the presence or absence of a merger prohibition,
the loan agreement does not prohibit either the liquidation or the dis-
solution of the subsidiary companies into the parent, nor would it
have prohibited all the subsidiaries from forming a general partner-
ship with the parent-a move equally devastating to a corporate asset
partition. 12 9 In fact, so long as no material adverse effect resulted to
the consolidated group, the only entity that had to maintain its corpo-
125 See TRIBAR OPINION COMM., supra note 19, at 720.
126 Owens Corning, 419 F.3d at 213-14.
127 In re Owens Corning, 316 B.R. 168, 172 (Bankr. D. Del. 2004), rev'd, 419 F.3d 195 (3d
Cir. 2005). At the hearing, Judge Wolin remarked that he found Section 8.09 "potentially ambig-
uous," though he was later replaced by Judge Fullam who authored the lower court opinion. See
Post-Hearing Brief, supra note 122, at 59 (quotation omitted).
128 The prohibition on mergers appears in Section 8.09 of the credit agreement and
provides:
[Article 8] B. Negative Covenants. The Company shall not, and shall not per-
mit any Subsidiary to, directly or indirectly:
Section 8.09 Mergers, Consolidations and Acquisitions. (a) Merge or consoli-
date with any Person, except for, if after giving effect thereto no Default would
exist, (i) the Merger, (ii) any merger or consolidation of the Company or any Sub-
sidiary with any other Person; provided that (A) the Company or such Subsidiary,
as the case may be, shall be the continuing Person, and (B) in the case of a merger
or consolidation with any Subsidiary, the other Person shall not be a Subsidiary,
(iii) any merger or consolidation of any Subsidiary that is not a Loan Party with
and into any one or more other Subsidiaries, and (iv) any merger or consolidation
of any Subsidiary that is a Loan Party with any one or more other Subsidiaries that
are Loan Parties ....
Owens Corning, Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q), at 45, 50 (July 24, 1997), available at http://
www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data75234/0000075234-97-000012-index.html.
129 By forming a general partnership, the various entities in the consolidated group would
have become collectively liable for debts of the general partnership.
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rate existence to avoid default was the parent company.1 30 I suspect
the court did not consider these alternate structural possibilities be-
cause substantive consolidation so often is compared simply to a
merger (though the procedure bears equal analogy to dissolutions and
consolidations). Yet, because of these alternatives, the syndicate
could not properly have relied on the continued separate existence of
the subsidiaries to provide advantage. I find the lending syndicate's
claim of reliance on fragile and unprotected asset partitions inside
bankruptcy implausible when those very partitions might have been
eliminated without penalty outside bankruptcy.
Under the Owens Corning loan agreement, only subsidiaries with
assets of $30 million or more provided guarantees.1 31 The Third Cir-
cuit apparently viewed this threshold as further evidence of affirma-
tive lender reliance,132 similar to specifying collateral coverage for a
loan. The specification of a $30 million limit, in this context, does
nothing of the sort. In the case of collateral amounts, the lender typi-
cally seeks a particular loan to collateral value ratio for which the dol-
lar values of particular assets are crucial. A casual review of the
financial covenants in the Owens Corning credit agreement reveals
that the lenders structured a cash flow deal, not an asset coverage
deal-no specific dollar amount of guaranteed value supports out-
standing loan amounts.1 33
130 Owens Corning, Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q), supra note 128, at 44. My interpreta-
tion of the merger prohibition is strengthened by the covenant requiring the Company and its
Subsidiaries to maintain corporate existence. The Company (i.e., Owens Corning) must main-
tain its corporate existence but no default occurs if any subsidiary fails to do so provided that the
failure does not result in a materially adverse effect on the consolidated group. Id. The provi-
sion provides in relevant part:
[Article 8] A. Affirmative Covenants. The Company shall and shall cause each
Subsidiary to:
Section 8.01 Preservation of Existence and Properties, Scope of Business,
Compliance With Law, Payment of Taxes and Claims. (a) Preserve and maintain
its corporate existence and all of its other franchises, licenses, rights and privi-
leges, . . .except that this Section 8.01 (other than clause (a), in so far as it requires
the Company to preserve its corporate existence ... ) shall not apply in any circum-
stance where noncompliance, either singly or together with all other incidents of
non-compliance, would not have a Materially Adverse Effect on the Company and
the Consolidated Subsidiaries taken as a whole.
Id.
131 Owens Corning, 419 F.3d at 201.
132 Id. at 213 (noting that each subsidiary guarantor had assets with a book value equal to
at least $30 million).
133 Though I am critical of the Third Circuit's understanding of syndicated lending, I have
great sympathy for their predicament. The Third Circuit is not the first court, nor will it be the
last, that fails to understand a complex financial transaction and the context in which it was
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The $30 million limit likely arose as a compromise between pro-
tection for the lending syndicate and limitation of internal monitoring
costs for Owens Corning. Often corporate groups form subsidiaries
for minor purposes, such as reserving corporate names in a particular
jurisdiction. Any top-level manager who monitors a credit agreement
typically would be unaware of such small matters. Further, the person
forming the subsidiary would not be aware of the terms of a loan
agreement that required guarantees from "all" subsidiaries. Yet, top
managers must periodically certify to the lending syndicate that the
borrower is in compliance with the terms of its loan agreement. 134 A
$30 million guarantee threshold is low enough to give the lending syn-
dicate practical comfort that it has a direct claim on most of the assets
of the consolidated group, yet it is high enough to comfort top manag-
ers that they will not be forced to make false certifications about loan
agreement compliance. Far from the $30 million number functioning
as a surrogate for collateral, it simply represents a compromise be-
tween competing concerns in the context of breaking down an asset
partition.
Another way of looking at the situation is to recognize that, if the
provision of subsidiary guarantees had no cost, the lending syndicate
would have required them from all entities in the consolidated group.
Such a scheme would have provided a complete match between the
assets on the consolidated balance sheet (which the lending syndicate
uses to monitor the credit) and the assets against which the lending
syndicate might assert a pari passu claim.135
Many debtors will enter bankruptcy with unsecured intercom-
pany guarantees in place. Owens Coming effectively gives lending
syndicates holding such guarantees a veto right over any plan of reor-
ganization that proposes the use of substantive consolidation. The
Third Circuit's decision changes the structure of negotiations in cases
made. Counsel for the lending syndicate did a masterful job of eliciting, and then working with,
testimony in which syndicate managers acknowledged that a natural consequence of using guar-
antees was to create possible priorities for the lending syndicate.
134 Kenneth Lay, formerly of Enron, was convicted of ten counts in an indictment, four of
which asserted that he made false statements to banks from whom he had made margin borrow-
ings. Alexei Barrionuevo, The Enron Verdict: The Overview; 2 Enron Chiefs Are Convicted in
Fraud and Conspiracy Trial, N.Y. TIMES, May 26, 2006, at Al. His criminal indictment and
subsequent conviction highlight why members of management take care to avoid making false
statements to lending syndicates.
135 A significant exception to this general principle is the provision of guarantees by foreign
subsidiaries. For federal income tax reasons, lenders typically do not require guarantees from
foreign subsidiaries when they exist in a consolidated group because the guarantee results in a
deemed dividend. See I.R.C. § 956(a), (d) (2000).
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where intercompany guarantees are present, giving a veto right to
powerful economic players who did not rely on the guarantee to pro-
vide priority. When a priority based on corporate form is intended to
be relied upon, lending syndicates do not rely on naked guarantees.
Professional financiers require more. Significantly, creditworthy bor-
rowers resist providing security interests and limiting their ability to
manage internal corporate structure, believing that a good credit rat-
ing entitles them to access the credit markets with limited restrictions.
Whenever a borrower grants a security interest or agrees to overly
restrictive covenants, it sends the market a message of financial
weakness.
Before the Third Circuit's decision in Owens Corning, I can confi-
dently say that no sophisticated lending syndicate ever relied on a
mere covenant prohibiting merger, consolidation, or dissolution to
create priority when the syndicate itself employed a web of guaran-
tees. The reason for nonreliance on such covenants is simple: the mar-
ket believed that the presence of intercompany guarantees virtually
assured that imposition of substantive consolidation would be proper
for any companies forming part of an intercompany guarantee web
(and no competent counsel would have opined otherwise).136 In
Owens Coming, rather than a bona fide case of reliance on asset parti-
tions, we have a case of simple good fortune for the lenders: the asset
partitions and guarantees happened to remain in place until the bank-
ruptcy filing, and the continued presence of the guarantee structure
afforded them a priority.
My critique of the Third Circuit's approach in Owens Corning
does not follow simply from the court's imperfect understanding of
lending practices, but from my own analysis of how substantive con-
solidation doctrine should be reformulated. I turn now to that refor-
mulation, focusing first on economic justifications for substantive
consolidation (Part V) and then on the veil piercing rationale (Part
VI). Lastly, I formulate a new rationale for substantive consolidation
based on traditional fairness considerations (Part VII).
136 See, e.g., Eastgroup Props. v. S. Motel Ass'n, 935 F.2d 245, 248-49 (11th Cir. 1991); In re
Amereco Envtl. Servs., Inc., 125 B.R. 566, 568 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1991); Bruce Energy Ctr. Ltd.
v. Orfa Corp. of Am. (In re Orfa Corp. of Phila.), 129 B.R. 404, 415 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1991); In re
Snider Bros. Inc., 18 B.R. 230, 238 n.5 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1982); In re Manzey Land & Cattle Co.,
17 B.R. 332, 337 (Bankr. D.S.D. 1982); In re Commercial Envelope Mfg. Co., No. 76 B2354, 1977
Bankr. LEXIS, at *15 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Aug. 22, 1977); see also TRIBAR OPINION COMM., supra
note 19, at 741 (listing absence of guarantees as a factor supporting issuance of a legal opinion).
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V. Reformulating an Efficiency Promotion Rationale for the
Doctrine
In a classic substantive consolidation, multiple related companies
appear in a procedurally consolidated bankruptcy proceeding. Typi-
cally, a parent company owns one or more subsidiary companies. A
simple arithmetic example illustrates the different economic results
with and without a consolidation.
Table 2: Separate Entities Versus Consolidation
Asset Big Factor Local
Entity Value Bank Co. Bank
A $750 $1000 -0- -0-
B $500 -0- $1000 -0-
C $250 -0- 1 -0- $1000
Consol. $1500 $1000 $1000 $1000
Suppose company A owes Big Bank $1000 and owns assets worth
$750, company B owes Factor Co. $1000 and owns assets worth $500,
and company C owes Local Bank $1000 and owns assets worth $250.
In the absence of a substantive consolidation, Big Bank would receive
75% of its claim, Factor Co. would receive 50% of its claim, and Local
Bank would receive 25% of its claim. Upon the substantive consoli-
dation of the three companies, the aggregate of $3000 in claims would
be satisfied from the common pool of $1500 in assets, with each credi-
tor receiving 50% of its claim. Whereas Factor Co. is indifferent to
substantive consolidation, Big Bank is harmed and Local Bank is ben-
efited. Substantive consolidation almost always takes money from
one creditor to pay another creditor in a world without transaction
costs. In the simple model, substantive consolidation is a zero-sum
game. Ibis situation potentially changes when the transaction costs of
gathering information are factored into the model.
The question of substantive consolidation typically arises when a
court and the parties are unsure about the allocation of assets and
liabilities among the subject companies. Substantive consolidation of-
fers an inexpensive alternative to generating balance sheets for each
individual company in a consolidated group of companies. Dispensing
with the accounting and other procedures to generate separate bal-
ance sheets potentially saves transaction costs, leaving more assets
available for distribution to creditors.
I identify below four different scenarios that emerge from this
discussion and label them: Necessity, Pareto, Kaldor-Hicks, and
Wealth Transfer.
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A. The Necessity Scenario
Courts often employ the rhetoric of "necessity" to justify the use
of substantive consolidation. 137 When the facts of a case reflect ex-
tremely poor recordkeeping, a failure to observe corporate formali-
ties, and similar deficiencies, this rhetoric actually may match a
situation where separate accounting is truly impossible (i.e., incapable
of reconstruction by forensic accountants). If the asset identification
function within the consolidated group has broken down, the only
practical alternative appears to be a pooling of the assets of the sub-
ject companies and the pro rata satisfaction of third-party creditors
from a common fund.138 I consider such a situation a proper one for
use of the "necessity" rhetoric. In true cases of necessity, poor record-
keeping and failure to observe corporate formalities may explain the
breakdown in the asset identification function. Such shortcomings
should not, however, be seen in themselves as reasons for imposition
of substantive consolidation. 139
Though I use the inability to reconstruct financial records as my
paradigm case of necessity, courts might be confronted with other
forms of necessity presented by a complex business form. In the
ongoing Adelphia bankruptcy case, for example, one party requested
that each individual debtor in the procedurally consolidated cases be
represented by an independent fiduciary and an independent coun-
137 See infra note 149 and accompanying text.
138 I term a pro rata distribution as the "only" practical alternative based on my assumption
of what distributional schemes will satisfy collective notions of fairness. In cases of shortage, the
allocation of available resources based, pro rata, on the amount of the claim has broad appeal. I
trace the notion at least back to Jeremy Bentham:
The loss of a portion of wealth will produce, in the total happiness of the loser, a
defalcation greater or less, according to the proportion of the part lost to the part
which remains.
Take away from a man the fourth part of his fortune, and you take away the
fourth part of his happiness, and so on.
BENTHAM, supra note 1, at 106.
This notion is grounded in the principle of average utility, which directs society to maximize
the average utility per capita rather than total utility. See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE
162 (1971). Other schemes might be advanced, such as a lottery with the winner being paid first,
in full, with those holding higher numbers paid in order until funds are exhausted. In lieu of a
lottery to determine order of payment, one might adopt a temporal priority by paying either the
oldest or the most recent claims first.
139 Some cases suggest that poor recordkeeping and failure to observe corporate formali-
ties may constitute separate and independent grounds for imposition of substantive consolida-
tion as a form of penalty for poor corporate housekeeping. See Kors, supra note 7, at 433 &
n.272. In my formulation, such failures do not justify ignoring the separate entity form unless
one of my three rationales for substantive consolidation is met. Accord id.
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sel. 140 As consolidated group members in large bankruptcies often
number in the hundreds or the thousands, the sheer complexity of
consolidated group structure may overtax the professional resources
available to manage procedurally consolidated cases on an entity-by-
entity basis. Indeed, one suspects that the creditor in Adelphia re-
quested separate entity representation to create negotiation leverage
equal to the increased costs and disruption that granting such a re-
quest would create.
Though I do not find case law disagreement over use of substan-
tive consolidation in situations of strong necessity, two practical
problems lurk behind the analysis: (1) the poor quality of corporate
recordkeeping and (2) the magnitude of particular recordkeeping
problems in relation to the actual effect on creditors caused by imposi-
tion of substantive consolidation.
In practice, I have found that business recordkeeping is often
quite poor, 141 even in well-run businesses. Many courts considering
substantive consolidation will be able to conclude that it is, in some
sense, "impossible" to identify accurately the assets and liabilities of
consolidated group members. To effect a separation, a court may
need to draw arbitrary lines to establish the levels of intercompany
payables and receivables-to decide which asset transfer was a loan,
which asset transfer was a capital contribution, and which asset trans-
fer was a dividend. Unless courts require something short of perfec-
tion for entity separation, almost any business situation might support
imposition of substantive consolidation on necessity grounds. 42
Unfortunately, the case law does not give much guidance on the
extent to which a court should allow parties and their accountants to
fill gaps in order to create the separate books and records needed to
140 In re Adelphia Commc'ns Corp., 333 B.R. 649, 655 (S.D.N.Y. 2005). The party later
dropped the request for such relief. Id. at 665 & n.102.
141 See David Wessel, Wall Street Is Cleaning Derivatives Mess, WALL ST. J., Feb. 16, 2006,
at A2 (describing 18,000 undocumented credit derivatives trades). Moreover, it would not sur-
prise me to find that insolvent companies, on average, have less comprehensive and accurate
recordkeeping than solvent companies and that poor recordkeeping might contribute to the poor
financial condition by providing management with less information. I do not, however, know
that to be the case and, accordingly, I am not suggesting an independent penalty for failure to
keep a clean corporate house. Certainly, as Coase's model suggests, some recordkeeping might
be inefficient.
142 I do not mean to suggest that such matters need to be proven "beyond a reasonable
doubt" or some other standard in excess of that typically required for proof in a civil matter. I
do mean that, in some cases, there simply will not be any evidence (or, at least, evidence appro-
priate for civil proof) to decide the allocation question.
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administer separate bankruptcy estates. Though pure creative writing
should not suffice, what type of evidence should pass muster? 143
The recordkeeping problem looms large in any case in which the
range of the uncertainty related to settling intercompany accounts is
small in relation to the estimated distributional effect on third-party
creditors caused by a substantive consolidation. A simple arithmetic
example illustrates this point. Suppose that company A owns $100 of
tangible assets and owes Local Bank $1000, while company B owns
$500 of tangible assets and owes Big Bank $1000. If we analyze this
situation before consideration of intercompany balances, we find that
imposition of substantive consolidation is a boon to Local Bank and a
disaster for Big Bank.
This situation may not change much if we set reliable upper and
lower bounds on the amount of net intercompany payables and re-
ceivables. For example, suppose that, as a historical matter, A and B
actively exchanged assets, with A sometimes owing B up to $50 in net
payments and B sometimes owing A up to $50 in net payments. Sup-
pose that, other than a justified belief in this range, no reliable infor-
mation allows the level of intercompany receivables to be set as of the
bankruptcy filing date. A substantive consolidation still works a sig-
nificant disadvantage for Big Bank even if we use the range of net
intercompany payables least favorable to B (i.e., B owing A $50 net).
Indeed, this type of situation may reflect the true facts in Owens Corn-
ing. In such a case, we are confident that substantive consolidation
results in a wealth transfer from Big Bank to Local Bank even though
we are unable to place a precise dollar figure on the amount of the
wealth transfer. 144
If no basis exists to set an upper or lower bound on the net in-
tercompany payables and receivables, then substantive consolidation
is proper on grounds of necessity. In many cases, however, the court
will be able to estimate ranges. 145 What should a court do if the only
determinable facts allow the setting of an upper and a lower bound,
but not fixing any details in between? Again, the existing case law
143 Some courts have attempted to answer the issue of what constitutes a permissible de-
gree of accounting inaccuracy. See, e.g., R 2 Invs., LDC v. World Access, Inc. (In re World
Access, Inc.), 301 B.R. 217, 276-79 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2003).
144 The Third Circuit perceived this to be the situation in Owens Coming. See In re Owens
Corning, 419 F.3d 195, 215 n.26 (3d Cir. 2005).
145 At least the parties may think they can set ranges. Some research suggests that bank-
ruptcy participants may not be particularly good at making these kinds of judgments. See Lynn
M. LoPucki, The Myth of the Residual Owner: An Empirical Study, 82 WASH. U. L.Q. 1341,
1345-46 (2004).
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provides little guidance to answer this type of question.146 My recom-
mendation in such cases is that courts impose a partial substantive
consolidation,147 but I am not aware of any court that has taken the
precise step in contested cases needed to solve this kind of estimation
or range problem. The settlement in Enron provides one example of
a form of partial substantive consolidation that might be adapted for
this purpose. In a negotiated settlement context, the Enron parties
allowed claims on the basis that litigation to force a substantive con-
solidation had a 30% chance of success. Thus, 30% of each claim's
amount was paid as if substantive consolidation had been ordered and
the balance of each claim was paid as if substantive consolidation had
not been ordered. 148 The compromise appeared to result from an as-
sessment of the relative strengths and weaknesses of the substantive
consolidation claims, rather than limits on the ability to conduct fact
finding. In the Owens Corning case, however, the problem focused on
by the district judge appeared to be the cost and ability to conduct fact
finding on issues related to intercompany payables, with the amount
in dispute being a far lower dollar amount than the amount of the
wealth transfer that would result from a complete substantive consoli-
dation. If the Owens Corning court found uncertainty over the alloca-
tion of $100 million in receivables among various entities, I suggest
that a different sort of partial consolidation might have been ordered
(i.e., rather than one predicated on the probabilities of success). The
court might have distributed $100 million in assets as if the estates had
been consolidated, with the balance distributed as if no consolidation
had taken place. Such a compromise would allow cost savings associ-
ated with foregoing accounting procedures (while avoiding the "all or
nothing" quality of the actual $1 billion dispute that confronted the
court in Owens Corning) because the partial consolidation would have
146 Case law suggests that courts have flexibility to craft partial substantive consolidations
of some sort, though the particular case law examples amount to simply preferring one creditor
or collateral claim against the claims of other creditors. See, e.g., First Nat'l Bank of El Dorado
v. Giller (In re Giller), 962 F.2d 796, 799 (8th Cir. 1992); FDIC v. Hogan (In re Gulfco Inv.
Corp.), 593 F.2d 921, 927 (10th Cir. 1979); Talcott v. Wharton (In re Cont'l Vending Mach.
Corp.), 517 F.2d 997, 1001-02 (2d Cir. 1975); In re Pittsburgh Rys., 155 F.2d 477, 484-85 (3d Cir.
1946); Gill v. Sierra Pac. Const., Inc. (In re Parkway Calabasas Ltd.), 89 B.R. 832, 837 (Bankr.
C.D. Cal. 1988). Even the "deemed" consolidation might be seen as a form of partial consolida-
tion because legal entities are not actually combined. Though courts and commentators have
noted general court authority to custom tailor partial consolidations, see Kors, supra note 7, at
450-51 & n.337, I am not aware of cases or commentators advocating the form of partial consoli-
dation that I suggest to solve problems of proof.
147 See Kors, supra note 7, at 450-51 & n.337.
148 See Findings of Fact, supra note 58, at 47-48.
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been crafted as a solution tailored to the size of the accounting prob-
lem. All creditors in Owens Corning might have benefited from the
administrative cost savings if a partial consolidation had been used
whereas a total consolidation created a large wealth transfer.
Courts also employ necessity rhetoric to justify imposition of sub-
stantive consolidation when no literal impossibility exists, but the
costs associated with providing a separate accounting are prohibitively
high.149 This second use of "necessity" reflects a judicial determina-
tion that the accounting and related costs of preparing separate finan-
cial records for individual companies is so significant that it
jeopardizes a meaningful return to creditors. In these cases, substan-
tive consolidation preserves a return to creditors by reducing the ac-
counting costs-consolidation is "necessary" to maximize each
creditor's recovery. Courts often supplement necessity rhetoric by
finding that a substantive consolidation "benefits all creditors.' 150
This second type of case forms the "Pareto Scenario."
B. The Pareto Scenario
I borrow the label "Pareto" from welfare economics.1 51 I intend
my use of the label as simply descriptive of a particular class of finan-
cial circumstances. Substantive consolidation may distribute the sav-
ings achieved by dispensing with procedures to separately account for
each member in a consolidated group in a manner that improves each
creditor's position. The situation feels like the familiar Pareto im-
provement from economics. A substantive consolidation fits my
Pareto Scenario if no creditor's expected recovery is reduced and at
149 For a case that displays concerns over both actual necessity and practical necessity asso-
ciated with high administrative accounting costs, see Chemical Bank N.Y. Trust Co. v. Kheel, 369
F.2d 845, 847 (2d Cir. 1966).
150 Union Sav. Bank v. Augie/Restivo Baking Co. (In re Augie/Restivo Baking Co.), 860
F.2d 515, 518 (2d Cir. 1988).
151 See Howard F. Chang, A Liberal Theory of Social Welfare: Fairness, Utility, and the
Pareto Principle, 110 YALE L.J. 173, 175 (2000) (describing the Pareto principle as a measure of
improvement in social welfare). See generally Talcott Parsons, Pareto's Central Analytical
Scheme, in PARETO & MOSCA 71, 81-83 (James H. Meisel ed., 1965). I do not use the term to
describe a rule of decision that might be used for a particular society as a whole, but simply use
the same arithmetic to describe procedures for deciding allocations among creditors in a particu-
lar bankruptcy proceeding. In this narrow setting, the welfare of creditors is determined by the
size of their recoveries. Further, I do not wish to take sides in the debate over whether the
Pareto principle is compatible with notions of fairness. Compare Louis Kaplow & Steven
Shavell, Notions of Fairness Versus the Pareto Principle: On the Role of Logical Consistency, 110
YALE L.J. 237 (2000), with Howard F. Chang, The Possibility of a Fair Paretian, 110 YALE L.J.
251 (2000). I use the arithmetic of the Pareto principle to sharpen case law notions that use of
substantive consolidation doctrine should benefit all creditors.
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least one creditor's expected recovery is increased by the consolida-
tion.152 Return to our base example, but now with the introduction of
a column to illustrate the impact of transaction costs.
Table 3: Transaction Cost Effects in Parento Scenario
Entity Value Costs Big Bank Factor Co. Local Bank
A $750 ($250) $1000/500 -0- -0-
B $500 ($250) -0- $1000/250 -0-
C $250 ($250) -0- -0- $1000/-0-
Consol. $1500 N/A $1000/500 $1000/500 $1000/500
Introducing transaction costs, Big Bank would receive $500 in ei-
ther the consolidation or in the separately administered case (and is
thus indifferent). Factor Co. would receive $500 in the consolidation
but only $250 in the separately administered case, and Local Bank
would receive $500 in the consolidation and $0 in the separately ad-
ministered case. Thus, when the transaction costs153 incurred to create
separate balance sheets are factored into the analysis, a substantive
consolidation yields a preferred result for two creditors and a neutral
result for one creditor. In the real world, however, neither the parties
nor the court have any assurance that a substantive consolidation will
yield such a value-enhancing result because the transaction costs to be
incurred must be incurred in order to perform the very calculation at
issue. Only with hindsight, after incurring the transaction costs, might
we determine whether a substantive consolidation actually put more
money in the creditors' pockets than separately administered estates.
Despite this chicken-and-egg problem caused by lack of knowl-
edge, parties and courts might make educated guesses about the rela-
tive costs and benefits of imposing substantive consolidation. In cases
in which all parties make the same assessment, a substantive consoli-
dation might be agreed upon as part of a reorganization plan and no
controversy will result.154 A controversy will, however, arise in two
cases. First, different parties might make honest, but different, esti-
mates concerning the relative costs and benefits of a substantive con-
152 These criteria are analogous to the strong Pareto criteria. The analog to the weak
Pareto criteria would require that the consolidation benefit all creditors.
153 I use the costs associated with preparing balance sheets as an example. In fact, these
costs are merely one type of cost that might be saved. Cost savings include reduced litigation
costs over fraudulent transfers, the benefits of emerging from bankruptcy sooner, and the simpli-
fication in, and reduction in number of, plans of reorganization that must be prepared and dis-
tributed to creditors for votes.
154 Nevertheless, case law tells us that a court must make a separate and independent find-
ing that substantive consolidation is justified. See supra text accompanying notes 56-62.
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solidation compared to the costs and benefits of separately
administered estates. Second, one or more parties might elect to en-
gage in strategic behavior. For example, Big Bank might object to a
substantive consolidation hoping to extract some value from Local
Bank because, in the absence of the consolidation, the parties expect
Local Bank to receive little or nothing and estimate that Big Bank will
receive a substantially equivalent recovery. Big Bank might "sell" its
consent to the substantive consolidation by initially objecting to a pro-
posed consolidation. For an enhanced recovery percentage, Big Bank
might later drop its objection to a plan that included substantive con-
solidation. The enhanced recovery to Big Bank would be justified as
part of a settlement of litigation over substantive consolidation.
Such hold-out behavior might arise based solely on facts and cir-
cumstances related to that case. But it may also be the product of a
differing perspective between a court and creditors. In theory, the
court administers a bankruptcy case in the best interests of the partic-
ular group of creditors in the case before it. Individual creditors, how-
ever, may have rational incentives outside the particular case to take
positions that do not maximize returns within the case. 155 Beyond
possible different vantage points between judges and creditors, the
possibility of court action further allows a judicial override if the per-
sonalities and testosterone levels in a particular case come to over-
shadow the exercise of sound judgment-a not uncommon
phenomenon in my observation of workout negotiations.
However rationalized, courts routinely approve substantive con-
solidation under the rubric of "benefiting all creditors"-a justifica-
tion grounded in the promotion of efficiency. 156 The promotion of
efficiency has a firm grounding in the history of the Bankruptcy Code
and its predecessors. 157 I turn now to another scenario in which ap-
peals to efficiency might justify imposition of substantive consolida-
tion, but one which courts have not explicitly adopted.
155 This situation might exist for creditors who participate in numerous bankruptcy cases.
Positions taken in one case may influence results in other cases. In effect, any particular bank-
ruptcy case functions as merely one stage in a multistage, multiplayer game for these creditors.
For example, a bank might take a tough position in one case, even at the expense of its recovery
in that case, hoping its reputation for tough negotiating will provide advantage in another case.
156 See Union Sav. Bank v. Augie/Restivo Baking Co. (In re Augie/Restivo Baking Co.),
860 F.2d 515, 518 (2d Cir. 1988).
157 See supra note 101.
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C. The Kaldor-Hicks Scenario
If a court embraced the "Kaldor-Hicks Scenario" as justifying
substantive consolidation, the court would use the remedy when: (1)
those creditors benefiting from the consolidation could afford to pay
those creditors harmed by the consolidation and still be better off fi-
nancially, and (2) those creditors harmed by the consolidation could
not afford to bribe those benefiting from the consolidation to forego
the consolidation. Though I again borrow a label from welfare eco-
nomics, my use of "Kaldor-Hicks" is intended simply as a description
of financial circumstances affecting a clearly identified group of credi-
tors in a bankruptcy proceeding, and is not intended to be suggestive
of a decision procedure applicable to improve a larger segment of
society.
An arithmetic example illustrates the point by simply changing
the relative transaction costs needed to separately account for each
entity.
Table 4: Transaction Costs in Kaldor-Hicks Scenario
Entity Value Costs Big Bank Factor Co. Local Bank
A $750 ($150) $1000/600 -0- -0-
B $500 ($350) -0- $1000/150 -0-
C $250 ($250) -0- -0- $1000/-0-
Consol. $1500 N/A $1000/500 $1000/500 $1000/500
Administration through a substantive consolidation would hurt
Big Bank (by lowering its recovery from $600 to $500), though it
would help both Factor Co. (by increasing its recovery from $150 to
$500) and Local Bank (by increasing its recovery from $0 to $500).
Though this simple consolidation would not satisfy the narrow Pareto
improvement criteria (because Big Bank is hurt by the consolidation),
substantive consolidation yields enough cost savings such that Factor
Co. and Local Bank could pay Big Bank to accept the consolidation
and, following the payment, all parties would benefit financially. Such
a simple renegotiation would find Factor Co. and Local Bank agreeing
to pay Big Bank an aggregate of $101 or more to consent to the sub-
stantive consolidation.
Unlike the Necessity Scenario and the Pareto Scenario in which
case law rhetoric matches the scenario, I do not find reported cases
which embrace the rhetoric of the Kaldor-Hicks Scenario to justify
imposition of substantive consolidation. Outside the case law, how-
ever, I find a large number of negotiated reorganizations in which sub-
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stantive consolidation is imposed as part of implementing a plan, or in
which settlement of threatened substantive consolidation litigation is
used, as the rationale to adjust claim amounts and/or percentage re-
coveries. 158 The large number of consensual substantive consolidation
reorganization plans suggests to me that, in some cases, courts ap-
prove substantive consolidation in Kaldor-Hicks Scenarios that are
not also Pareto improvements. 159 I suspect parties often negotiate re-
organization plans to share cost savings to improve the positions of all
parties even though mere imposition of substantive consolidation, ab-
sent the negotiation, would not have improved everyone's position. If
this supposition is correct, the possibility of a Kaldor-Hicks improve-
ment functions as a silent efficiency rationale for imposition of sub-
stantive consolidation or use of the doctrine by a court in justifying
approval of a reorganization plan or a settlement. The important
point is this: courts do not expressly mention Kaldor-Hicks improve-
ment as a rationale because they wait until the parties themselves
have converted a Kaldor-Hicks Scenario into a Pareto Scenario
through negotiations.
Another possibility does exist, given that the parties are function-
ing under the umbrella of uncertainty. Creditors who believe (1) that
they are operating in a Kaldor-Hicks Scenario and (2) that they would
be harmed by use of substantive consolidation (such as Big Bank in
the example) simply may fear that, despite their beliefs, the facts
would allow a court to support a finding of a Necessity Scenario or a
Pareto Scenario and that this finding would not constitute reversible
error, even if erroneous. In such a case, the threat of substantive con-
solidation looms over the negotiation of the reorganization plan, lead-
ing creditors to agree to settle claim amounts and distribution
percentages at levels they believe fairly allocate savings associated
with the use of substantive consolidation in a Kaldor-Hicks Scenario.
For example, Big Bank may accept an aggregate payment of $75 to
approve a consolidation for fear that, even though on the actual facts
Big Bank should receive $101 or more, the court will order consolida-
tion and Big Bank will receive only $500, rather than the $600 it be-
lieves it is entitled to outside of consolidation.
As with the Pareto Scenario, creditors have incentives to agree to
a substantive consolidation reorganization plan in a Kaldor-Hicks Sce-
158 See generally Widen, Prevalence of Substantive Consolidation, supra note 20.
159 To think otherwise, one would have to assume that all these consensual substantive
consolidation plans either are cases of strict necessity or cases of a Pareto improvement. This is
a restrictive assumption that seems unlikely to me and, therefore, one that I do not make.
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nario because negotiations allow each creditor to improve its position.
Again, one might question the need for the remedy to apply in such a
scenario because the parties should agree to the efficient outcome
without court intervention. Again, the motive of limiting strategic be-
havior applies in the Kaldor-Hicks Scenario as in the Pareto Scenario.
Through the threat of substantive consolidation, the court can influ-
ence the parties to produce an efficient result even if they would fail
to reach that result in the absence of the threat.
Why does case law rhetoric fail to embrace forced imposition of
substantive consolidation in the Kaldor-Hicks Scenario? Perhaps
courts fear that the precedent of causing certain creditors economic
harm to create economic gain for other creditors cannot be contained.
Once harm to a particular creditor is allowed because it enhances
overall creditor recoveries, the rationale may expand beyond the nar-
row situation in which we might criticize the harmed creditor for fail-
ure to reach a bargain sharing benefits that flow from consolidation.
The same problem does not apply to a reorganization plan negotiated
in a Kaldor-Hicks Scenario, because the negotiation produces a
Pareto-like result. A consolidation imposed by the court in a Kaldor-
Hicks Scenario, without negotiation, produces a wealth transfer as a
penalty for failure to agree (unless the court attempts to mirror a ne-
gotiated result by, for example, ordering consolidation with respect to
a portion of the estate). Yet there is no assurance that the penalty will
fall on those who might be said to have unreasonably failed to reach
agreement. Rather than imposing a random penalty for negotiation
failure, the court approves a plan in a Kaldor-Hicks Scenario only af-
ter the negotiation results in reallocations benefiting all creditors. Al-
lowing courts to order partial consolidations tailored to the size of
identified accounting problems would give the courts a tool to achieve
a result benefiting all creditors in the absence of negotiations con-
verting a Kaldor-Hicks Scenario into a Pareto Scenario.
Even though imposing substantive consolidation might produce
cost savings that boost the total payments to creditors, we would not
criticize a creditor for opposing consolidation if the harm to the credi-
tor exceeded any possible compensating payment from other credi-
tors. In such a case, the substantive consolidation creates a wealth
transfer-my fourth scenario.
D. The Wealth Transfer Scenario
In a Wealth Transfer Scenario, the aggregate amount of losses
suffered as a result of substantive consolidation by creditors harmed
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in the consolidation exceeds the aggregate amount of transaction cost
savings realized by imposing substantive consolidation. The losses
suffered by the disadvantaged creditors show up as gains for the credi-
tors who benefit from the consolidation. Because the substantive con-
solidation saves transaction costs, the aggregate payout to creditors
with consolidation exceeds the aggregate payout to creditors without
consolidation (even though some individual creditors are worse off).
As seen in the Necessity Scenario, some cases of necessity may result
in wealth transfers. 60 This will be the case when the magnitude of
accounting questions that are not determinable (e.g., does company B
own a $50 receivable or owe a $50 payable?) is small in relation to the
estimated wealth transfer effected by the substantive consolidation
(e.g., the expected $500 loss suffered by Big Bank as a result of
consolidation).
The Third Circuit clearly identified the Owens Corning case as a
Wealth Transfer Scenario, 161 while the district judge found substantive
consolidation "a virtual necessity" to effect the reorganization. 62
Both courts might be correct. Indeed, we have seen how a case of
necessity can overlap with a case of pure wealth transfer. The existing
articulation of the substantive consolidation doctrine did not give the
district judge the option of imposing partial substantive consolidation
to save costs without creating a wealth transfer.163
The Third Circuit decision might be seen to foreclose a substan-
tive consolidation that results in a pure wealth transfer (particularly a
significant wealth transfer). The better view is instead that the Third
Circuit decision simply rejects the district judge's finding of necessity.
The latter reading is strongly preferred because, in the face of a
wealth transfer, the court went on to consider whether substantive
consolidation conflicted with the lending syndicate's reliance interest.
160 See supra Part V.A ("The Necessity Scenario").
161 In re Owens Corning, 419 F.3d 195, 214 (3d Cir. 2005).
162 In re Owens Corning, 316 B.R. 168, 172 (Bankr. D. Del. 2004), rev'd, 419 F.3d 195 (3d
Cir. 2005).
163 The Third Circuit identified the possibility of a partial consolidation as an open question
in Owens Corning. See Owens Corning, 419 F.3d at 210 n.16. Case law supports a partial ap-
proach in similar contexts. See supra text accompanying note 146. Generally, a partial consoli-
dation would involve a court-imposed accommodation, similar to the negotiated settlement in
Enron, in which a portion of the estate is distributed as if consolidation had been ordered, with
the balance being distributed on a separate entity basis. See supra text accompanying note 146.
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E. Reformulation of the Economic Rationale
In summary, case law should be reinterpreted to justify the impo-
sition of substantive consolidation on economic grounds in the Neces-
sity Scenario and the Pareto Scenario. In addition, courts might
properly justify approval of substantive consolidation in the Kaldor-
Hicks Scenario when the parties have conducted their own negotia-
tions as reflected in a plan of reorganization or a settlement, so that,
by the time the plan or settlement is approved, benefits flow to all
creditors. The approval of the plan then rises or falls with the voting
procedures of Chapter 11. In no case, however, does the economic
rationale support the imposition of substantive consolidation on eco-
nomic grounds alone when the consolidation creates a pure wealth
transfer. Case law to the contrary should thus be rejected. 164 A court
might use dicta in a variety of cases to support crafting a "partial"
consolidation to break an impasse between creditors when a case of
"minor" necessity arises. 165 General acceptance of "partial" consoli-
dation as a method to save costs in cases of factual uncertainty (as a
supplement to the "deemed" consolidation procedure) is a develop-
ment that I would strongly endorse. 166
The valuation/timing problem for application of the substantive
consolidation doctrine is analogous to the valuation/timing problem
with identifying the "residual owner" of a bankruptcy estate. Profes-
sor LoPucki succinctly states the problem with identifying the residual
owner:
To identify the residual owner presumably would require val-
uation of the firm. That valuation would have to occur at the
outset of the bankruptcy reorganization case. Yet, valuation
is notoriously expensive and difficult. Indeed, valuation is
the essence of the bankruptcy reorganization process. If the
court could value the firm at the outset of the proceeding,
the proceeding would no longer be necessary. 167
Similar to the problem of identifying a "residual owner," a court
often will not be sure that its imposition of substantive consolidation
will benefit all creditors. In some cases, for a court to make this find-
ing confidently, the parties would need to have already spent the time,
effort, and expense to prepare separate balance sheets. Yet, avoiding
164 An example of the rhetoric courts should ignore is the balancing test in Auto-Train. See
supra text accompanying notes 114-16.
165 See supra note 146.
166 See supra note 146.
167 LoPucki, supra note 145, at 1345-46 (citation omitted).
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this expenditure provides the very benefit that imposition of substan-
tive consolidation is expected to produce. The circular process of de-
termining the facts needed to justify application of the rule destroys
the benefit achieved by application of the rule. At a minimum, a sig-
nificant tension exists between the need to find facts and the antici-
pated benefits. The more fact finding required, the less savings
creditors might realize. Uncertainty is present in all scenarios. There
is, however, no uncertainty in the application of the rule. The rule of
decision is not open textured, though the application of the doctrine is
uncertain for epistemological reasons. Use of a laundry list of factors
detailing a failure to observe corporate formalities relating to a break-
down in the internal asset identification function of the consolidated
group serves as a heuristic device to justify the finding of cost savings
that benefit all creditors. This use of factors differs, however, from
use of factors in a balancing test.
One might rationally decide that proper analysis of substantive
consolidation should begin and end with the economic account given
above. The rhetoric of case law instead reveals a separate and distinct
justification for substantive consolidation grounded in the rationale
originally evolved for corporate law "veil piercing" and related doc-
trines. Lawyers involved in securitization transactions recognize this
dual strand of justification for substantive consolidation. Veil piercing
cases still receive mention in substantive consolidation legal opinions
rendered in structured financings, attesting to the doctrine's continued
vitality.
VI. Veil Piercing as a Stand-Alone Rationale for the Doctrine
In contrast to substantive consolidation grounded in economics,
where the stated rule is clear but the facts are uncertain, the rule justi-
fying substantive consolidation on veil piercing grounds is open tex-
tured, though the facts are not often disputed. The law provides a list
of factors without suggesting the particular weights assigned to those
factors or how those factors might combine to produce an outcome.
The judicial discretion to assign different weights to particular factors
(or combinations of factors) contributes to the open texture of the
doctrine and to the indeterminacy of outcome. 168 Factors such as com-
mon directors, officers, and shared bank accounts present little room
for factual disagreement. The debate revolves around the legal effect
168 See generally John Zeleznikow, The Split- Up Project: Induction, Context and Knowledge
Discovery in Law, 3 LAW, PROBABILITY & RISK 147 (2004) (describing various sources of open
texture in law).
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given to such facts. 169 The problems facing substantive consolidation
justified on veil piercing grounds mirror the problems facing substan-
tive consolidation justified on economic efficiency grounds.
My reflection on the cases produces the following principle: a
court may order substantive consolidation to correct a "wrong" if, in
so doing, the court does not commit a "wrong." For this purpose, pro-
ducing a simple wealth transfer does not constitute a "wrong." The
classic wrong committed by a company in a substantive consolidation
case is some form of misrepresentation in which the company mis-
leads a class of creditors into thinking that more assets support their
loans than in fact exist. 170 (This is true whether the deficiency existed
at the time of the loan or resulted from subsequent transfers.) This
explains why, in many early cases, courts employ the substantive con-
solidation remedy in circumstances that also support the use of fraud-
ulent conveyance law to protect creditors.171 In these latter cases, the
debtor typically has transferred assets to a related company to prevent
payment to a creditor. Breach of a covenant also might constitute a
"wrong" correctable by substantive consolidation.172 I am not sug-
gesting that a court is limited to correcting only actionable "wrongs"
such as fraud.
The various factors listed to support the veil piercing rationale for
substantive consolidation should not be examined solely for the pur-
pose of generating an identity among the various companies as might
be done in a traditional "alter ego" or "instrumentality" analysis. In-
stead, I suggest that the court should consider these factors as part of
its determination of whether a wrong was committed, such as mislead-
ing a creditor. One can easily see how, in some cases, a combination
of the veil piercing factors might produce a creditor misperception.
The misperception might be caused either from a breakdown in the
internal asset identification function of the consolidated group or from
169 See, e.g., Fish v. East, 114 F.2d 177, 191 (10th Cir. 1940) (listing factors to consider
because "[tihe determination as to whether a subsidiary is an instrumentality is primarily a ques-
tion of fact and degree").
170 Cf. Posner, supra note 83, at 520-22 (discussing veil piercing).
17' For example, Sampsell v. Imperial Paper & Color Corp., 313 U.S. 215 (1941), is essen-
tially a fraudulent transfer case. See also Kors, supra note 7, at 392.
172 It is common for a syndicated loan agreement to provide that the borrower must cause
any new subsidiary formed by it to execute a guarantee of the loan. If the borrower forms
subsidiary companies but does not cause the guarantees to be executed, then the syndicate will
be structurally subordinated to credit incurred by the new subsidiaries. The existence of a de-
fault for failure to procure the guarantees does not change this result. In such a case, a substan-
tive consolidation of the new subsidiaries with the borrower would correct the harm caused by
the breach, benefiting, rather than harming, the loan syndicate.
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a breakdown in the artificial personality of the consolidated group
members. In the absence of such a misperception or other wrong, we
should not worry about silly things such as whether an SPC has a sepa-
rate phone line and letterhead. Substantive consolidation does not
exist simply as a remedy to promote good corporate housekeeping.
My approach to this branch of substantive consolidation doctrine
resembles the approach to veil piercing taken by the National Labor
Relations Board when deciding the extent of shareholder liability for
employment claims. In White Oak Coal Co.,173 the Board stated:
We conclude that the corporate veil may be pierced
when: (1) the shareholder and corporation have failed to
maintain separate identities, and (2) adherence to the corpo-
rate structure would sanction a fraud, promote injustice, or
lead to an evasion of legal obligations.1 74
Mere failure to observe corporate formalities did not suffice for
veil piercing in White Oak Coal Co.175 Disrespecting the corporate
form must create, in some sense, a "wrong" which veil piercing cor-
rects. 76 This view conforms to that expressed by federal courts when
using veil piercing to further some federal policy. 77 What I am advo-
cating is that the veil piercing rationale for substantive consolidation
remember its roots, and require a prior finding of a harm in need of
correction1 78
173 White Oak Coal Co., 318 N.L.R.B. 732 (1995).
174 Id. at 732.
175 Id. at 735.
176 Id.
177 See Bd. of Trs. v. Valley Cabinet & Mfg. Co., 877 F.2d 769, 773 (9th Cir. 1989) (discuss-
ing veil piercing to recover pension contributions made pursuant to ERISA); Seymour v. Hull &
Moreland Eng'g, 605 F.2d 1105, 1112 (9th Cir. 1979); accord United States v. Bestfoods, 524 U.S.
51 (1998); Bangor Punta Operations v. Bangor & Aroostook R.R., 417 U.S. 703, 713 (1974)
(disregarding corporate form where form was used "to defeat an overriding public policy"); cf
Anderson v. Abbott, 321 U.S. 349, 357-58 (1944) (piercing the corporate veil despite a finding of
good faith and adequate capitalization because liability was required by federal statute).
178 This suggestion might seem to go against many courts' perceptions of substantive con-
solidation as distinct from state-law veil piercing. See, e.g., In re Stone & Webster, Inc., 286 B.R.
532, 538-39 (Bankr. D. Del. 2002); see also Kors, supra note 7, at 393 (noting situation in which
court distinguished veil piercing from consolidation). I too believe there is a difference, which I
base in the fact that three separate grounds exist for substantive consolidation. Only when using
the veil piercing rationale do I require a finding of prior harm. Though I divide my analysis of
substantive consolidation doctrine into an economic rationale and a veil piercing rationale, an
economic justification can be given for the veil piercing rationale as well. See FRANK H. EAS-
TERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 58 (1991).
Unlike a tort creditor, a typical contract creditor is compensated ex ante for increased risk ex
post. This distinction between tort and contract creditors does not, however, exist when the
debtor commits a "wrong" such as fraud or misrepresentation (i.e., the debtor firm may engage
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The analytical problems with the rationale for veil piercing were
discussed in the 1920s and apply with equal force when used as a ratio-
nale for substantive consolidation. 179 At the surface, veil piercing is
justified by a litany of metaphors: a subsidiary is found to be the "alter
ego" or "mere instrumentality" of the parent company, suggesting an
identity of the subsidiary with the parent; this identity justifies a deci-
sion to ignore the asset partition created by the corporate business
form. 180 Though the litany of factors requires resort to metaphor for
their use, many courts appear unmoved by the mere presence or ab-
sence of these factors. Rather, my supposition is that courts use the
factors to justify substantive consolidation when imposition of sub-
stantive consolidation avoids a perceived inequitable result; similarly,
courts deny substantive consolidation when the perceived result is in-
equitable. 181 The prerequisite that there exist a "wrong" to correct
lends structure to the examination of factors borrowed from veil
piercing to justify substantive consolidation. Further structure comes
from the notion that abuse of the corporate form must have contrib-
uted to the wrong. Thus, the factors do not simply appear as part of a
balancing test.
My suggested approach to substantive consolidation is consistent
with the Supreme Court's view that veil piercing doctrine "is not,
properly speaking, a rule, but a convenient way of designating the ap-
plication in particular circumstances of the broader equitable principle
that the doctrine of corporate entity ... will not be regarded when so
to do would work fraud or injustice. ' 182 The core inquiry in this
branch of substantive consolidation must be to find a "wrong" to cor-
rect, rather than merely to find a substantial identity between compa-
nies. The alter ego factors help explain why or how the "wrong" was
committed, but do not serve as an independent reason to impose sub-
in excessive risk taking, and therefore shift costs to creditors). Courts might respond to this
"wrong" by allowing creditors to pierce the corporate veil. Id. at 58-59. Though the normative
point can be made to justify the veil piercing rationale, a persuasive empirical study demon-
strates that courts do not, in fact, currently decide veil piercing cases on this basis. See Thomp-
son, supra note 102.
179 See, e.g., William 0. Douglas & Carrol M. Shanks, Insulation from Liability Through
Subsidiary Corporations, 39 YALE L.J. 193 (1929); see also Henry W. Ballantine, Separate Entity
of Parent and Subsidiary Corporations, 14 CAL. L. REV. 12, 18-20 (1926) (considering notions of
agency and alter ego, and metaphors of alias and dummy, to describe the relationship between
parent and subsidiary).
180 Judge Cardozo aptly described veil piercing doctrines as "enveloped in the mists of met-
aphor." Berkey v. Third Ave. Ry., 155 N.E. 58, 61 (N.Y. 1926).
181 See Kors, supra note 7, at 397-409 (discussing current case law factors).
182 Taylor v. Standard Gas & Elec. Co., 306 U.S. 307, 322 (1939).
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stantive consolidation. This approach coheres with my approach to
the economic rationale in which misuse of the corporate form explains
the breakdown in the asset identification function but does not inde-
pendently justify use of substantive consolidation.
Under this reformulation, the Owens Corning notion that a pro-
ponent of substantive consolidation must show actual reliance on an
identity among the entities to be consolidated 183 is too strong. Indeed,
if taken seriously, this requirement could operate in practice to pro-
hibit many applications of substantive consolidation that my analysis
suggests otherwise would be proper. Take, for example, a situation
where a creditor may be misled into believing that assets support a
loan made to a subsidiary without believing that it made a loan to the
parent company. The creditor need only think that the parent com-
pany's assets support the loan. For this situation, we do not require a
fraudulent transfer. The assets may have been parent company assets
all along, with the creditor simply being misled by a breakdown in
separate corporate personality or asset identification. This can hap-
pen even though the creditor is well aware that the subsidiary is a
member of a consolidated group made up of different legal entities.
In Owens Corning, the noteholders may have thought that the value
in subsidiary companies reflected on a consolidated balance sheet
would be available to repay their notes if they were unaware of the
significant structural subordination caused by the lending syndicates'
guarantees. This belief does not require that the noteholders also be-
lieved that Owens Corning had no subsidiaries.
Under my reformulation, the Third Circuit should have first
found a "wrong" to correct-ideally either a misrepresentation or a
covenant breach relating to the consolidated group structure. Then it
should have proceeded to consider whether use of the remedy created
a further "wrong" (which would have rendered use of the doctrine
improper). A misrepresentation wrong may well have existed in the
Owens Corning case; Owens Corning sold unsecured notes using an
offering memorandum that did not disclose the risk that the note in-
vestors would be subject to structural subordination to creditors of
subsidiaries, such as the lending syndicate. 184 An offering memoran-
dum typically discloses the risk of structural subordination when the
corporate structure presents such a risk.'8 5
183 In re Owens Corning, 419 F.3d 195, 212-14 (3d Cir. 2005).
184 The Third Circuit alluded to this disclosure failure when it suggested that those pursuing
substantive consolidation should separately pursue securities fraud claims. Id. at 215 n.27.
185 See In re Worldcom, Inc., No. M-47 HB, 2003 WL 21498904, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. June 30,
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Notwithstanding this omission, the case for misrepresentation
does not automatically follow. Owens Corning, the parent company,
was not a mere shell entity with assets consisting solely of subsidiary
stock. Rather, its other assets might have sufficed at one time to re-
pay note investors notwithstanding structural subordination. Fact
finding would determine whether failure to mention the risk of struc-
tural subordination amounted to a material omission, justifying the
use of substantive consolidation. Only if the failure to disclose
amounted to a material omission would the court examine whether
the use of substantive consolidation creates a second wrong by harm-
ing a legitimate reliance interest of the syndicated lenders. As dis-
cussed above, however, the Third Circuit likely erred when it made its
finding of creditor reliance on intercompany guarantees.18 6
My reformulation of the existing economic and veil piercing ra-
tionales for substantive consolidation does not exhaust my view of the
proper reach of the doctrine. Though a court could appropriately use
the fairness rationale advanced below, current case law does not ex-
tend into such uncharted territory.
VII. A New Fairness Rationale for the Doctrine Based on
Eliminating Double Proof in Cases of Intercompany Guarantees
Commentators often identify the promotion of equity between a
debtor and its creditors as a significant goal of bankruptcy law. 187 The
related objective of promoting equity among different creditor classes
receives less attention. Various provisions of the Bankruptcy Code
promote equity among creditors: the automatic stay'88 prevents a race
among creditors to the courthouse; the recovery of preferential pay-
ments 89 defeats a debtor's attempt to prefer payment of one creditor
over another; fraudulent conveyance provisions allow for recovery of
assets from third parties for distribution to creditors; 190 and the abso-
2003) ("Before WorldCom entered Chapter 11 bankruptcy, WorldCom issued more than $27
billion of debt. In the prospectus distributed by WorldCom, it informed buyers that their debt
would be 'structurally subordinate' to the debt owed to creditors of subsidiaries, such as
Wireless.").
186 See supra Part IV.C ("How the Owens Corning Circuit Court Misunderstood the Role
of Reliance on Guarantees in Syndicated Finance").
187 See SKEEL, supra note 101, at 45.
188 11 U.S.C. § 362 (2000).
189 Id. § 547.
190 Id. § 548. State fraudulent conveyance law also may be employed using § 544 of the
Bankruptcy Code.
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lute priority rule prevents payments to lower-ranking creditors or in-
terest holders if higher-ranking creditors have not been paid in full. 191
Another, less-noticed principle of equity among creditors is based
upon consideration of the sources of payment available to various
creditors to satisfy their claims. Some of these provisions are reflected
in express provisions of the Bankruptcy Code dealing with treatment
of partnership bankruptcies, whereas others exist indirectly as equita-
ble principles developed originally in England under the general ru-
bric of "marshaling" and incorporated into current law, arguably by
§ 105 of the Bankruptcy Code.192
At a most general level, we have a simple question of fairness
when one creditor (a "multiple-source creditor") has resort to two or
more sources of payment (at least (1) a "shared source" and (2) one
additional "alternate source" which is not shared), and another credi-
tor (a "single-source creditor") has resort to a single shared source of
payment also available to the multiple-source creditor. Should the
law direct how the multiple-source creditor goes about satisfying his
claims, or should the multiple-source creditor remain free to pursue
remedies as he sees fit in accord with the contracts he has negotiated?
The question arises in cases of balance sheet insolvency of the shared
source. The problem increases in complexity when the alternate
source is also balance sheet insolvent. In the absence of scarcity, the
question of fair allocation does not arise. 193
The law provides a partial answer to the allocation question in
various related doctrines collected under the general heading of "mar-
shaling. '' 194 Again, at a most general level, the law says fairness re-
quires that the multiple-source creditor first seek payment from the
191 Id. § 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii). The absolute priority rule derives from Supreme Court prece-
dent. See N. Pac. Ry. v. Boyd, 228 U.S. 482, 508 (1913). William Douglas used this case to
support the Bankruptcy Act's first version of the absolute priority rule. See SKEEL, supra note
101, at 67. Prior to Northern Pacific, railroad reorganizers often squeezed out unsecured credi-
tors by allowing mortgage bondholders and existing equity security holders to participate in the
reorganized company. Unsecured creditors complained that it was unfair to allow participation
by equity security holders while they, as more senior members of the capital structure, had been
excluded from participation. Id.
192 See infra Part VIII ("Why Use of the Doctrine Does Not Present Constitutional Con-
cerns") (discussing actual grounds for the use of equitable principles by a federal court exercis-
ing bankruptcy jurisdiction).
193 See RAwLs, supra note 138, at 128 ("[T]he circumstances of justice obtain whenever
mutually disinterested persons put forward conflicting claims to the division of social advantages
under conditions of moderate scarcity.").
194 As a general matter, a court of equity does not consider the question of marshaling of
assets unless both sources of payment are under the jurisdiction and control of the court. Lewis
v. United States, 92 U.S. 618, 623 (1875). In procedurally consolidated bankruptcies, all the
20071
The George Washington Law Review
alternate source rather than deplete the shared source of payment. 95
Using up the shared source may harm the single-source creditor with-
out benefiting the multiple-source creditor. In some sense, a multiple-
source creditor who first pursues a shared source for payment gratui-
tously harms the single-source creditor. Equity may intervene to stop
this result.196 The principle of fairness that emerges from this general
fact pattern is sometimes identified as the solution to the "two funds"
problem. 197
I have been deliberately vague about the nature of the sources of
payment. Sources of payment might be various items of collateral se-
curity pledged to creditors by a single debtor (with each payment
source being an asset or pool of assets subject to a separate lien). The
classic multiple-asset fact pattern involves a debtor, D, who grants a
first mortgage on Blackacre to A and also grants a first mortgage on
Greenacre to A. Later, D grants a second mortgage on Greenacre to
B. Consider this circumstance to be a classic "multiple-asset scena-
rio."1 98 The payment sources are individuated in a multiple-asset sce-
nario by a combination of asset identification through description,
coupled with imposition of liens on the assets identified. The junior
creditor invokes the doctrine of marshaling to compel the senior cred-
debtors, and all the assets subject to consolidation, are under the jurisdiction of a single court.
This would not be the case, however, if consolidation of a debtor with a nondebtor were sought.
195 See 53 AM. JUR. 2D Marshaling Assets and Inverse Order of Alienation §§ 3, 4 (2006).
196 See JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE 637 (Melville M. Bige-
low ed., Boston, Little, Brown & Co., 13th ed. 1886). Though equity might direct the senior
creditor to exhaust a separate fund prior to accessing a shared fund, this directive typically would
not be made if it resulted in harm to the senior creditor. Id. (stating that the general principle
operates "whenever it will not trench upon the rights or operate to the prejudice of the party
entitled to the double fund" (emphasis added)); accord 53 AM. JUR. 2D Marshaling Assets and
Inverse Order of Alienation § 14.
197 See 53 AM. JUR. 2D Marshaling Assets and Inverse Order of Alienation § 25.
198 In a variation on the multiple-asset scenario, D later grants a second mortgage on
Blackacre to C. With two junior interests to consider, the law must tell A which mortgage to
foreclose first. Under the "inverse alienation doctrine," see id. §§ 33, 34, A is told to foreclose on
Blackacre. The theory seems to be that, all the mortgages being public, B might have known
that only A had a claim to Blackacre and taken comfort from the fact that its junior position in
Greenacre was, in some sense, less at risk because of the additional security for A's claim. C
cannot take such comfort were C to have examined the record. C would have known that, on
the facts available to B at the time of the second mortgage, A would have been required to look
to Blackacre first. Thus, D's alienation in the form of the second mortgage on Blackacre to C is
least preferred. Properties are selected for foreclosure in the inverse order of alienation when
multiple junior interests might be protected in support of the two funds doctrine, which is seen as
the primary purpose of marshaling.
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itor to satisfy its claim first from Blackacre, the alternate payment
source. 199
Sources of payment might consist of distinct legal persons who
are jointly and severally liable on a debt. The classic multiple-legal-
person fact pattern involves a general partnership and its individual
general partners. If A is a creditor of the general partnership D
(formed by partners P and Q), A is also a creditor of the general part-
ners P and Q and, thus, is a multiple-source creditor. Multiple-source-
creditor status results because, by operation of law, general partners
are liable for their partnership's debts. Another creditor, B, may be a
single-source creditor with a claim solely against P because B has no
claim against the general partnership D or the other partner, Q. Con-
sider this circumstance to be a classic "multiple-entity scenario." The
payment sources in a multiple-entity scenario are individuated by the
boundaries of the legal entities involved, coupled with rules and pro-
cedures that identify assets as owned by the legal entities. The assets
identified as owned by the legal entities comprise the real payment
sources, though these assets are described indirectly by reference to a
legal entity. In both these scenarios we might think of A as the senior
creditor and B as the junior creditor.
A significant structural difference exists between the multiple-as-
set and the multiple-entity scenarios; the difference relates to the pri-
ority of claims. In the classic multiple-asset scenario, the senior
creditor holds a senior claim both on the assets in the alternate pay-
ment source and on the assets in the shared payment source. In the
classic multiple-entity scenario, the senior creditor holds a senior
claim on the alternate payment source (by virtue of structural senior-
ity to investors and their creditors) but holds a claim ranked pari
passu with the junior creditor on the assets in the shared payment
source. The competition among pari passu claims for entitlement to
the shared payment source raises the problem known as "double
proof." The general rule is that a creditor may prove but a single
claim with respect to a particular debt. A double proof results when
multiple claims are made with respect to a single debt. The effect of
double proof is to dilute the recoveries of other creditors with respect
199 In some jurisdictions, marshaling has developed so that the senior creditor, A, may pro-
ceed against Greenacre even though it is the shared payment source. See id. § 32. The junior
creditor, B, invokes the doctrine of marshaling to obtain subrogation to A's mortgage on Black-
acre. Professor Langdell reminds us that the marshaling doctrine can be invoked to harm un-
secured creditors and that, in such a situation, he finds use of the doctrine works the opposite of
equity. C.C. Langdell, A Brief Survey of Equity Jurisdiction, 1 HARV. L. REV. 55, 69-70 (1887).
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to their debts by multiplying claims with respect to the particular debt
that is double proved 200
Double proof presents two related fairness questions for consid-
eration. The first considers the priority of the senior creditor's claim
against the same source. The second relates to the size of the claim
that the senior creditor is permitted to make against the shared pay-
ment source.
In the case of partnership insolvencies, the law sometimes pro-
vides that the senior creditor's claim against the shared payment
source should be subordinated to the claims of the junior creditor
against the shared payment source .20  This result makes the second
fairness question moot. In circumstances in which partnership credi-
tors' claims against a partner are not subordinated, the question of the
size of the claim allowed against the partner remains. If not subordi-
nated, the senior creditor could, in theory, make a full claim against
the shared payment source-a form of double proof. If, however, the
senior creditor had first satisfied a portion of its claim against the part-
200 See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1251 (8th ed. 2004) (defining "double proof").
201 Justice Holmes refers to this subordination rule in Mitchell v. Hampel, 276 U.S. 299, 302
(1928). See also Francis v. McNeal, 228 U.S. 695, 700 (1913) (Holmes, J.) (recounting "the old
rule as to the prior claim of partnership debts on partnership assets, and that of individual debts
upon the individual estate"). This rule of subordination is part of the so-called "jingle rule"
pursuant to which (1) partnership creditors proved claims first against partnership assets, and (2)
creditors of single partners proved claims first against the assets of the individual partners. Only
after creditors had exhausted their respective sources of payment might claims be pursued
against the other source. Partnership creditors could then take the crumbs left by the creditors
of the individual partner, but creditors of the individual partner could only access the value
associated with the partner's residual interest in the partnership. By the time of Mitchell v.
Hampel, the Supreme Court had clearly identified the subordination rule with § 5f of the old
Bankruptcy Act of 1898, see Schall v. Camors, 251 U.S. 239, 248 (1920), without acknowledging
its much older English origins, see Craven v. Knight, (1682) 21 Eng. Rep. 664, 664 (Ch.). See also
Ex parte Elton, (1796) 30 Eng. Rep. 988, 989 (Ch.); Ex parte Cooke, (1728) 24 Eng. Rep. 834,
834-35 (Ch.); Ex parte Crowder, (1715) 23 Eng. Rep. 1064, 1064 (Ch.). I rely on work by Dr.
Macnair and Dr. Getzler. See infra note 244. On the facts of Mitchell v. Hampel, despite the
subordination rule, a full double proof without subordination was allowed because the partner-
ship creditor at issue had not relied simply on the liability of the partners under partnership law.
Mitchell, 276 U.S. at 301-02. To supplement liability imposed by the partnership business form,
the creditor required that partners execute separate guarantees to provide additional security.
Id. The guaranty contract provided a separate basis for claims against the partners-claims not
subject to subordination preventing double proof. Id.; see also Myers v. Int'l Trust Co., 273 U.S.
380, 384-85 (1927) (holding that a partnership composition agreement did not absolve partners
of liability for endorsement of partnership notes). The "jingle rule" has been repealed by § 723
of the Bankruptcy Code for Chapter 7 liquidation cases. The Bankruptcy Code does not ex-
pressly repeal the jingle rule in Chapter 11 reorganization cases, see Frank R. Kennedy, Partner-
ship and Partners' Estates Under the Bankruptcy Code, 1983 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 219, 235-36, 245,
though courts have so held, see In re Safren, 65 B.R. 566, 575 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1986).
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nership assets before proceeding against the partner (as the "two
funds" solution classically required), the possibility exists that the se-
nior creditor would be allowed to prove the smaller, residual amount
of its claim. Current bankruptcy law relating to partnerships changed
the prior law and § 723 of the Bankruptcy Code now allows a claim to
be made for the full amount against the individual partner's estate
once a deficiency in partnership assets is shown.202 Though the Bank-
ruptcy Code now allows this specific form of double proof in partner-
ship insolvencies, it takes care to eliminate or mitigate the effect of
other forms of double proof, creating a mixed and theoretically incon-
sistent approach.2 0 3
In contrast, § 506 of the Bankruptcy Code directly addresses the
problem of double proof when handling claims of partially secured
creditors because it bifurcates an undersecured creditor's claim into a
secured claim equal to the value of the collateral and an unsecured
claim equal to the amount of the deficiency. The creditor is not al-
lowed to prove the full amount of its claim as an unsecured claim com-
peting with other unsecured creditors.2 04 The partially secured
creditor is a multiple-source creditor because he proves his claim
against two sources: (1) the collateral or alternate source and (2) the
debtor's general estate available to unsecured creditors (i.e., the
"shared source"). You might frame this problem as one of competing
"secured" creditors claiming against the shared source because the
bankruptcy trustee has the status of a hypothetical lien creditor.20 5 In
the case of these "secured" creditors, however, the multiple-source
creditor does not enjoy a priority claim against the shared asset
source. An example makes the situation clear.
Suppose that A holds a $100 claim against D that is secured by a
lien on an asset worth $70. Under current bankruptcy law, 20 6 A holds
two claims: a secured claim for $70 and an unsecured deficiency claim
202 See 11 U.S.C. § 723 (2000).
203 See Frank R. Kennedy, Partnerships and Partners Under the Bankruptcy Code: Claims
and Distribution, 40 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 55, 77 n.92 (1983) (noting that the Bankruptcy Code
provisions relating to co-debtors should not apply to partners). See generally Larry E. Ribstein,
The Illogic and Limits of Partners' Liability in Bankruptcy, 32 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 31, 65-67
(1997).
204 11 U.S.C. § 506(a)(1) (Supp. 2006).
205 See Owens-Corning Fiberglass Corp. v. Ctr. Wholesale, Inc. (In re Ctr. Wholesale, Inc.),
759 F.2d 1440, 1446-47 (9th Cir. 1985) (providing an example of such a situation). I do not
believe that characterization of the problem as one of competing secured creditors has particular
value except to the extent that it enables one to more closely tie the problem of double proof to
the doctrine of marshaling collateral for secured claims.
206 See 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) (2000 & Supp. 2006).
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for $30. Suppose that B holds an unsecured claim against D for $100,
and that D owns unencumbered assets worth $60. A files a secured
claim for $70 and an unsecured claim for $30; B files an unsecured
claim for $100. The result is that A receives a bankruptcy dividend of
$70 from the collateral proceeds and $13.85 from the unencumbered
assets; B receives a bankruptcy dividend of $46.15 out of the unen-
cumbered assets. If, however, A had been allowed to prove a full $100
unsecured claim, A would have been given $30 and B would have
been given $30 out of the unencumbered assets. If A were permitted
to prove its entire claim against the shared asset source, A would
squeeze down the recovery obtained by B. The larger the numerator
allowed to A, the more it reduces B's recovery. There is a double-
proof situation because $70 gets "proved" against two sources. Even
in cases in which double proof has been permitted, the senior creditor
is not allowed a double recovery; the bankruptcy dividend is capped at
$100.
Historically, the principle of fairness that limited the senior credi-
tor to filing a proof for the unsecured deficiency, rather than the en-
tire amount of the debt, was known as the "bankruptcy" rule.20 7 The
bankruptcy rule operates to prevent the squeeze-down effect by
preventing double proof. The U.S. Supreme Court determined, in a 5-
4 decision, that the bankruptcy rule derived from the express language
of the former Bankruptcy Act and, thus, did not apply in a context to
which that Act did not apply.20 An insolvency proceeding for a na-
tional bank was not subject to the former Bankruptcy Act. Accord-
ingly, the Supreme Court instead applied the "chancery" rule and
allowed the multiple-source creditor to file a claim in the full amount
of its debt against the shared asset source. In two strongly worded
dissents, Justices White and Gray explained the historical origins of
the bankruptcy rule, tracing it back to England, and argued on statu-
tory construction grounds why the bankrutpcy rule should not be lim-
ited to the application given it in the Bankruptcy Act.20 9
207 See Merrill v. Nat'l Bank of Jacksonville, 173 U.S. 131, 138 (1899) (discussing the bank-
ruptcy rule).
208 Id. at 138, 146-47.
209 See id. at 153-61 (White, J., dissenting); id. at 172-76 (Gray, J., dissenting). The histori-
cal connection between bankruptcy laws in the United States and England is strong. The first
U.S. bankruptcy law, enacted in 1800, derived almost entirely from English bankruptcy legisla-
tion. SKEEL, supra note 101, at 2. The Supreme Court held early on that the U.S. Constitution's
use of the term "bankruptcy" referred generally to laws governing financial distress and did not
make a distinction between "bankruptcy" and "insolvency" as existed in English legislation.
Sturges v. Crowninshield, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 122, 143, 194-95 (1819).
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Properly understood, the so-called "bankruptcy rule," though not
expressly identified with the doctrine of marshaling, addresses the
same problem outlined generically at the start of this Part: how do we
fairly deal with circumstances in which the interests of a multiple-
source creditor conflict with the interests of a single-source creditor?
In each of three situations-marshaling collateral, marshaling partner-
ship claims, and allowing claims of undersecured creditors-the law
has developed doctrines in which considerations of fairness override
the results that would obtain if the parties were free to exercise the
rights given to them under contract.
In each case, the law recognizes that use of a particular, accepted
business technique can result in unfairness even though there is noth-
ing wrong per se with use of the business technique. In a context that
creates unfairness, equitable considerations operate to modify the re-
sult that contract law produces by straightforward application of the
business technique. In each case, use of the business technique both
produces asset partitioning and divides creditors between multiple-
source creditors and single-source creditors.
Modern financial practice presents the same conflict between the
interests of multiple-source creditors and single-source creditors. The
conflict arises with great frequency in syndicated lending. Any time a
consolidated family of companies obtains a syndicated loan supported
by intercompany guarantees, the syndicated lenders become multiple-
source creditors. These multiple-source creditors compete with credi-
tors of the individual group companies, typically single-source credi-
tors. Unlike the three cases discussed above, courts have failed to
articulate expressly a modern doctrine of marshaling that might apply
in the context of corporate groups using intercompany guarantees to
obtain financing.210
Creation of a web of guarantees by a consolidated group of com-
panies is a business technique that breaks down the asset partitioning,
which results when a parent company owns one or more subsidiaries.
Typically, the asset partitioning resulting from the division of assets
210 Combining the evolving notion of deemed consolidation with fairness considerations
derived from principles of marshaling might produce a workable structure for reorganizing cor-
porate groups. The process bears a family resemblance to the development of the equity receiv-
ership out of traditional foreclosure law used initially to reorganize railroads. See generally
SKEEL, supra note 101, at 56-60 (discussing the development of the equity receivership device).
In an equity receivership, a court may order the sale of all the assets of a railroad in a single
parcel at auction. This procedure produces a different result than might have been obtained if
mortgages or judgments liens filed in individual counties and held by separate creditor groups
were subject to separate foreclosure proceedings in a fragmented liquidation.
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among multiple legal entities predates the planning for the syndicated
financing. Thus, the guarantee web divides creditors into multiple-
source creditors and single-source creditors, though it does not create
the asset partitions.
The preexisting asset partition created by the parent/subsidiary
structure may have been created for the express purpose of matching
different creditors with different assets. 211 In such a case, a substan-
tive consolidation might defeat expectations of creditors who had ad-
vanced funds to the separate legal entities. However, too often we
forget that the preexisting asset partition might have resulted from
other factors. Prior to his appointment to the Supreme Court, (then
Professor) William 0. Douglas made this very point in a coauthored
article:
The factor of limited liability has not been unimportant. It
merely has not been paramount. The same can be said for
the evolution that has taken place within the business units
using the corporate form. Recent years especially have seen
an increasing use of the subsidiary-parent structure.... The
reasons for the use of this structure are manifold. The in-
creased facility in financing; the desire to escape the diffi-
culty . . . of qualifying the parent company as a foreign
corporation in a particular state; the avoidance of complica-
tions involved in the purchase of physical assets: the reten-
tion of the good will of an established business unit; the
avoidance of taxation; the avoidance of cumbersome man-
agement structures; the desire for limited liability, are among
the primary motives. The desire for limited liability has been
merely one among many factors. And at times it has ap-
peared to recede. 212
Though use of the same business technique, here application of
the corporate form, appears in any corporate group, Douglas reminds
211 Professors Hansmann and Kraakman contemplated such a scenario in their initial pres-
entation of their theory of asset partitioning. See Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 5, at 399
(using as an example of possible segregation of creditors and assets a parent company that
owned a hotel business and an oil business). Professor Triantis uses a similar fact pattern in his
analysis of internal capital markets. See Triantis, supra note 96, at 1131-32. I examine a differ-
ent sector of consolidated corporate groups, the world in which the internal asset partitions no
longer serve the purpose of the group, yet the partition remains because it is cheaper to leave it
in place than to dismantle it. In my experience, this is a common situation.
212 Douglas & Shanks, supra note 179, at 193 (citation omitted). Justice Douglas's views on
corporate form have particular interest in the context of corporate reorganization because he
and his cohorts at the Securities and Exchange Commission reflected anti-Wall Street, populist
philosophy in the Chandler Act reforms of 1938. See SKEEL, supra note 101, at 18.
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us of a basic reality. The presence of the business technique does not
mean the same thing in all contexts. Context-sensitivity should guide
equitable considerations.
The squeeze-down effect caused by intercompany guarantees be-
comes clear with a simple example. Suppose you are an investor with
$100 allocated to purchase an outstanding corporate debt as an invest-
ment. You have a choice of purchasing a $100 note from two different
borrowers with very different corporate structures. The first bor-
rower, a single corporation with no subsidiaries, owns assets worth
$2000 and owes third-party creditors claims totaling $1000. The sec-
ond borrower is a member of a corporate group composed of six cor-
porations; your investment might consist of a loan to any of these
corporations. The corporate group owns assets in various entities with
a consolidated value of $2000 and group members owe third-party
creditors claims totaling $1000, of which $500 is owed to various third-
party lenders and $500 is owed to a lending syndicate with intercom-
pany guarantees. Company A distributes proceeds from the syndi-
cated loan throughout the consolidated group, as needed.
Based on this example, in general, which investment should you
prefer? You might answer this question by considering what happens
if the stand-alone company and the consolidated group each lose
$1700, leaving only $300 in realizable asset value. The table below
illustrates the situation for the consolidated group and its debt
investors.
Table 5: The Squeeze-Down Effect of Multiple Guarantees
3rd-P. Syndicate Syn. Syn. 3rd-P.
Entity Value Creditors Loans Claim Distrib. Distrib.
A $50 $-0- 5 x $100 $500 $50 -0-
B $50 $100 -0- $500 $41.67 $8.33
C $50 $100 -0- $500 $41.67 $8.33
D $50 $100 -0- $500 $41.67 $8.33
E $50 $100 -0- $500 $41.67 $8.33
F $50 $100 -0- $500 $41.67 $8.33
Total $300 $500 $500 N/A $258.35 $41.65
There is a significant structural reason to prefer holding a $100
syndicated loan in the second company over holding either a $100
claim against the first company or an independent third-party claim
against a member of a consolidated group in the second company.213
213 This structural reason supplements any preference for a claim against a larger asset pool
rather than a smaller asset pool based on notions of risk diversification.
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In the first, stand-alone corporation, the $100 debt investment re-
ceives a distribution of $30 because a total of $1000 in claims compete
pari passu for $300 in assets. This would be true even if $500 of these
claims were made by syndicated lenders because, in the absence of
subsidiaries and guarantees, the syndicated lender claims simply com-
pete on a pari passu basis with other third-party claims. In the consol-
idated group, however, the syndicated lender holding a $100 claim
receives a distribution of $41.67, while the independent third-party
lender receives a distribution of $8.33 (in the absence of substantive
consolidation).
The reason for the vast difference in outcomes relates to the phe-
nomenon of double proof. The syndicated lenders to the consolidated
group file proofs of claim for $500 against each member in the group
because each member in the group provided a full, complete, and un-
conditional guarantee of payment, not simply collection, to support
the syndicated loan. This $500 thus squeezes down the recoveries of
independent creditors of the individual group members. This would
not have occurred if the individual group members had each arranged
for their own separate financing, rather than having one member in
the group, typically the parent company, arrange for centralized
financing.
The squeeze-down effect in the context of intercompany guaran-
tees magnifies the problem of double proof. In the example, we have
not merely a simple problem of double proof but the problem of a six-
fold proof. In general, the squeeze-down effect is enhanced as the
number of guarantees from separate legal entities increases.
In the above example, the small independent creditors are
squeezed down, while the organized syndicated lenders receive an en-
hanced recovery. A variety of fairness considerations may lead one to
question the appropriateness of this result. First, the small indepen-
dent creditors may be "nonadjusting" creditors (such as tort claim-
ants) or they may be voluntary creditors with little or no bargaining
power. We might have a simple case in which the transaction costs
needed to provide guarantees to the voluntary little guys are per-
ceived to be too high. These concerns echo those raised during the
secured lending "carve-out" debate in which it was proposed that se-
cured lenders and borrowers set aside twenty percent of collateral
value for payment of nonadjusting and other unsecured creditors.2 14
214 See supra note 30. The concerns raised by the guarantee squeeze-down relate directly
to analysis performed by Professor LoPucki, who noted how multiplying legal entities can re-
duce liabilities. See Lynn M. LoPucki, The Death of Liability, 106 YALE L.J. 1, 20, 61-62 (1996);
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An additional fairness consideration presents itself. The squeeze-
down effect operates much like a security interest in two ways. In the
above example, the asset partition provided by A gave the syndicated
lenders complete priority in $50 of assets. In the case of the five group
members in which independent lenders competed with the syndicate,
the repetition of the large $500 proofs of claim by the syndicate cre-
ated a distinct advantage, though not a complete priority. Unlike the
priority created by secured credit, which requires some form of public
notice for perfection, syndicated guarantees squeeze without system-
atic notice. In the case of public companies, it would be unusual to
find any useful information on the extent of guarantee webs either in
financial statements or SEC filings. In practice, of course, even the
presence of notice is of no help to nonadjusting creditors and may be
of little help to small voluntary creditors. Nevertheless, the presence
or absence of notice often figures prominently in our assessement of
overall fairness of a structure. I mean to suggest only that if secured
lending presents fairness problems, the unsecured syndicated guaran-
tee may be the 800-pound gorilla in the corner that goes unnoticed.
I propose a third justification to use substantive consolidation,
also grounded in equity, but based on equitable considerations that
sound in fairness rather than notions of responding to affirmative
wrongs (such as misrepresentation, fraud, and the like). Simply put,
substantive consolidation doctrine can be used to balance the equities
when we find that intercompany guarantees divide creditors into vari-
ous camps of single-source creditors competing with a multiple-source
creditor that benefits from the web of intercompany guarantees. Sub-
stantive consolidation in this context removes the unfairness of the
see also Lynn M. LoPucki, The Essential Structure of Judgment Proofing, 51 STAN. L. REV. 147,
148-52 (1998) (responding to critics of the analysis presented in The Death of Liability). My
example shows how multiplying legal entities can enhance recoveries for a preferred creditor
while reducing recoveries for all other creditors. With the example of a single economic firm
dividing itself into multiple subsidiary entities, we see how easily one may squeeze down, theo-
retically to almost nothing, the claims of small voluntary creditors who deal with the entity only
through one of its subsidiary nodes, as well as the claims of tort claimants who may be directly
injured through contact with a subsidiary node. In contrast, if the firm had not organized itself
into multiple subsidiary entities, the same economic activity, organized as a single legal entity,
would provide a greater payout to the small contract creditor and the tort claimant. In the
consolidated group structure, using a web of guarantees, the sophisticated financier reduces its
exposure to these types of claims, thus enhancing its recovery. Though it is beyond the scope of
this Article, my analysis may have relevance for the treatment of consolidated group liability for
tort claims, a much debated issue. See generally Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Toward
Unlimited Shareholder Liability for Corporate Torts, 100 YALE L.J. 1879 (1991); David W. Leeb-
ron, Limited Liability, Tort Victims, and Creditors, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1565 (1991); Mark J. Roe,
Corporate Strategic Reaction to Mass Tort, 72 VA. L. REV. 1 (1986).
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squeeze-down effect. This notion of fairness, though stressed by
courts critiquing the structure of business enterprises in past times, has
not found a voice with modern courts. 215 Contrary to the circuit
court's notion that substantive consolidation trampled upon the con-
tract rights of the lenders, from the debate between Landers and Pos-
ner, we see that substantive consolidation may actually effectuate the
purpose behind use of the guarantees because the guarantees are used
to contract around the existing default rules that do not recognize en-
terprise liability.
My remarks on the fairness rationale are intended to be as much
descriptive as they are normative. I expect many would cringe at the
idea of advocating for a legal regime based on fuzzy notions such as
fairness when notions of economic efficiency present a seemingly ana-
lytical bright line. I do not engage that debate here. The current
bankruptcy law expressly includes doctrines of equity in the bank-
ruptcy judge's toolbox. For example, in cases of disagreement over
approval of reorganization plans in a cram-down context, the statute
expressly instructs judges to consider both the fairness and the equity
of the plan.216
Furthermore, historically speaking, considerations of fairness and
equity have been raised in situations in which multiple-source credi-
tors compete with single-source creditors. At the time these fairness
issues were developed, the general partnership form dominated busi-
ness, while the corporate form did not permit organization of corpo-
rate groups. Nevertheless, a long pedigree should not disqualify
current use. The foregoing analysis would be all for naught, however,
if the Supreme Court did not permit the evolution of equitable princi-
ples in the manner that I suggest.
VIII. Why Use of the Doctrine Does Not Present
Constitutional Concerns
In proposing my reformulation of substantive consolidation doc-
trine, I am mindful of the Supreme Court's decision in Grupo Mexi-
cano de Desarrollo, S.A. v. Alliance Bond Fund, Inc. 217 There is little
215 Analyzed under this third rationale for substantive consolidation, the lower court prop-
erly ordered substantive consolidation in Owens Corning. Far from surprising, this is the result
that industry professionals would have expected in the case of unsecured intercompany guaran-
tees. Indeed, this is the significance of the fact, given little credence by the Third Circuit, see In
re Owens Corning, 419 F.3d 195, 213-14 (3d Cir. 2005), that no competent lawyer would have
given a nonconsolidation opinion in the face of a web of intercompany guarantees.
216 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(1) (2000 & Supp. 2006).
217 Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollo, S.A. v. Alliance Bond Fund, Inc., 527 U.S. 308 (1999).
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point in reformulating a doctrine if that doctrine is in danger of being
thrown out as unconstitutional. In Grupo Mexicano, the Supreme
Court held, in a 5-4 decision authored by Justice Scalia, that a federal
court's equity jurisdiction is limited to the "jurisdiction in equity exer-
cised by the High Court of Chancery in England at the time of the
adoption of the Constitution and the enactment of the Judiciary Act,
1789."218 The idea of such a rule is flexibility within limits-the courts
have the power to craft a broad range of equitable remedies so long as
they do not stray from the types of equitable remedies known at the
time of the grant of authority to fashion them.219
As a general matter, the Constitution provides that federal courts
acquire power only through legislative grant;220 thus, for a bankruptcy
court to impose substantive consolidation properly, particular legisla-
tion must give the court power to use that remedy.22' Because the
Court in Grupo Mexicano limited equity powers to those exercised by
218 Id. at 318 (quotation omitted). The Judiciary Act of 1789 gave federal courts jurisdic-
tion over "all suits ... in equity." Judiciary Act of 1789 § 11, 1 Stat. 73, 78. In fixing the scope of
this jurisdiction to the time of separation of the United States from England, the Supreme Court
relied on its earlier such pronouncement in Atlas Life Insurance Co. v. W.I. Southern, Inc., 306
U.S. 563, 568 (1939). Accord Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 278 (2004) ("'The judicial power'
created by Art. III, § 1, of the Constitution is not whatever judges choose to do .. .or even
whatever Congress chooses to assign them .... It is the power to act in the manner traditional
for English and American courts." (citation omitted)); cf In re Kmart Corp., 359 F.3d 866, 871
(7th Cir. 2004) (noting that § 105 of the Bankruptcy Code does not justify vendor relief because
the power given by the section implements, rather than overrides, provisions of the Code); Jamo
v. Katahdin Fed. Credit Union (In re Jamo), 283 F.3d 392, 403 (1st Cir. 2002) (noting that the
equitable power conferred by § 105 may be used only if "the equitable remedy dispensed by the
court is necessary to preserve an identifiable right conferred elsewhere in the Bankruptcy
Code").
219 The Supreme Court stated that bankruptcy courts "are essentially courts of equity, and
their proceedings inherently proceedings in equity." Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 240
(1934). A bankruptcy court employs principles and rules of equity within the jurisdiction given it
by the Bankruptcy Code and title 28 of the U.S. Code. Cf. Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 304
(1939) (describing how bankruptcy courts use equitable principles). Bankruptcy courts use prin-
ciples of equity to counteract fraud, to ensure that form does not triumph over substance, and to
stop technical considerations from preventing substantial justice. See id. at 304-05. Bankruptcy
courts have considerable latitude to modify debtor/creditor relationships. United States v. En-
ergy Res. Co., 495 U.S. 545, 549 (1990).
220 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1. In addition to the equity jurisdiction conferred by the Judici-
ary Act of 1789, Congress has specifically granted federal courts jurisdiction in bankruptcy cases.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1334(a) (2000). A separate clause of the Constitution provides Congress with
the power to establish uniform bankruptcy laws. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
221 One might ask whether courts have certain mandatory powers under Article III of the
Constitution, without the requirement of an act of Congress, thus focusing on the Constitution
rather than the Judiciary Act of 1789. See Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304,
328-29 (1816); Akhil Reed Amar, A Neo-Federalist View of Article III: Separating the Two Tiers
of Federal Jurisdiction, 65 B.U. L. REv. 205, 215, 272 (1985). I do not see a provision of certain
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the High Court of Chancery in 1789, if the remedy of substantive con-
solidation did not exist at that time, another act of Congress must con-
fer such power for it to be constitutional. Given Grupo Mexicano, the
question remains whether Congress has chosen to confer the power to
order substantive consolidation on the federal courts in any particular
piece of legislation.222
The Grupo Mexicano decision generated a flurry of speculation
that the Court had deprived bankruptcy courts of the ability to order
substantive consolidation.2 3 Accepted wisdom holds that the Su-
preme Court tacitly approved substantive consolidation doctrine in
1941, in Sampsell v. Imperial Paper & Color Corp.,2 24 far too recent a
decision if Grupo Mexicano requires a much older equitable remedy
to sustain its use. The evolution of business forms presents a further
complication; in 1789, corporations could not own subsidiaries, so the
High Court of Chancery had no opportunity to order the remedy of
substantive consolidation between a parent and a subsidiary
corporation.
Since Grupo Mexicano, however, no federal court has found that
substantive consolidation is unavailable, and several courts have spe-
cifically approved the use of substantive consolidation. 225 One might
distinguish Grupo Mexicano on the grounds that bankruptcy jurisdic-
tion derives from 28 U.S.C. § 1334, and not the Judiciary Act of 1789;
but significantly absent from the current jurisdictional grant to federal
courts exercising bankruptcy jurisdiction is an express grant of general
equitable powers-a grant formerly present (including at the time of
Sampsell) but no longer in effect.2 26 The Bankruptcy Code itself pro-
equitable remedies as mandated by the structure of the Constitution and thus search for author-
ity in grants of power by Congress to the courts.
222 See Norwest Bank Worthington v. Ahlers, 485 U.S. 197, 206 (1988) ("[Wlhatever equita-
ble powers remain in the bankruptcy courts must and can only be exercised within the confines
of the Bankruptcy Code.").
223 See, e.g., J. Maxwell Tucker, Grupo Mexicano and the Death of Substantive Consolida-
tion, 8 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 427, 428 (2000); Sabin Willett, The Doctrine of Robin Hood: A
Note on "Substantive Consolidation," 4 DEPAUL Bus. & COM. L.J. 87, 99-101 (2005).
224 Sampsell v. Imperial Paper & Color Corp., 313 U.S. 215, 221 (1941).
225 See, e.g., In re Owens Corning, 419 F.3d 195, 209 n.14 (3d Cir. 2005) ("What the Court
has given as an equitable remedy remains until it alone removes it or Congress declares it re-
moved as an option.").
226 The Bankruptcy Act of 1898, the Chandler Act of 1938, and the Bankruptcy Code of
1978 all contained a grant of general equitable jurisdiction. See Tucker, supra note 223, at
435-38. This grant was dropped, likely by mistake, when Congress "fixed" problems with the
1978 Code identified by the Supreme Court in Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon
Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 87 (1982) (rejecting, on constitutional grounds, the broad jurisdiction
of the bankruptcy courts under the 1978 Code).
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vides the options of merger or consolidation22 7 to implement a reor-
ganization plan, but that section has been termed a "thin reed" upon
which approval for substantive consolidation might rest.228
A. A Proposed New Statutory Foundation in the Bankruptcy Code
to Support Use of the Doctrine
The lack of an extant general statutory grant of equitable powers
to federal courts exercising bankruptcy jurisdiction is both surprising
and troubling. Section 105 of the Bankruptcy Code, often cited as a
possible supplemental source of equity powers, appears limited to the
use of equity to carry out express provisions of the Bankruptcy
Code.229 Accepting this limitation, for the sake of argument, if I had
to locate in the Bankruptcy Code the power of a bankruptcy court to
act generally as a court of equity or to order an equitable remedy in
furtherance of substantive consolidation, I would turn to the defini-
tion of "claim" in § 101, which has two parts:
"claim" means-
(A) right to payment, whether or not such right is reduced to
judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, ma-
tured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, se-
cured, or unsecured; or
(B) right to an equitable remedy for breach of performance
if such breach gives rise to a right to payment, whether or not
such right to an equitable remedy is reduced to judgment,
fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed,
secured, or unsecured. 230
It appears from the definition that rights to payment can be equi-
table in nature. Further, holders of some claims may be entitled to an
equitable remedy. The language of the definition allows a creditor to
assert its entitlement to an equitable remedy as part of, or in addition
227 11 U.S.C. § 1123(a)(5)(C) (2000); cf id. § 302 (providing for consolidation of the estates
of a husband and wife in joint administration).
228 See Douglas G. Baird, Substantive Consolidation Today, 47 B.C. L. REv. 5, 19 (2005).
Section 1123(a) of the Bankruptcy Code contemplates that a debtor may merge or consolidate
with another person as part of implementing a plan of reorganization, though no specific author-
ization for substantive consolidation or deemed consolidation expressly appears in the Code. 11
U.S.C. § 1123(a)(5)(C). The references to merger and consolidation likely refer to state-law
corporate procedures implemented by filing with the applicable secretary of state. Substantive
consolidation might involve combining estates of a natural person with a corporation, as in
Sampsell-a special bankruptcy procedure clearly not involving a state-law business
combination.
229 See 11 U.S.C. § 105 (2000 & Supp. 2006).
230 Id. § 101 (2000).
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to, its assertion of the claim (regardless of whether the claim itself is
equitable in nature).2 31 Under § 502 of the Bankruptcy Code, a claim
is deemed allowed unless a party in interest objects. 232 Following an
objection, the court, after notice and hearing, determines the amount
of the claim and whether to allow it.233
This definition of "claim" arrived on the scene in 1978 as a signifi-
cant change in law 34-well after the doctrine of substantive consolida-
tion was recognized in the federal courts. One might conclude,
therefore, that when Congress decided that claims for payment may
be equitable in nature and that entitlement to an equitable remedy
might form part of a claim, it also intended to include substantive con-
solidation within the ambit of an equitable claim to payment, or
within the scope of the term "equitable remedy," or both. This fol-
lows simply from the fact that, by 1978, federal courts had developed
substantive consolidation as an equitable remedy and creditors often
implored courts to use their equity powers of substantive consolida-
tion to expand the universe of assets available to pay their debts.
Thus, the year 1978, rather than the year 1789, becomes the date by
which to measure the extent of "equity."
The impediment to such an analysis is the question of whether a
creditor can actually request substantive consolidation as part of its
assertion of an equitable claim or as part of its entitlement to an equi-
table remedy.235 Certainly, creditors do not assert a right to substan-
tive consolidation outside of bankruptcy. The issue of substantive
consolidation might, however, arise in the following setting. Company
A is a parent and company B is its subsidiary. Creditor C loaned
money to B. Both A and B file for bankruptcy and the cases are
231 The Bankruptcy Code provides that, as a principle of interpretation, "or" is to be inter-
preted as inclusive, rather than exclusive. See id. § 102(5).
232 Id. § 502(a).
233 Id. § 502(b) (2000 & Supp. 2006).
234 See S. REP. No. 95-989, at 21-22 (1978); H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 309 (1977). The
definition permits the broadest possible relief in the bankruptcy court, including equitable as
well as legal rights to payment. S. REP. No. 95-989, at 22; see also Ohio v. Kovacs, 469 U.S. 274,
279 (1985) (recognizing that Congress desired a broad definition of a "claim" in bankruptcy); In
re Caldor, Inc.-N.Y., 240 B.R. 180, 190-91 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1999) (noting that the drafters of
§ 101(5) of the Bankruptcy Code gave the term "claim" a broad definition to ensure that all
parties with potential calls on a debtor's assets, provided that the call in at least some circum-
stances could give rise to suit for payment, would come before the court so that the permissibil-
ity, priority, and dischargeability of their demands could be determined), affd sub nom. Pearl-
Phil GMT (Far E.) Ltd. v. Caldor Corp., 266 B.R. 575 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
235 See In re Antonino, 241 B.R. 883, 888 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1999) ("A 'claim' exists for
bankruptcy purposes only if the relationship between debtor and creditor contains all of the
elements necessary to give rise to a legal obligation under relevant non-bankruptcy law.").
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procedurally consolidated. C files a proof of a "legal" claim against B
based on B's prior execution of a note evidencing C's loan to B. C
also files a proof of an equitable claim against A, asserting that, under
principles of veil piercing, C is entitled to be paid from A's assets as
well as from B's assets. Assume C would be entitled to assert a state-
law veil piercing claim, an equitable remedy, 236 outside of bankruptcy.
In determining whether to allow C's claim against A, the court
must decide, in effect, whether to substantively consolidate A with B.
The court might conclude that, in respecting C's claim against A, it
should consolidate A with B so that all creditors of B benefit from the
breakdown in the asset partition occasioned by C's equitable claim.237
If C's equitable claim against A is justified, then the court would have
found, in effect, that A was the alter ego of B, that B was a mere
instrumentality of A, or some similar identity pursuant to which the
asset partition between A and B should not be respected. Though a
court might ignore the asset partition for C's benefit (in effect consoli-
dating for C alone in a form of "deemed consolidation") but respect
the asset partition for the other creditors of B, it need not do So. 2 3 8
Often, a bankruptcy court asserts claims for the benefit of the entire
estate that, outside of bankruptcy, would have been asserted by a sin-
gle creditor for its own benefit. 239
Further, if the court were to allow C's equitable claim to stand
against A without ordering a substantive consolidation, the court
236 It is widely acknowledged that corporate veil piercing has evolved into an equitable
doctrine. See Phillip I. Blumberg, The Increasing Recognition of Enterprise Principles in Deter-
mining Parent and Subsidiary Corporation Liabilities, 28 CONN. L. REV. 295, 330 (1996) (describ-
ing the doctrine of corporate veil piercing as "a creation of nineteenth century equity
jurisprudence under which equity courts disregard corporate forms where required to prevent
fraud"); see also I. MAURICE WORMSER, DISREGARD OF THE CORPORATE FICTION AND ALLIED
CORPORATION PROBLEMS 44 (1927) ("It has been oftentimes stated that courts of law invariably
adhere to the entity theory even though gross miscarriages of justice result. It is quite true that
equity, less abashed by forms or fictions than a court of law, is more willing to draw aside the veil
and look at the real parties in interest.")
237 In the case of a fraudulent conveyance claim, a bankruptcy court will not allow a credi-
tor in C's position to assert a fraudulent conveyance claim against A. Instead, the trustee asserts
the claim against A for the benefit of all creditors of B. This is true even though, outside of
bankruptcy, C's fraudulent conveyance claim against A would benefit only C. See, e.g., Am.
Nat'l Bank of Austin v. MortgageAmerica Corp. (In re MortgageAmerica Corp.), 714 F.2d 1266,
1275 (5th Cir. 1983).
238 The Third Circuit speculated that such a split treatment might be available to a court.
In re Owens Corning, 419 F.3d 195, 210 n.16 (3d Cir. 2005). In light of the Third Circuit's appar-
ent hostility to "deemed" consolidations, it is not clear how the Third Circuit would support the
use of split treatment unless it did so under the simple principles of claim evaluation advocated
herein.
239 See Am. Nat'l Bank of Austin, 714 F.2d at 1275.
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would create the problem of a double proof benefiting C. In other
contexts, we have seen that courts strive to limit double proof. In em-
ploying substantive consolidation to avoid the dilemma (both of
double proof and of inconsistent treatment of the asset partition), the
court merely employs substantive consolidation as part of evaluating
and allowing proof of an equitable claim. The court must evaluate
claims as part of its responsibilities under § 502.240 Thus, in imposing
substantive consolidation, the court is using the equity powers given it
under § 105 to carry out its responsibility under another specific provi-
sion of the Bankruptcy Code.241
By the foregoing analysis, I do not mean to suggest that, in cases
of substantive consolidation, the issue of the consolidation remedy ac-
tually arises because creditors have filed multiple proofs of equitable
claims. I have never in fact seen such a case.242 Analytically, however,
a creditor's request for substantive consolidation amounts to the filing
of a proof of an equitable claim against every member of a consoli-
dated group for which that creditor does not have a legal claim (such
as the legal claim the creditor would have through a note or a guaran-
tee). Objection to the use of substantive consolidation by a party in
interest amounts to objection to allowance of the equitable claim. In-
deed, if courts found that substantive consolidation must pass through
the eye of a proof of equitable claim under § 502, I would expect to
see the filing of such proofs proliferate.
I intend the above discussion to strengthen the statutory basis for
the use of substantive consolidation, despite the apparent gap in gen-
eral bankruptcy equity jurisdiction created when 28 U.S.C. § 1471 was
repealed in response to Northern Pipeline.43 Although I believe a
court might fairly accept my statutory analysis to justify the use of
substantive consolidation, the reasons for its acceptance go much
240 11 U.S.C. § 502 (2000 & Supp. 2006).
241 Id. § 105.
242 In an interesting twist on filing proofs of claim, one creditor in the Enron bankruptcy
failed to file proofs of claim against all relevant entities, arguing that it did not do so because it
expected a substantive consolidation in which its single proof of claim would have sufficed. See
Midland Cogeneration Venture Ltd. v. Enron Corp. (In re Enron Corp.), 419 F.3d 115, 126 (2d
Cir. 2005). An example of an equitable proof of claim based on veil piercing appears in Expert
Report of Jonathan R. Macey 34, In re Stone & Webster, Inc., 286 B.R. 532 (Bankr. D. Del.
2002) (No. 00-2142), 2005 WL 3263064 ("Under traditional corporate law rules regarding pierc-
ing the corporate veil, BVG&E was the alter ego of Stone & Webster [and] Stone & Webster
should, therefore, be responsible for BVG&E's debts.").
243 N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 87 (1982); see also supra
note 226.
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deeper and, I believe, are much older, tracing back to England in
1673.
B. The Existence of the Remedy in Chancery Prior to the Judiciary
Act of 1789
The prior analysis of marshaling, double proof, and the so-called
"bankruptcy rule" for undersecured creditors suggests that courts of
equity have long balanced the general question of fairness between
multiple-source creditors and single-source creditors. The label "sub-
stantive consolidation" is simply the name for a procedure pursuant to
which, among other things, traditional questions of fairness might be
addressed if members of a corporate group execute intercompany
guarantees and later file for bankruptcy. Contrary to the accepted
wisdom that pre-1789 chancery practice did not sanction a consolida-
tion remedy, I find approval for a consolidation remedy in the 1676
chancery case of Brown & Naylor.244 The case arose from a bill of
review brought to reverse a 1673 decree in Naylor v. Brown. 45
In Naylor v. Brown, Naylor loaned £500 to the Company of
Woodmongers.2 46 The company also owed debts to thirteen of its
members totaling £620.247 The company owned a bond of £1000 due
from the King.248 The company assigned the bond to Sir William
Wild, who declared a trust for £620 of the bond in favor of the thirteen
member-creditors, and as to the residue, in favor of the company.2 49
Then the company declared a second trust on the company's residual
interest to twenty-five other persons claiming debts (who also appear
to be members).25° This state of affairs remained until a quo warranto
was brought against the company, resulting in its dissolution.251 Fol-
lowing the dissolution, the various member-creditors claimed the
bond except for a £135 residue for the unrelated creditors, including
244 Brown & Naylor (1676), reprinted in 73 SELDEN SOCIETY 419 (1954). I learned of the
case through work on the early history of asset partitioning by Drs. Macnair and Getzler. See
Joshua Getzler & Mike Macnair, The Firm as an Entity Before the Companies Acts, in ADVEN-
TURES OF THE LAW: PROCEEDINGS OF THE SIXTEENTH BRITISH LEGAL HISTORY CONFERENCE,
DUBLIN 2003, at 267 (Paul Brand et al. eds., 2005).
245 Naylor v. Brown, (1673) 23 Eng. Rep. 44 (Ch.), sub nom. Naylor & Godfrey (1674),
reprinted in 73 SELDEN SOCIETY 55 (1954).
246 Id.
247 Id.
248 Id.
249 Id.
250 Id.
251 Id.
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Naylor. 252 Naylor and the other third-party creditors sued Brown, the
master of the Woodmongers, and the thirteen members of the com-
pany who benefited from the Wild declaration of trust.2 5 3 Lord Not-
tingham held for Naylor and the other third-party creditors, directing
an accounting for the £620 and granting priority to Naylor and the
other third-party creditors over the thirteen insider-creditors.25 4
Three key points emerge from a close reading of these cases. I
suggest first that the parties conceived of the two declared trusts as
what we would today conceive of as corporate subsidiaries, 255 because
each trust was seen as a separate corpus within the company. Second,
the court ignored one trust based upon a failure to observe proper
formalities in its formation, despite a later ratification. Finally, on ap-
peal, the court considered a defendant-proposed alternate remedy:
combine the two trusts with the company in a "kind of average" and
satisfy all creditors from the common pool.25 6 Lord Nottingham re-
marked that such an alternate consolidated solution was "fair" (with-
out excepting the properly formed second trust), but he declined to
adopt it because of the taint of fraud and the failure of the Wood-
mongers to raise the possibility of consolidation earlier.2 5 7
The dog that did not bark in Naylor v. Brown is the absence of
any mention of the fraudulent conveyance remedy (particularly odd
because Lord Nottingham was one of the promoters of the Statute of
Frauds).25 8 Why did Naylor not argue that the initial assignment of
the bond to Sir William Wild resulted in a violation of the Statute of
Elizabeth because it amounted to a fraudulent conveyance? I suggest
that a transaction form consisting of (1) an absolute assignment of the
bond to Sir William, coupled with (2) the grant back to the company
of a residual interest in the trust created by Sir William was not seen
as a transfer of the bond outside the estate of the company. Rather,
252 Brown & Naylor (1676), reprinted in 73 SELDEN SocIETY 419, 419 (1954).
253 Naylor v. Brown, 23 Eng. Rep. at 44.
254 Id. at 45.
255 In three essays, Maitland provides authority for the early connection between the trust
and the corporation. See MAITLAND, The Unincorporate Body, in SELECTED ESSAYS 128 (H.D.
Hazeltine et al. eds., 1936); MAITLAND, Trust and Corporation, in SELECTED ESSAYS, supra, at
141; MAITLAND, Moral Personality and Legal Personality, in SELECTED ESSAYS, supra, at 223.
Maitland stated: "And now let me once more repeat that the connection between Trust and
Corporation is very ancient. It is at least four centuries old. Henry VIII saw it." MAITLAND,
Trust and Corporation, supra, at 214.
256 Brown & Naylor, 73 SELDEN SocIEm at 419.
257 Id.
258 See Introduction to 73 SELDEN SocEm'Y ciii (1954) (noting Lord Nottingham as a pro-
moter of the Statute of Frauds).
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this business structure was seen at the time as analogous to dropping
an asset into a subsidiary company in today's corporate world. This
account explains both why a fraudulent conveyance action was not
brought and why the criticism of the transaction advanced in 1673 had
any currency.
In 1673, the Naylor v. Brown court reasoned that the first trust
failed because the company either (1) had not joined in the authoriza-
tion to create the trust, (2) had not authorized Sir William to create
the trust under company seal, or (3) had not authorized Sir William to
declare the trust by any corporate act.259 This reasoning only makes
sense if the initial assignment of the bond to Sir William, coupled with
the grant of a residual interest in the trust back to the company, failed
to remove the bond from the estate of the company. Significantly, the
1673 court does not remark that the initial assignment to Sir William
was defective; rather, it stated that the "Declaration of the Trust" was
void. 260 If the assignment of the bond to Sir William had resulted in
an absolute assignment outside the estate of the company, then Sir
William needed no approval from the company or its seal to create a
trust for the thirteen creditors or the company. With an absolute as-
signment of the bond, he could have created the first trust under his
own signature. On appeal in 1676, the defendants did not argue this
point.261 Instead, they argued that the company had ratified the first
trust when it approved the second trust because the recitals for the
second trust mentioned the creation of the first trust and its residual
interest. 262 The 1676 court rejected this argument.263
From the above, I conclude that the first trust transaction struc-
ture-an absolute assignment of property, followed by the creation of
a trust, with the residual of the trust remaining in the company-was a
technique designed to keep the bond within the estate of the company
for the express purpose of preventing a fraudulent conveyance chal-
lenge based on the Statute of Elizabeth. Several additional factors
support the conclusion that the trusts remained within the estate of
the company. The first trust included an express assignment of a
residual interest back to the company. The second trust, apparently
259 Naylor v. Brown, 23 Eng. Rep. at 44-45.
260 Id. at 45. Given the reporting standards of the day, any argument based on silence can
only be a probable argument. Arguments stated in court simply might not have been recorded.
In a case such as this, however, in which we have multiple reports and an appeal, the argument
from silence appears much stronger.
261 See Brown & Naylor, 73 SELDEN SOCIETY at 419.
262 Id.
263 Id.
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properly formed, did not contain any language reciting a residual in-
terest in favor of the company.2 64 Yet, the residual interest in the sec-
ond trust did return to the company. Why this difference and result?
I suggest that the creation of the second trust by the company grant
was understood as not effecting an absolute transfer of the residual
interest in the first trust outside the company's estate. No mention
was made of the treatment of the residual interest in the second trust
because of this understanding. Thus, the two trusts in this case,
formed by different procedures, were intended to create asset parti-
tions within the company itself. If the parties conceived of the two
trusts as existing within the estate of the company, it further explains
why the members of the company waited until dissolution to extract
proceeds from the bond.265
A second critical question remains. Why did Lord Nottingham
consider the proposal to consolidate both trusts with the company to
be a "fair" proposal? Certainly, the consolidation of the first trust
with the company might be considered fair given that the proper for-
malities were not observed in its formation. But what could have
made consolidation of the second trust fair? I suggest that the multi-
ple signatures of company members on Naylor's debt would have sus-
tained this result. The court takes care to point out that none of these
member signatures on the debt bound any of the members person-
ally.266 The multiple signatures did, however, create the impression
that the company members nevertheless supported payment of Nay-
lor's debt. Use of a trust, even the properly formed second trust, to
prefer claims of members ran counter to the impression created by the
company.
We might further ask: why did the Woodmongers suggest the con-
solidation remedy and why did Lord Nottingham decline to impose it,
even though it was a "fair" solution? My tentative answer lies in the
sketchy recitals of the relative amounts of the claims that we are given
in the various reports. We are told that Naylor and the other third-
party creditors were owed £1200.267 The first thirteen insider-creditors
were owed £650 by the time of the appeal and the second group of
264 See Naylor v. Brown, 23 Eng. Rep. at 44.
265 I do not place great emphasis on this timing point because, from the version of the case
in Selden's Reports, it appears that the trusts may have been formed just prior to the liquidation
and, indeed, as a device in anticipation of the liquidation. See Brown & Naylor, 73 SELDEN
SOCIETY at 419. This, however, makes the absence of a fraudulent conveyance claim all the
more unusual.
266 Naylor v. Brown, 23 Eng. Rep. at 45.
267 See Brown & Naylor, 73 SELDEN SOCIETY at 419.
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twenty-five creditors were owed £250.268 Thus, we have a ratio of
three insider claims to four outsider claims. With a total fund of ap-
proximately £1000 from the King's bond, 69 a pro rata distribution to
all creditors resulting from a consolidation would yield approximately
£429 to the insider-creditors and £516 to the third-party creditors.
Leaving the original decree in place (which did not attack the second
trust) apportioned £650 to the third-party creditors from the first trust,
£250 to the insider-creditors from the second trust, and, we are told,270
a residual of £135 to the third-party creditors from the second trust.
Based on the distribution percentages, we can see why, as a col-
lective, the Woodmongers suggested the consolidation remedy: con-
solidation enhanced their recovery. Also, we can see why, based on
suspicion of fraud, including, perhaps, inflated debt claims by the in-
siders, the court simply affirmed the 1673 ruling, which was the only
matter really before the court. The court might have liked the idea of
consolidating both trusts with the company (and then subordinating
the insiders), but that issue did not present itself on appeal because
the 1673 case addressed only the first trust.271 Thus, Lord Nottingham
approved the concept of consolidating multiple artificial entities as a
fair remedy, though he declined to impose it in this particular case.
What I take away from the foregoing analysis and the dicta in
Brown & Naylor is that, if consolidation of two internal trusts with a
company had been requested of Lord Nottingham in 1677, the Chan-
cellor would have considered the request as one for an appropriate
equitable remedy. I am not aware of counterexamples to his approval
of consolidation as a remedy. Though the case does not present the
consolidation of two "bankrupts," the facts are tantalizingly close to a
modern substantive consolidation. Importantly, it is the feature of
consolidation itself, more than the nature of trusts, that resonates
here. One might disagree that the trusts were conceived of as sepa-
rate entities. One might further disagree that the trusts were seen as
existing within the company. Nevertheless, the trusts did form a prim-
itive asset partition, however one otherwise conceives of them. The
court remarked favorably upon the proposal to consolidate the asset
partitions, though it declined to do So. 2 7 2 Unlike the facts in Grupo
268 Id.
269 Naylor v. Brown, 23 Eng. Rep. at 44.
270 The amount of the claims reported is slightly inconsistent among the various reports
and, in any event, the precise amounts available for distribution cannot be reconciled without
assuming interest on the King's bond.
271 See Naylor v. Brown, 23 Eng. Rep. at 44-45.
272 Drs. Macnair and Getzler note the early respect given to asset partitioning as a liability
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Mexicano, in which historically a creditor's bill was not requested and
given prior to judgment (the fatal flaw identified by Justice Scalia),273
consolidation of asset partitions, if not distinct legal entities, was con-
sidered appropriate prior to 1789.
Beyond finding a prototype of substantive consolidation ap-
proved prior to the Judiciary Act of 1789, my support for substantive
consolidation as an appropriate remedy also stems from my belief that
business fraud simply assumes new forms based on the existing legal
technology available to miscreants. The same might be said of pat-
terns of business advantage that do not rise to the level of fraud.
Reading Naylor v. Brown and Brown & Naylor reminded me of Asso-
ciated Gas,274 with respect to business fraud in the form of a classic
shell game.275
Associated Gas presented the question of whether the transfer of
assets to a newly formed corporate subsidiary, followed by the incur-
rence of indebtedness by the new subsidiary, violates a negative
pledge covenant that bound the parent/transferor to not create liens
on its assets.276 To circumvent the negative pledge clause, the miscre-
ant simply created a series of structural priorities for new lenders, us-
ing the asset partition created by a new subsidiary, to give the new
lender priority. 277 The structure was clever because one could argue
that technically the procedure did not involve the creation of any lien,
mortgage, or security interest, thus complying with the negative
pledge covenant. The court was unwilling to confirm that this techni-
cal approach avoided a covenant violation.278
shield between investors and business activity in the reluctance of the court in Naylor v. Brown
to hold the members of the Woodmongers personally liable for company debts. Getzler &
Macnair, supra note 244, at 286. Interestingly, in a note to the Finch Reports on Naylor v.
Brown (not reproduced in Elizabeth's Reports), the idea of the company as a liability shield is
traced to civil law. Naylor v. Brown, (1673) Rep. Temp. Finch 83 (Ch.). I understand from Dr.
Getzler that "whether a fund held together by fiduciary law is separate from the entity it serves
and those individuals who contributed to the fund or who have claims against it is a hard-fought
over question in modern English law." E-mail from Joshua Getzler, CUF Univ. Lecturer in
Law, Reader in Legal History, St. Hugh's Coll., Univ. of Oxford, to William Widen, Assoc.
Professor, Univ. of Miami School of Law (Feb. 27, 2006) (on file with author). Dr. Macnair and
Dr. Getzler should not be understood to agree or disagree with my analysis of Brown & Naylor.
273 Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollo, S.A. v. Alliance Bond Fund, Inc., 527 U.S. 308, 319,
330-31 (1999).
274 In re Associated Gas & Elec. Co., 61 F. Supp. 11 (S.D.N.Y. 1944), affd, 149 F.2d 996,
1004 (2d Cir. 1945).
275 Id. at 28-31.
276 Id. at 28-29.
277 Id.
278 Id. at 31.
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Harkening back to Naylor v. Brown, with the precedent of Asso-
ciated Gas in mind, I imagine counsel to the Woodmongers suggesting
two internal trusts to create priority without violating the Statute of
Elizabeth, just as the miscreant in Associated Gas sought to avoid the
negative pledge covenant.
Conclusion
Theoretical work focusing on the corporate form as it exists in-
side corporate groups, particularly in the context of bankruptcy, lags
behind scholarship surveying more general aspects of the corporate
form. To close this gap, this Article argues for a framework that or-
ganizes this particular undertheorized milieu in terms of (1) asset par-
titioning, (2) artificial personality, and (3) asset identification. Using
these tools, we better understand the doctrine of substantive consoli-
dation-a doctrine used to destroy the very asset partitioning function
of the corporate form, which is so important to our general under-
standing of that form outside consolidated group and insolvency con-
texts. This analytical framework fills a desperate need because courts
have settled for articulation of a number of tests, sometimes inconsis-
tent, and a listing of factors that leaves the scope of the substantive
consolidation doctrine uncertain-we are left with vague balancing
tests.
Some courts might feel more comfortable directly appealing to
unbounded notions of equity and fairness to reach what they consider
the just result in certain cases. This general approach, however, leads
to uncertainty, reinforcing an impression that no real standards exist.
To modify a phrase, justice is measured by the length of a particular
judge's foot.279 Concern over unbounded rules fueling courts' expan-
sionist tendencies may explain the Supreme Court's decision in Grupo
Mexicano as an attempt to reign in the discretion afforded lower
courts generally. Further, uncertainty serves the interests of those
creditors who view bankrutpcy as a somewhat lawless contest-a form
of legal roller derby-in which negotiations might occur.
This Article argues for an expanded rationale for the use of sub-
stantive consolidation based on fairness concerns and gives reasons to
deny a lending syndicate the benefit of a structural priority. Though
some might consider this project a liberal one-expanding both
debtor rights against creditors and rights of less powerful creditor clas-
279 I refer to Lord Selden's celebrated remark that the measure of equity is the length of
the Chancellor's foot. Introduction to 73 SELDEN SOCIETY xlii (1954).
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ses against more powerful creditor classes-the project actually
amounts to an inherently conservative one. Bankruptcy courts should
not be able to invoke absolute discretion in the name of fairness and
equity. Rather, they should exercise their powers on a bounded play-
ing field. This can only happen, however, if the rules of the game are
relatively clear.
Existing scholarship identifies principled reasons to believe that
bankruptcy law should not significantly alter the balance of rights be-
tween debtors and creditors established under nonbankruptcy law.28 0
Some have argued that a more expansive bankruptcy law that alters
these rights might lead to expensive and inefficient contests reflecting
the competition between those who favor the nonbankruptcy regime
and those who favor the adjustments in rights made by bankruptcy
law.281 While harmful forum shopping between bankruptcy courts cer-
tainly occurs in some settings,282 there seems to me only a modest op-
portunity to forum shop between a bankrutpcy and a nonbankruptcy
alternative. Nevertheless, basic fairness and market predictability
seem to recommend that differences between bankruptcy and
nonbankruptcy regimes be minimized. The proposals outlined in this
Article are conservative in the sense that these differences are
minimized.
By dividing the corporate form's function into asset partitioning,
artificial personality, and asset identification, it is easier to understand
the different contexts in which the corporate form appears. In subsid-
iary corporations, economic theory predicts that both artificial person-
ality and asset identification will deteriorate. The asset identification
function remains a crucial part of creating asset partitions inside a sub-
sidiary, while the artificial personality function serves no similar role.
Thus, it makes little sense to destroy an asset partition simply because
a subsidiary has ceased to function as an artificial person in a consoli-
dated group. The economic rationale for substantive consolidation
addresses breakdowns in the asset identification function on its own
terms. This analysis has particular relevance to the asset securitization
business.
280 See generally Charles W. Mooney, Jr., A Normative Theory of Bankruptcy Law: Bank-
ruptcy as (Is) Civil Procedure, 61 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 931 (2004) (arguing that bankruptcy law
is a branch of civil procedure and should not create substantive rules that are equally applicable
outside bankruptcy).
281 This position has been forcefully argued by leading bankruptcy scholars. See THOMAS
JACKSON, THE LOGIC AND LIMITS OF BANKRUPTCY LAW 20-24 (1986).
282 See LYNN M. LoPUCKI, COURTING FAILURE 123-35 (2005) (discussing forum
shopping).
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Asset securitization practices reflect a competition between bank-
ruptcy and nonbankruptcy regimes. We might ask why many compa-
nies that establish $PCs engage in seemingly pointless activities, such
as subleasing office space to the SPC, printing separate SPC letter-
head, and procuring a separate SPC telephone line. All these activi-
ties are done to shield against the risk of substantive consolidation
because the law as presently articulated (one might say "muddled")
creates the risk that a simple breakdown in artificial personality may
influence a consolidation decision. Outside bankruptcy, the creditors
can make current collections on securitized assets, such as receivables.
Inside bankruptcy, the automatic stay prevents current collections and
may permit collateral to be substituted. To avoid the bankrutpcy re-
gime, financiers engage in wasteful activities to maintain the fiction of
the artificial person.
Under this Article's analysis, such wasteful activities might be
eliminated. Within corporate groups, we should expect managers to
minimize costs. This often involves promoting identities between par-
ents and subsidiaries that destroy artificial personality. Even though
the expenses of maintaining SPCs-such as subleasing office space,
separate stationary, and extra telephone numbers-are outweighed by
the overall cost savings realized from a securitized financing, waste is
simply waste. Notwithtstanding the degree of articifial personality in
a properly structured securitization, the asset identification function
will almost always -be operating smoothly. Further, such a financing
typically involves public filings to perfect asset transfers and security
interests, alleviating traditional veil piercing concerns over misrepre-
sentation and fraud. When this is the case, the SPC and its investors
should have no fears of substantive consolidation due to lack of robust
artificial personality at the SPC.
Though the reformulated economic rationale goes hand in glove
with evidentiary concerns, the four scenarios of Necessity, Pareto,
Kaldor-Hicks, and Wealth Transfer provide reference points to frame
any inquiry. My suggestion that future courts develop a doctrine al-
lowing recognition of partial consolidation resolves an overlap be-
tween situations of Necessity and Wealth Transfer, but the suggestion
merely amounts to a welcome refinement, rather than a reason to
postpone reformulation of the doctrine as is more generally outlined
in this Article. A fear that creditors may not always make decisions in
their narrow best interests, as limited to the context of a single bank-
ruptcy proceeding, suggests that courts should decide valuation dis-
putes. This conclusion follows reluctantly because, as a general
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matter, government may be less suited to valuation tasks than private
parties. 83 If a court orders substantive consolidation purely for rea-
sons of cost savings on the reasonable belief that the remedy benefits
all creditors, we do not create a pernicious divide between incentives
inside and outside bankruptcy. As a general rule, parties pursue cost
savings and enhanced returns both inside and outside bankruptcy.
Reformulation of the veil piercing rationale directs the doctrine
of substantive consolidation in a similarly conservative manner back
towards its origins by reintroducing the prerequisite of identifying a
wrong to be corrected prior to use of the remedy. The traditional veil
piercing remedy exists both inside and outside of bankruptcy court, so
again the reformulation eliminates a potentially undesirable distinc-
tion. By clearly recognizing two types of harm (i.e., the economic
harm of decreased distributions and the wrong that results from
trouncing a reliance interest), we see how use of the veil piercing
branch of substantive consolidation may remain effective. A general
creditor may not protest against use of the remedy on veil piercing
grounds simply because its use results in a wealth transfer. The court
has the power to correct a wrong despite a purely economic-based
complaint arising from a diminished bankruptcy dividend. In using
substantive consolidation grounded in veil piercing, we require both
that a substantial identity of parent and subsidiary must exist and that
this identity must contribute to the original "wrong" that triggered the
remedy. Breakdowns in either the management function or the asset
identification function may contribute to causing a wrong suitable for
correction in this context. When a court makes the causal connection
between substantial identity and wrong, it may order substantive con-
solidation, subject only to respect for legitimate reliance interests.
This approach coheres with the corporate law notion that a credi-
tor typically has no right to object to a consolidation, merger, or disso-
lution-prebankruptcy analogues to substantive consolidation. Why
should a creditor's rights expand in bankruptcy, creating a hurdle for
courts addressing particular harms, such as fraud, misrepresentation,
or covenant breach? The limit on a court's use of this power to cor-
rect is also clear. The power may not be used under the veil piercing
rationale to cause another wrong, typically destruction of a reliance
283 Cf Walgreen Co. v. Sara Creek Prop. Co., 966 F.2d 273, 275-76 (7th Cir. 1992) (Posner,
J.) (describing calculation of damages and suggesting that prices and costs are more accurately
determined by parties in the market than by government). While markets may generally set
prices more accurately than instruments of government, government determination, such as by a
court, may be preferred when we have reason to believe that a market imperfection may exist.
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interest. This reliance interest should not, however, be understood to
exist simply because a creditor dealt with a particular subsidiary. It
will always be the case that a creditor dealt with a particular member
of a consolidated group. If the creditor did not have a particular con-
tractual expectation of separateness, i.e., an ability to stop a merger,
consolidation, dissolution, or similar event outside of bankruptcy, then
it makes little sense to expand that right within bankruptcy to sustain
an objection to a consolidation procedure.
Finally, the proposed fairness rationale for substantive consolida-
tion is conservative for two reasons: it is grounded in historical prac-
tices and it coheres with accepted marketplace wisdom (at least,
accepted prior to the Third Circuit's decision in Owens Corning).284
Prior to that decision, nobody thought that the presence of intercom-
pany guarantees provided a reason not to consolidate companies. In-
deed, the market believed exactly the opposite. The presence of
guarantees provided an affirmative reason to consolidate-a reason so
strong that no reputable law firm would give a nonconsolidation opin-
ion in the face of such guarantees.
Recall that Professor Landers criticized Judge Posner for allowing
an economic analysis to divert attention from the reality of actual
cases in which he believed benefits flowed from the law mirroring the
reality of a single economic enterprise. The reformulation of substan-
tive consolidation doctrine presented here does not overturn estab-
lished default rules on difficult-to-prove efficiency grounds. Rather, a
substantive consolidation is proper under the fairness rationale when
the entities themselves, by their very action of executing intercom-
pany guarantees (or otherwise designating themselves as multiple-
source creditors within a consolidated group), signal the reality of a
single economic enterprise. 285 The step to consolidate under this ra-
tionale thus rests on specific and historical fairness considerations,
grounded in accommodations between multiple-source creditors and
single-source creditors. I like to think that the market's perception of
284 Further consideration might be given to the reception that my proposed tests would
receive from regulators of financial institutions. Although in particular cases use of my reformu-
lated tests might result in a lower recovery for bank lenders, I do not believe that bank lenders
will systematically be disadvantaged. Indeed, in many cases, the option of substantive consolida-
tion may save costs and benefit all lenders, including banks. The only circumstance in which
bank recoveries will be systematically reduced is in the case of syndicated guarantees. As I have
pointed out, prior to the Third Circuit's decision in Owens Corning, banks viewed the existence
of such guaranties as a reason to consolidate and did not rely on the expectation of enhanced
recoveries in such cases. See supra note 214 and accompanying text.
285 See supra notes 68 and 73 and accompanying text.
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guarantees and their impact on substantive consolidation doctrine
might derive, in some sense, from collective memories of fairness con-
siderations that operated in past times. 286
286 Future consideration should be given to the effect that veil piercing statutes, such as the
joint and several liability of consolidated group members for federal income taxes, should have
on the analysis. Further work remains to be done on the arithmetic of the squeeze-down effect,
including analysis of its operation at varying degrees of insolvency. Computation of the subroga-
tion effects when a guarantee squeeze-down results in full payment to certain creditors might not
be easily computed under current 11 U.S.C. § 509.
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